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Anotace (abstrakt) 
Autor analyzuje prostřednictvím kvantitativních i kvalitativních metod tři dlouhodobé 
konflikty 20. století (studenou válku, izraelsko-arabský konflict a indo-pakistánské soupeření) 
s cílem odpovědi na následující výzkumnou otázku: Způsobuje selhání odstrašení zapříčiněné 
nedostatkem kredibility v jedné krizové situaci zvýšení pravděpodobnosti opětovného selhání 
odstrašení v krizi následující?“  
Abstract 
Author analyses three protracted conflicts of the 20th century (Cold War, Israeli-Arab 
Conflict and Indo-Pakistani Rivalry) in both qualitative and quantitative manner in order to 
find out an answer for the following research question: “Does a deterrence failure caused by a 
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Recently there has been renewed interest in deterrence theory in its various forms. In the 90s, 
the main realm of deterrence was aimed primarily on rogue states represented by North 
Korea´s nuclear saber-rattling and possible Islamic republic of Iran´s struggle to acquire 
nuclear weapons (Hynek, 2010, 443). The Ukraine Crisis, China´s rampage in the South-East 
Asia or enduring Indo-Pakistani rivalry indicate that deterrence of rogue states probably won´t 
become deterrence theory´s sole puzzle to address in years to come. Consequently, with the 
dramatic shift towards multipolar world, unlike in the 90s, general theory of deterrence 
deserves further examination.  
Deterrence, in general, is a use of threat which discourages others from attacking. It can be 
described as a strategy which main purpose is to maintain status quo between two hostile 
entities. Deterred country which has an incentive in attacking is discouraged from doing so by 
a threat of punishment/denial that outweighs all possible gains.  
Glenn Snyder, famous American professor of political science, defines deterrence as a 
negative aspect of power. While wielding power means the same as having the capacity to 
induce others to do the things, which they would not otherwise do or refrain from doing, 
deterrence is just the negative aspect of the same thing. (Snyder, 1966) Patrick Morgan says 
“deterrence is the use of threats of harm to prevent someone from doing something you don´t 
want him to do.” (Morgan, 1977,17) Zeev Moaz, in addition, defines deterrence as “policy 
through which one attempts to scare-off a would-be attacker by holding out a drawn sword. It 
works as long as the sword is not being used. When the sword becomes covered with blood, 
deterrence is said to have failed, no matter whose blood was spilled.“ (Moaz, 1990, 65) 
Deterrence in general operates with two kinds of requirements, capability and credibility. In 
order for deterrence relationship to be stable, potential attacker has to be either convinced that 
the defender has enough power or military assets to prevent him from achieving swift and 
easy victory, or it has to believe that its adversary has enough retaliatory capability to 
minimize attacker’s potential gains by inflicting unacceptable damage. Concerning the 
question of credibility, defender must also prove his willingness to execute his threats. 
Analysis of two different schools of thoughts subsequently emerged from this concern with 
threat credibility: 
1) Commitment Theory 
2) Theory of Inherent Credibility 
Commitment theory was defined by Thomas Schelling in 1960s, who believed both 
commitments and events are horizontally coupled, implying that a failure to react even to a 
single regional challenge could undermine others´ belief in defender´s willingness to act in 
other areas as well. Schelling in fact explained the rationale behind the US Doctrine of 
Containment. Schelling´s theory second dimension concerns the issue of past behavior and the 
consistency of strong resolve over time. Under this logic, should deterrence be maintained, 
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deterring country should communicate its commitment through threats and the entire range of 
techniques signaling strong resolve regardless of the involved inherent stakes. (Danilovic, 
2010) 
Inherent Credibility, stressed the importance of issues at stake and the subjectivity of 
perception. Pioneers of this approach such as Kaufmann or Maxwell raised the valid question 
of one´s willingness to engage in a nuclear war should relatively unimportant pawn/ally be 
attacked by a hostile power (Danilovic, 2010). George and Smoke therefore pointed out: “that 
the task of achieving credibility is secondary to and dependent upon the more fundamental 
question regarding the nature and valuation of interests.” (Danilovic, 2010, 18) Therefore, the 
problem with Commitment Theory is the following; Deterring country might not be able to 
effectively signal its commitment to the deterred who might eventually interpret threat signals 
as bluffing. Hence, the approach of great powers might be rather context-dependent. This 
resulted in an assumption that honoring commitments plays a secondary role in great powers 
behavior. 
Methodology 
This paper aims to analyze possible connection between deterrence and credibility through 
empirical analysis of three different but long-lasting conflicts in the 20th century. Primary 
purpose of this research paper is to answer the following question: 
“Does deterrence failure caused by a lack of credibility influence future behavior?” 
This research question might prove itself extremely valuable in the light of recent conflicts 
especially due to its emphasis of credibility. If the answer on the former research question is 
yes, then potential attacker can be clearly deterred if convinced the defender would react at all 
costs. For instance Israel can deter its adversaries by regular preventive use of force, and 
Russia´s and China´s potential expansion can be stopped by early decisive US response.  
The notion of credibility is difficult to grasp mainly due to its subjectivity. Therefore, author 
assumes that terms of credibility and capability are intertwined and are both related to 
deterrence failure. This rationale is described in capability-credibility matrix below: 
  Credibility 
Capability 
0;1 (Deterrence failure) 1;1 (Deterrence success) 
0;0 (Deterrence failure) 1;0 (Deterrence failure) 
Each deterrence failure will be gauged with the respect to capability-credibility matrix. 
Author assumes there was no credibility each time a particular country failed to deter its 
opponent even though the capacity to do so. 
In order to answer the research question, the author analyses the relationship between 
credibility and deterrence using case studies of three famous conflicts. Three independent 
examples of complex deterrence relationship between two hostile entities are the following: 
 
 (1946 – 1986) Cold War 
 (1948 - ) Arab-Israeli conflict 
 (1947 - ) Indo-Pakistani rivalry  
Each of the conflicts above provide valuable data for the critical analysis of deterrence theory. 
All of the rivalries lasted almost over half a century and all of them spiraled either into direct 
military confrontation or proxy wars. In addition, every subject consists of both conventional 
and nuclear level of deterrence.  
Each standoff between two adversaries will be analyzed with the use of qualitative methods 
with the special emphasis on credibility. Main task will be to conduct qualitative analysis of 
decision making processes through the study of relevant historical literature in order to find 
out how interaction in a particular crisis influenced future events. Deterrence relationship at 
the time of every crisis will be marked as either success or failure. Based on presumptions of 
this paper defined in capability-credibility matrix, every failure of deterrence was caused by 
lack of capability or credibility. Therefore, military strength of each side will be compared 
with an aim to find out what was the reason behind deterrence failure in each crisis. If a 
country has enough military capability at its disposal but fails to deter its adversary, it 
obviously lacked credibility. 
Upon detailed qualitative analysis of every selected crisis, statistical methods will be used in 
an attempt to find a correlation, if there is any, among various military-political crises. Every 
conflict will be analyzed with the use of time series. For each conflict, a two dimensions chart 
will be constructed. Author will measure intervals between crises and their intensity with an 
aim to find a relationship between them with the respect to credibility and deterrence 
success/failure. Quantitative methods as described above will help to trace a possible link 
between results of various crises.  
It is quite possible that deterrence between to powers is reset once a head of state is replaced, 
thus it might be linked to a particular person which represents the country at the moment. 
Hence emphasis will be put on changes of deterrence caused by rotation of both countries 
leaders. Each time series will also include changes of political leadership. Under this logic, 
every newly elected head of state needs to reassure its foreign counterparts of his intentions.  
Thesis Outline 
This research paper will be divided into four main parts.  
First part of the paper will be devoted to theoretical background of the paper. It will 
concentrate on credibility and its relation to previous behavior of a particular actor with an 
aim to trace evolution of its interpretation throughout the second half of the 20th century.  
In the second part, the period of Cold War will be analyzed. Author will concentrate on 
various crises of the US-USSR competition in the 20th century with an aim to gauge 
frequency of each crisis and its intensity. Author emphasizes especially comparison of relative 
military strength between each pair of hostile actors. 1948 Berlin Crisis, 1962 Berlin Crisis, 
Cuban Missile Crisis, Korean War, Vietnam War and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan will be 
main subjects of deterrence analysis. A study by B. Russet “The Calculus of Deterrence” will 
be used in order to analyze pre-1962 crises. (Russet, 1963). Additional information will be 
taken from book by George and Smoke “Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and 
Practice”. (George, Smoke, 1974) This paper´s Cold War part will also reflect the credibility 
of various US presidents and Soviet General Secretaries of the USSR´s communist party.  
The third part of this paper will be devoted to infamous Israeli-Arab rivalry which escalated 
into war quite a few times since 1948. Conflicts of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and other Israeli 
military campaigns will be researched. Special emphasis is put on the events of 1956 Sinai 
War and 1967 Six-Days wars, which serve as a basis for the research of deterrence and its 
eventual failure. Primary source of interpretation of Arab-Israeli conflict will provide books 
by Bickerton and Klausner “A History of Arab-Israeli Conflict”. (Bickerton, Klausner, 2010) 
Credibility status examination will be based on “A never-ending conflict a guide to Israeli 
military history” by Mordechai Bar On. (Bar on, 2004) 
In addition, Israeli air strikes on Iraq and Syria serve as an empirical evidence for how can 
Israel conventionally deter its adversaries from obtaining nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the 
author’s main motivation is to critically examine the existence of general belief that every 
military actions is caused means failure of deterrence. Author´s is going to confront this 
paradigm with theory of cumulative deterrence by Israeli scholar Doron Almog presented in 
his article “Cumulative Deterrence and War on Terrorism”. (Almog, 2005) Author tests 
Almog´s hypothesis which claims that Israeli offensive campaigns reduce the likelihood of 
potential Arab attack due to gradual erosion of Arab military power and Israeli decisiveness 
which leads to increase of its credibility.  
Indo-Pakistani conflicts will be analyzed in paper´s fourth part due to its very specific nature.  
Wars of 1947-1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 will provide a background for deterrence´s analysis. 
Author will compare relative military power both sides of the conflict and their behavior in 
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“Deterrence is making a comeback” as the Head of NATO´s energy security section Michael 
Ruhle put it. (Ruhle, 2015, 2) A great deal of this revived interest centers on the linked 
problems of nuclear proliferation and the provision of regional security guarantees, the 
nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran being of particular concern in this regard. (Stone, 
2012, 301) Perceived by many as a mere relic of the Cold War, the Russia-Ukraine crisis has 
hastened deterrence´s resurrection on both academic and decision-making levels. (Ruhle, 
2015, 2) 
Although apparently uncoordinated, both 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize Winners for Economics 
– Robert Aumann and Thomas Schelling – chose the occasion of their Nobel lectures to 
address the continued relevance of deterrence in an international order concerned with the 
global spillover of conflicts stemming from failed states, rogue nations, regional conflict, and 
terrorism (Arce, 2009, 385) 
‘Negative’ reasons can also be identified for this revived interest in deterrence. For one thing, 
the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have proved costly in terms of blood, treasure and 
international reputation. There is also the uncomfortable fact that the West is presently facing 
economic difficulties that are certain to constrain its capacity for future military action, while 
sharpening its sensitivity to the costs associated with whatever efforts it nevertheless feels 
bound to make. In this context deterrence appears attractive because, in principle at least, it 
offers a middle way between the risks associated with inaction in the face of an emerging 
threat, and the risks associated with attempting to snuff out such threats by dint of some 
(hopefully) definitive act of force. (Stone, 2012, 108) 
All in all, the events of 2016 indicate that international relations are about two enter a new 
age, in which deterrence will matter once again. Presidency of Donald J. Trump and possible 
US isolationism, Russia´s increasing capability to project its power overseas, China´s 
territorial ambitions in the South China Sea and the surprising rise of Islamic State suggest 
that the world is getting increasingly multipolar. Deterrence, presumably, will thus play 
essential role in the 21st century.  
This paper is focused on deterrence and its relationship to credibility, two important concepts 
which are according to most scholars deeply intertwined. It aims to answer the following 
research question: “Does a deterrence failure caused by a lack of credibility increase the 
likelihood of general deterrence failure in the next crisis?” 
To answer the research question above, author analyzes two different approaches which laid 
down the framework to study deterrence-credibility relationship: 
 Commitment Theory 
 Theory of Inherent Credibility 
Commitment Theory assumes that credibility failure in one crisis will most likely result in 
another crisis. In contrast to that Theory of Inherent Credibility assumes that country behavior 
is independent of previous interactions since leadership evaluates the present situation rather 
than opponents past behavior. While Commitment Theory approach is quantitative in nature, 
Theory of Inherent Credibility relies mainly on qualitative analysis. This paper will synthesize 
approach of both theories by putting emphasis on both qualitative and quantitative analyses.
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Credibility is not an independent variable, it can be hardly achieved without the presence of 
physical assets that would have supported it in the eyes of potential attacker. Apparently, 
military capability is the backbone of every deterrence related political move, should it be 
considered credible.  
To anchor this concept in paper´s methodology, author assumes that terms of credibility and 
capability are intertwined and are both related to deterrence failure which are clearly 
differentiated by the use of force. This rationale is described in capability-credibility matrix 
below: 
  Credibility 
Capability 
0;1 (Deterrence failure) 1;1 (Deterrence success) 
0;0 (Deterrence failure) 1;0 (Deterrence failure) 
 
Each deterrence failure will be gauged with the respect to capability-credibility matrix. 
Author assumes there was no credibility each time a certain country failed to deter its 
opponent even though the capacity to do so. Should deterrence succeed, the deterring country 
must have both capability and credibility. 
Expanded view of deterrence outcomes reveals, for instance, that there can be two forms of 
deterrence failure, one violent (war) and the other peaceful (defender's acquiescence). Clearly, 
these and other subtleties, such as the possibility of compromise as a midpoint between 
success and failure, are obscured in a simple dichotomized approach to deterrence outcomes.  
Three major conflicts of the 20th century will provide empirical data necessary for the 
research. Cold War, Arab-Israeli Conflict and Indo-Pakistani rivalry were chosen as three 
enduring rivalries to be analyzed in both qualitative and quantitative way. All these conflicts 
are data rich enough to conduct a thorough analysis, comprise of repeated interactions and 
offer sufficient time span. 
As main data source for the purpose of this research, three relevant databases were identified: 
 International Crisis Behavior Dataset by Duke University 
 Correlates of War by University of Michigan 
 Uppsala Conflict Data Program by University of Uppsala 
While all these datasets contain very similar units of observations such as conflict duration, 
balance of power or, the level related to country decision makers is missing. None of the 
datasets above contains a variable that would entail head of states term length; this unit of 
analysis is completely missing. To examine the validity and relevance of Theory of Inherent 
Credibility, the availability of these data might be essential. 
It is likely that deterrence between to powers is reset once a head of state is replaced, thus it 
might be linked to a particular person which represents the country at the moment. Hence 
emphasis will be put on changes of deterrence caused by rotation of both countries leaders. 
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Each time series will also include changes of political leadership. Under this logic, every 
newly elected head of state needs to reassure its foreign counterparts of his intentions.  
Every conflict examined in this period will be analyzed from 1945 until 2001, since the events 
of 9/11 in 2001 brought a paradigm shift in the dynamics of all the protracted conflicts 
researched in this paper. Special emphasis will be put on relationship of deterrence 
success/failure in every crisis with respect to actual balance of power and head of states´ term 
length from both defender´s and challenger´s standpoints. 
In order to find an answer for such a challenging research question, logistic regression will be 
conducted and then confronted with the qualitative findings to analyze the selected topic from 
perspective of both Commitment & Inherent Credibility theories. 
2. Deterrence, Credibility & Capability – Definitions & 
Relationship 
2.1 Deterrence Failure and Deterrence Success 
Deterrence, in general, is a use of threat which discourages others from attacking. It can be 
described as a strategy which main purpose is to maintain status quo between two hostile 
entities. Deterred country which has an incentive in attacking is discouraged from doing so by 
a threat of punishment/denial that outweighs all possible gains.  
According to Huth, deterrence is a policy that seeks to persuade an adversary, through the 
threat of military retaliation, that the costs of using military force will outweigh the benefits.” 
(Huth and Gelpi, 1993, 607) Glenn Snyder, on the other hand, defines deterrence as a negative 
aspect of power. While wielding power means the same as having the capacity to induce 
others to do the things, which they would not otherwise do or refrain from doing, deterrence is 
just the negative aspect of the same thing. (Snyder, 1960, 163) Patrick Morgan simplified 
Snyder´s perception of deterrence by claiming “deterrence is the use of threats of harm to 
prevent someone from doing something you don´t want him to do.” (Morgan, 1997, 17)  
Zeev Moaz, enriches deterrence definition by adding an important point related to question of 
its failure. According to Moaz, deterrence is a “policy through which one attempts to scare-off 
a would-be attacker by holding out a drawn sword. It works as long as the sword is not being 
used. When the sword becomes covered with blood, deterrence is said to have failed, no 
matter whose blood was spilled. (Moaz, 2009, 65) Maoz´s claim, however, is controversial 
since scholars are divided over how to approach deterrence success or failure. According to 
some, deterrence failed if the threatener had to use force while the others consider deterrence 
to fail if the threatener either had to use substantial force or did not attain his policy goals.  
Some authors support this approach by disregarding the importance of temporary deterrence 
failurers Kilgour and Zagare put the importance of small conflicts aside by claiming the 
following: “Strategic deterrence has been the rule and small deterrence failures are exception” 
(Kilgour and Zagare, 1991, 326) Others perceive minor deterrence failures and short-term 
military campaigns as a necessary conditions to stable long-term deterrence. 
Doron Almog, for instance claims that deterrence should be built on victories achieved over 
the short, medium, and long terms that gradually wear down the enemy which implies that a 
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set of deterrence failures over a short run leads to a stable deterrence over the long run. 
(Almog, 2004, 6) The policy of preventive strike under Almog´s logic connects a series of act 
of force to create and maintain deterrence over a long period of time. This concept, however, 
is not applicable to a situation in which both adversaries possess nuclear weapons, since any 
kind of direct confrontation can result in a nuclear holocaust. 
Deterrence may fail for many reasons and not necessarily for those related to the effectiveness 
of the deterrent threats. It may fail because of inadequate threat, but it may also fail despise 
threats, because it may be that some other factors have a stronger impact on the attacker´s 
decision than the deterrer´s behavior. Hence, the definition of what constitutes deterrence 
failure should be treated separately from the question of what caused this failure. (Danilovic, 
2010, 50) 
What is the precise relationship between deterrence and the intrinsic issues of a crisis, the 
costs associated with the outright conflict and the value of the status quo? In the context of 
military conflict, deterrence succeeds if the potential challenger believes that the 
consequences of attack will be sufficiently costly to outweigh the gains to be had from an 
attack. The defender may be the target herself (direct deterrence) or it may be another state 
(extended deterrence). States develop policies that will enhance both general deterrence (that 
is, the prevention of demands for change to the status quo at all) and immediate deterrence 
(the ability to encourage a challenger who has made a demand to back down). (Johnson, 2012, 
311) 
In general, theories have focused on two requirements for deterrence success. First, the 
defender must have the capability to impose high costs on the potential challenger. In other 
words, the challenger must believe that if he has to find defender, the expected outcome be 
less desirable than status quo. Deterrence success therefore can be defined as a “situation in 
which state´s leaders want to resort to force, prepare to do so, but ultimately decide to refrain 
because of the military capability and demonstrated resolve of their adversary. (Huth and 
Russet, 1984, 497)  Second, the defender´s threat must be credible. The potential challenger 
must believe that the defender will have incentive to bear the costs of fighting and thus 
impose the threatened costs on the potential challenger. While there is very strong agreement 
that deterrence can only succeed when threats are capable and credible, there is less 
agreements about what constitutes a capable and credible deterrent threat. 
All in all, it also has to be noted that a relationship between deterrence failure and credibility 
or threat communication does not necessarily have to be causal since there are many cases 
which prove otherwise.  
2.2 Credibility (Resolve) & Communication 
Lawrence Freedman once labelled credibility “a magic ingredient” of deterrence. (Kilgour 
and Zagare, 1991, 205) There one should ask the following question: What role does 
credibility play in the strategic equation? How credible must a threat be in order to deter an 
opponent?  
In the strategic literature, credibility has usually been taken to be synonymous with 
believability; conversely, threats that are not believed are seen as incredible – as was the 
Eisenhower administration´s threat to inflict nuclear devastation on Soviet Union for 
relatively minor transgression of status quo. (Kilgour, 2000, 306) Once the Soviet Union 
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developed survivable nuclear capabilities that could reach a US homeland, many defense 
officials and analysts argued that the threat of Massive Retaliation lacked credibility against 
anything than an all-out Soviet nuclear attack. (Gerson, 2009, 34)  
Credibility was also notably defined by the French nuclear strategist Pierre Gallois as the 
‘product of two factors one of which, purely technical, represents the operational value of the 
military means of retaliation and the other, subjective, expresses the will of the menaced 
nation to use force...’. In order to make a credible threat, in other words, one must be 
technically capable of carrying it out, and willing to do so despite any costs that are likely to 
accrue as a result. Gallois treated credibility as a product (rather than the sum) of these two 
components in order to highlight the point that a significant failure in either area will likely 
have fatal repercussions for the whole enterprise. (Gallois, 1960, 152) As Gallois pointed out, 
there is delicate balance between and interrelationship between deterrence and credibility 
since without credibility mutual deterrence cannot be established.  
Herman Kahn, another great scholar defined credibility in the following way: “Credibility 
depends on being willing to accept the other side’s retaliatory blow. . . it depends on the harm 
he can do, not on the harm we can do.” (Kahn, 2007, 32) 
The issue of credibility appears to be essential regarding general deterrence theory as both 
concepts are intertwined. One important point it omits, however, is the vital role played by 
communication in efforts to deter a potential adversary. After all, a robust technical capacity 
for action, combined with a steely determination to use it should the need arise, will avail us 
nothing unless the existence of both is effectively communicated to those whom we wish to 
deter. To be sure, a degree of ambiguity about exactly how we will respond, and in the face of 
exactly what transgressions, may be tolerable. Indeed, it may even be advantageous to the 
extent that it complicates an adversary’s cost-benefit calculations. But at a minimum, we need 
to communicate the fact that we can, and will, respond forcefully in the face of aggression. 
(Stone, 2012, 110) Communication, therefore, is necessary but not sufficient condition of 
deterrence. To solve the credibility problem (to make look irrational threats rational), 
attention centered on the techniques of signaling intentions.  
Deterrence threats can be signaled both verbally and behaviorally, the range of such moves 
includes: 
 Threat of force (the threat to blockade, occupy territory, declare war or use force) 
 Display of force (alert, mobilization, show of force) 
 The use of force (blockade, occupation, seizure, limited use of force, war) (Danilovic, 
2002, 59) 
Should communication or signaling of a commitment fail, deterrence relationship will 
eventually follow its fate as it did in 1950. In his speech before National Press Club, the 51st 
US secretary of state Dean Acheson forgot to mention South Korea as a part of essential US 
defense perimeter in South-East Asia which eventually made Soviets to presume that the 
Americans most likely won´t interfere in case North Korea attacks the South. 
The traditional view of necessary conditions for successful deterrence is that a potential 
attacker must perceive the deterrer´s threats as sufficiently capable and credible for retaliation. 
Simply put, the potential attacker needs to be convinced that the deterrer can and will execute 
its threats if the attack occurs. Although major powers can achieve and often do have the 
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capability necessary for effective threats, their core problem is conveying their willingness to 
execute threats. (Danilovic, 333) While certainly most states are prepared to defend 
themselves against threats to their existence, even in direct deterrence, potential challengers 
may doubt the willingness of their targets to fight over issues that may not be very important 
to them. Thus, weak potential challengers may not be deterred if the potential challenger 
believes that the stakes of the conflict are much more important to the challengers than to the 
target. (Johnson, 2012, 312) Therefore, history is full of cases in which relatively weaker 
player decided to attack its superior opponent.  
The sets of assumptions above support an important connection credibility and rationality 
which is found in the strategic literature of deterrence but also in game-theoretic literature, 
where the credibility of threats is usually take to be synonymous with subgame perfectness of 
Nash equilibria (with equilibria consistent with rational choices on all possible paths of the 
game tree). (Kilgour and Zagare, 1991, 307) Under this logic, one may form the following 
thesis: Credible threats are threats that are believed; threats can be believed exactly when they 
are rational to be carried out; thus only rational threats are credible. Should such a statement 
be true the defender has to possess enough capabilities and be determined enough to execute 
the threat. 
Credibility, therefore, is a function of both defender´s relative military capability and his 
perceived resolve to use military force. It should be high when: 
A) Defender possess substantial military capability to impose substantial costs to deny 
attacker a swift victory 
B) The potential attacker is persuaded about the defender´s will to use its capability when 
necessary 
2.3 Capability & Rationality Issue 
Capability apparently is the essential component of the deterrence matrix and, since 
defender´s commitment is unlikely to be believed if his military situation is markedly inferior 
to his enemy´s. (Russet, 1983, 107) When the local balance favors the adversary, deterrence is 
more likely to fail because the regime will calculate that it can achieve a rapid success. When 
the local balance favors the defender, deterrence is more likely to succeed. (Gerson, 2009, 38) 
The absence of sufficient capability can therefore lead to deterrence failure. 
Yet even clear military superiority provides no guarantee one´s antagonist will be dissuaded 
from attack. History abounds with examples of deterrence failing despite a balance of forces, 
and even cases in which the weaker side attacked the stronger. At least some of these attacks 
have occurred even when by any rational calculus such attacks would probably lead to a 
defeat or even annihilation. (Wolf, 1991, 5) 
In some cases, the weaker side banked on the element of surprise. The military leadership of 
Imperial Japan, for example, was fully aware of US military superiority. But if a surprise 
attack on the Pearl Harbor naval base would destroy a major part of the US Pacific Fleet while 
paralyzing Washington politically, Japan might stand a chance of prevailing. (Ruhle, 2015, 1) 
When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, they were in a position they perceived as desperate. 
The United States and its allies had frozen Japan´s assets and embargoed oil shipments to that 
country. At the same time, the United States was making demands that the Japanese 
leadership believed would lead to the loss of all of their gains in China. The leadership came 
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to believe that either war or what amounted to national suicide were the only choices and that 
Japan´s position would only get worse with the passing of time. Under such circumstances, 
Japanese resorted to wishful thinking that the US would not choose to wage a prolonged war 
against Japan. (Wolf, 1991, 7) 
In 1973 Syria and Egypt attacked the militarily superior Israel – not because they hoped to 
win, but because they wanted to re-establish the political clout they had lost after Israel had 
defeated them in the 1967 Six-Day-War. Israel had not seen the attack coming: why would 
two militarily inferior countries even think of attacking an opponent that was certain to 
emerge victorious? This self-assuredness led Israel to ignore the many warning signals about 
a pending attack. As a result, the rapidly advancing armies of Egypt and Syria were initially 
much more successful than expected. Military superiority had not ensured deterrence. 
This is a clear lesson from at least the 1973 Yom Kippur War. As Henry Kissinger later 
recognized, “Our definition of rationality did not take seriously the notion of Egypt and Syria 
starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect.”(Delpech, 2012, 88) Actually, in Anwar 
Sadat’s calculation, restoring Egyptian self-respect had a very high value, and this perception 
was correct, particularly if he had in mind a future peace treaty with Israel. On the Israeli side, 
the idea that Egypt would start a war to restore self-respect without a respectable air force 
made no sense. This is a good example of dangerous misperceptions leading to war. As 
strategic thinkers, have acknowledged since antiquity, in matters of war and peace, passions 
are at least as powerful as reason and calculation. (Delpech, 2012, 88) Some attacks might be 
attributed either to reasons beyond rationality or to different perception of what is rational at 
the moment. 
Numerous historical cases exist of regimes whose crisis decision making and behaviors 
strayed well beyond the bounds of rationality assumed by those offering precise, convenient, 
and comforting claims that deterrence will function predictably. Prime examples of military 
crises perceived as irrational from defender´s perspective include: 
• Napoleon, one of the most impressive generals in history, decision to stay in Moscow in 
1812 losing precious time which lead him and his army to disaster 
• Hitler in his bunker in 1945 willfully contributing to the destruction of Germany; 
• Mao Zedong in 1958 ordering the shelling of Quemoy Island for the purpose of eliciting US 
nuclear threats; 
• Cuba’s leaders in 1962 demanding that their Soviet patrons launch a nuclear war against the 
United States; 
• Nikita Khrushchev in 1962 moving missiles to Cuba with the comment, “They can attack us 
and we shall respond. This may end in a big war” 
• Arab state leaders in 1973 launching a massive armored attack on Israel, a putative nuclear 
power; 
• Saddam Hussein in 1991 raining missile attacks on Israel, even reportedly against the 
Dimona nuclear reactor, in the hope of provoking war with Israel with an aim to break the 




All of these infamous crises fall into one of the following categories: 
1) High motivation (May be due in whole or part to a strong commitment to particular 
values, a psychopathological leader or a rogue state mentality 
2) Misperception (A) perceived a vulnerability which did not exist, (B) expected no 
retaliation from the strong state (C) Believed allies would come to its aid 
3) Military vulnerability of the stronger state. Such vulnerability may occur in the context 
of large-scale or low-intensity conflict  (Wolf, 1991, 7) 
All of these elements in fact compose and important pillar of deterrence – uncertainty. The 
question is whether uncertainty strengthens or weakens deterrence. This was hotly debated 
during the Cold War. The principle behind ambiguity is that deterrence works best if the 
adversary is confounded by uncertainties in enemy response, which frustrate attack and 
contingency planning. Thomas Schelling thought uncertainty did in essence strengthen 
deterrence: The idea is that an adversary uncertain about how their enemy might respond to a 
certain action will think twice about taking that action whereas Herman Kahn believed quite 
the opposite. According to the latter, deterrence works best when opponent fully understands 
the unavoidable consequences of an attack. This discussion has so far did not come to a 
conclusion and scholars still vary on ambiguity´s role in deterrence. 
2.4 The Literature on Deterrence & Credibility 
Robert Jervis raised a crucial question which wraps up the main focus of this paper´s part in a 
single sentence: “How do past events influence current perceptions?” (Jervis, 1973, 217) 
According to Jervis, history is a primary source of imaginable situations which allows one to 
detect patterns and causal links. Political leaders therefore tend to find historical analogies for 
contemporary events such as military conflicts. 
Robert Jervis analyzed the way decision makers learn from the internationally impactful 
events they went through in the past by conceptualizing the following matrix: events -> 
lessons -> future behavior. He concluded that recent international history is a powerful source 
of beliefs about international relations and images of other countries. Jervis identifies several 
sources which shape country official´s perception of reality: 
1) Firsthand experiences 
2) Generational effects 
3) Revolutions 
4) The Last War 
All of these four points not only shape prism through a person observes the world, but also 
distort perception in the fashion similar to self-fulfilling prophecy. While these events 
certainly contain valuable information, the learning process is beset with three linked flaws 
that seriously affect the quality of decision-making process. First, there is often a little reason 
why those events provide analogies should in fact be the best guides to the future. Why should 
the last war, rather than earlier ones, most closely resemble the contemporary situation? 
Second, because outcomes are learned without careful attention to details of causation, 
lessons are superficial and overgeneralized. Analogies are applied to a wide range of events 
with little sensitivity to variations in the situation. Third, decision-makers do not examine 
variety of analogies before selection the one that they believe sheds most light on their 
situation. Instead, they see the present as like recent and dramatic events without carefully 
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considering alternative models of this way of perceiving, thereby they fail to fully apply their 
intelligence to the most important questions they face. (Jervis, 1979, 282) 
During the second half of the 20th century many studies were published concerning deterrence 
and the way it was influenced by the previous interactions between challenger and defender. 
Throughout decades, two main streams of theories have been formulated. 
One of the first theories to understand credibility as a function of previous interdependent 
interactions was defined on the beginning of the 60s as Commitment theory. In his seminal 
study The Strategy of Conflict (1960), Schelling essentially argued that the problem of 
nuclear threat credibility should be solved through refinements of signaling techniques that 
manipulate the levels of risk. One of the major concerns for maintaining a reputation for 
strong resolve comes from the understanding that commitments and events are seen as 
interdependent (Schelling 1966, 55-59). In this view, the interdependence of events takes two 
forms. First, commitments and events are considered to be horizontally (spatially) "coupled," 
implying that a failure to react to challenges in one region would diminish others' perceptions 
of one's resolve to honor its commitments in other areas as well. Domino theory that guided 
the Cold War containment policy was premised on this understanding of international events 
as spatially interdependent. (Danilovic, 2001, 344) The same line of reasoning gave a birth to 
Truman´s Doctrine of Containment. Under this logic, a failure to firmly respond to 
adversary´s challenge will seriously undermine defender´s credibility in future standoff.  
Commitment theory entails the following crucial point related to this research paper: 
A) The defender's resolve in its past deterrence encounters is likely to affect the outcome 
of its current deterrence encounters. The more resolute the defenders past behavior, 
the more likely the other side will acquiesce to the defender's current threats.  
Apart from this, another important point is related to its link to credibility.  The defender's less 
costly threats ("cheap talk") are more likely to result in deterrence failure than threats issued 
as "costly signals." Number of strategic thinkers observed that during the cold war, the United 
States was indeed greatly concerned with its reputation for fulfilling its commitments. 
According to several historical analyses, this concern was found to be so strong that it was 
often given primacy regardless of the specific contextual issue involved in the crisis (George 
and Smoke 1974, 253).  
Somewhat paradoxically to conventional wisdom, it is interesting that the same studies did 
not find other major players following a similar logic, not even the Soviet Union or an ally 
such as France. The approach of other major powers to deterrence appeared to be rather 
context dependent, fitting more the idea of what was inherently at stake in particular 
situations. The concern with honoring commitments, irrespective of the particular context, 
seemed to play only a secondary role in their behavior. (Danilovic, 2001, 346) 
In 1963, Yale University professor Bruce Russet published a study which analysis empirical 
data of seventeen crises/conflicts from 1935 to 1961. Focused mainly on patron-client 
relationship, Russet toys with the idea that credibility of deterrence depends upon economic, 
political and military interdependence of pawn and defender. (Russet, 1963, 203) Where 
visible ties of commerce, past or present political integration, or military cooperation exist, an 
attacker will be much more likely to bow before the defender´s threats – or if he does not 
bow, he will very probably find himself at war with the defender. This conclusion which is in 
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line with common sense is refuted by the author who claims “deterrence does not depend in 
any simple way merely upon the public declaration of solemn oath nor merely on the physical 
means to fight a war either limited or general. A defender´s decision whether to pursue a firm 
policy that risks war will depend upon his calculation of the value and probability of various 
outcomes. If he is to be firm the prospective gains from a successful policy of firmness must 
be greater, when weighted by the probability of success and discounted by the cost and 
probability of war, than losses from retreat.” (Russet, 1963, 106) 
Deterrence as a result of previous interactions between two rivals is a common and precarious 
element of great power relationships, but it was not directly addressed in the literature until 
70s. In particular, a series of works by Huth and Russet laid the grounds for quantitative 
research in this area by analyzing major conflicts in 19th and 20th centuries. 
Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, the first scholars to offer a definition of long-term, regional 
conflict, measured the volume of conflict using statistical methods. In their study, Huth and 
Russett adopted Patrick Morgan’s basic conceptualization of deterrence, which has two 
components: general deterrence and immediate deterrence. General deterrence characterizes 
relations between states that view each other’s motives with suspicion and hostility over an 
extended period of time. (Morgan, 1997, 153) Authors laid out an expected-utility model of 
deterrence and tested it on a set of cases from the period of 1900 to 1980. They concluded 
deterrence success was most often associated with close economic and political-military ties 
between defender and protégé. Local military superiority for the defender and its protégé 
helped bolster deterrence, but a military alliance was associated with deterrence failure. Only 
a marginal contribution was made by the possession of nuclear weapons. Other elements of 
national power and history of the defender´s earlier deterrence behavior played no significant 
role. Existence of formal military alliance did not play positive role, and, if not backed up by 
more tangible ties, actually worked against the success of deterrence. (Huth and Russet, 1984, 
524) 
As for the effect of past behavior on the chances for successful deterrence in current or future 
conflicts, Huth reported mixed findings. "Weakness in one situation did undermine a state's 
future credibility. But firmness in one situation did not necessarily enhance a state's credibility 
in another". (Danilovic, 2001, 358)   
A study published in 1993 by Huth and his colleague Gelpi, however, came to a very opposite 
conclusion. Authors used deterrence theory to test structural realism theory by Kenneth 
Waltz. One of the variables used in their work measured whether a state suffered a diplomatic 
put-down in a dispute with the same opponent in the past 10 years. (Huth and Gelpi, 1993, 
616) Based on their quantitative research, “Previous capitulation by either the challenger or 
defender appears to be a sign of general weakness on their part. If the defender was forced to 
back down in a previous dispute with the challenger, the likelihood that the challenger will 
escalate the current dispute increases by almost 38%. Similarly, if the defender forced the 
challenger to capitulate in the previous dispute with the challenger, the likelihood that the 
challenger will escalate the current dispute decreases by 27 %” (Huth and Gelpi, 1993, 618) 
Such a claim in concerning previous dispute behavior support those who emphasize 
Schelling´s assumption of the importance of developing reputation for toughness with a 




In 1991, Kilgour and Zagare published a sophisticated model of deterrence based on modeling 
with the use of games theory models including prisoner´s dilemma, a game of chicken and 
Nash equilibrium. Authors examined theoretical connections between deterrence, stability and 
threat credibility. They did so by formulating a model of mutual deterrence as a game of 
incomplete information in which each player is uncertain about how his opponents prefers to 
respond should the player unilaterally alter the status quo. Kilgour and Zagare came up with a 
a conclusion that in core areas, where both players have inherently credible threats, increasing 
costs of mutual punishment past a certain point does little to enhance deterrence stability. 
(Kilgour and Zagare, 1991, 326). By contrast, the same cannot be said about the peripheral 
areas where an asymmetry of credibility exists which Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and US 
adventure in Grenada confirmed. It should be noted, that both scholars use the very similar 
approach as their predecessors Russet and Huth; they examined many historical examples and 
test whether they are applicable to equilibrium model they designed. 
Elaborating on this research, Vesna Danilovic published a study in 2001 which emphasized 
the importance of the regional specifics and boundaries when it comes to deterrence. If the 
cases used to examine the defender's most recent deterrence encounters are selected from the 
same regional areas as its current conflicts, then the coefficients for the defender's past 
behavior indeed become highly statistically significant for most pairs of outcomes. In 
particular, a challenger was more likely to acquiesce to a defender with a strong past record of 
honoring its commitments in the same region of conflict. Furthermore the magnitude of the 
effect of the defender's past behavior within the same region is substantially stronger than the 
impact of the defender's past resolve in general. A change in the defender's intraregional past 
behavior from weak to resolute increases the probability of the challenger's acquiescence in 
the current crisis by 64.8%, whereas the likelihood of compromise and war is decreased by 
31.4% and 27.9%, respectively. (Danilovic, 2001, 364) Danilovic´s study supports findings of 
Huth and Gelpi whose model predicts that if a dispute centers on the control or acquisition of 
territory that is a part of or bordering on the homeland or colonial empire of the defender, the 
likelihood of challenger escalation is reduced by 41%. If the dispute centers on territorial 
issues proximate to the challenger, the likelihood of escalation increases by 35%. (Huth and 
Gelpi, 1993, 618) 
Such a finding is essential, because previously all the research has been conducted only with 
the use of huge datasets containing all the available events which to a large extent ignored 
regional context, probably due to the existence of the bipolar world. 
Despite not being clearly distinguished from one another in the academic literature, theory of 
Inherent Credibility conflicts with Commitment Theory. It does not perceive deterrence as a 
result of previous interactions between deferrer and deterred, but rather in the same manner as 
Paul Huth; as case-specific deterrence variables which are military capabilities, interests at 
stake and bargaining strategies. (Huth, 1997, 82) According to case-specific approach, we 
should not expect reputation to play an important role when it comes to explanation of 
international crises. 
In response to primarily quantitative nature of the Commitment theory, a new stream of 
thinking has galvanized. 
The first one to raise objections against Commitment theory was Stephen Maxwell who 
researched the question of rationality in deterrence. It was difficult to understand why it 
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would be rational for a state to engage itself in a nuclear war over an issue it did not consider 
worth a war "simply in order to support the credibility of its commitment to other objectives it 
did consider worth waging a war. To do so would mean deliberately exchanging a risk of 
nuclear war, even if a very high one, for a certainty of nuclear war" (Danilovic, 2001, 347) 
The most important inference drawn from this criticism is that "if interest is substituted for 
'commitment,' the argument for interdependence immediately becomes less plausible" 
(Danilovic, 2001, 347) 
The critics of Commitment Theory argued the likelihood of a great power to risk global 
nuclear confrontation has certain limits. Some commitments are worth to be honored, some 
are not. Does it make a sense for the United States to risk direct nuclear exchange with the 
USSR to protect South Korea from North Korea´s attack? 
In addition, quantitative research of Commitment Theory supporters lacks a very important 
element of human psychology & behavior Jervis was focused in his research. Lebow and 
Stein criticized quantitative approach to deterrence by refuting its main premises. According 
to them, Commitment Theory streams from the following premises which assume the leaders 
are: 
1) Instrumentally rational 
2) Risk-prone gain maximizers 
3) Free of domestic constraints 
4) Able to correctly identify themselves as defenders or challengers 
These assumptions, however, are unrealistic and contradict empirical evidence. (Lebow & 
Stein, 1989, 223) 
Most damningly, in case studies of the European politics in the 1930s and of Soviet-American 
relations during the Cold War, Daryl Press found no evidence that either Nazi leaders or 
American policymakers made predictions about the likely behavior of their opponents based 
on their record of backing down in previous crises. This implies the most leaders prefer to 
make a net assessment of contemporary situation rather than an analysis of the adversary´s 
past behavior. Analyzing literature on deterrence and credibility, one may come to a very 
interesting conclusion. While the most quantitative studies favor the close relationship of 
between credibility and deterrence, the qualitative works conclude the policy making calculus 
is a function of a contemporary situation rather than on the assessment of empirical crisis 
behavior. (Press; 2005, 218) 
Heretofore, this study should illuminate the validity of both theoretical streams based on the 
empirical evidence of three major rivalries in the 20th century.  
2.5 Methodology 
Author has compiled a dataset which consists of the following variables. This dataset is the 
main source of quantitative data and has been set for every of the three enduring rivalries 
present in this paper. Moreover, it offers a simplified model describing credibility and 





Below is the list of variables: 
 Year – the year of crisis 
 Crisis Name – the name of the crisis 
 Conventional Primacy – indicates, which side enjoyed conventional primacy based on 
qualitative analysis. 
 Nuclear Primacy – indicates, which side enjoyed nuclear primacy (if any). Data was 
gathered in qualitative analysis. 
 Deterrence/Credibility Success – this value shows, whether Deterrence/Credibility 
failed or not. The main criteria is a direct military conflict. 
 Deterrence/Credibility Failure – opposite value of Deterrence/Credibility Success. 
Shows, whether Deterrence/Credibility failed in the given crisis 
 No. of Years Since Last Conflict – this value shows how many years passed since the 
last conflict between two adversaries 
 Challenger´s Head of State Term Length – this number represent number of years 
challenger´s head of state was in power 
 Defender´s Head of State Term Length – value indicated how many years was 
defender´s head of state in power 
 Power Discrepancy - This variable refers to capability gap between adversaries in an 
international crisis. Capability is measured by six components: size of population, 
GNP, alliance relationship vis-a-vis major powers, territorial size, military capability 
and nuclear capability (International Crisis Behavior Project, Duke University) 
In every chapter, regression analysis will be run to analyze a relationship between Power 
Discrepancy and No. of Years since last conflict variables. This model will test general 
deterrence failure. 
In addition to this, a regression analysis will be run to examine the relationship between 
challenger´s and defender´s head of states. 
In the last chapter of this paper, logistic regression is conducted on Deterrence/Credibility 
failure and No. of Years Since Last Crisis variables. This method will show, if there is any 
relationship between credibility/deterrence failure between actual crises of the selected three 
enduring rivalries. 
The results of quantitative analysis will be confronted with thorough qualitative analysis to 









3. Cold War 
The Cold War presents one of the most famous examples of enduring rivalries. Due to its 
global nature, huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons and frequent diplomatic and military 
standoffs between United States and Soviet Union offer almost fifty years of valuable insight 
into deterrence and credibility relationship between two rivals.  
The most notable conflicts of the Cold War were chosen under the criteria that in each crisis 
the opposite side deterred the aggressor from its behavior. Some important events related to 
Cold War however, were disregarded, namely internal crises within the East Bloc. The most 
notable events, among these, are 1953 East German Riots, 1956 Hungarian Uprising, 1968 
Invasion of Czechoslovakia and 1981 Crisis in Poland. Another crises, which were attributed 
rather attributed to Arab-Israeli rivalry, Suez Crisis, Six Day War and the Yom-Kippur War 
were also not entailed. 
Table 1. Cold War Dataset 
 
Based on the dataset above, a regression analysis has been conducted in order find a possible 
link between independent variable (Number of Years Since Last Conflict) and multiple 
dependent variables (Challenger´s Head of State Term Length, Defender´s Head of State 
Term Length and Power Discrepancy Challenger´s Perspective). 
Below are the results of regression analysis for the Cold War Dataset. 
Table 1.1 – Cold War Regression Statistics 
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1948 The Berlin Crisis USSR US 1 0 0 0 22 3 -34
1950 Korean War USSR US 0 1 2 0 24 5 24
1961 The Second Berlin Crisis USSR US 1 0 11 11 8 0,2 -42
1962 The Carribean Crisis USSR US 1 0 1 12 9 0,5 9
1965 The Vietnam War USSR US 0 1 3 17 2 1 16
1979 The War in Afghanistan US USSR 0 1 14 29 15 2 -5




Adjusted R Square -0,697
Standard Error 6,974755
Observations 7
ANOVA df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 26,05838422 8,68612807 0,178553 0,904571046





Value of Significance F is much greater than generally recommended level of 0,05 the results 
of regression analysis for such a limited number of observations are not very accurate. 
Based on the regression analysis, the following function can be formulated: 
Y (No. of Years Since Last Conflict) = 5,81477022 + 0,05451205 * (Challenger´s Head of 
State Duration) - 0,0,9294702 * (Defenders´s Head of State Duration) – 0,0509654 * (Power 
Discrepancy) 
Regression analysis results for the given dataset are the following: 
Chart 1 – Cold War Power Discrepancy & Conflict Frequency1 
 
Apparently, the chart above shows the interdependence of Power Discrepancy and No. of 
Years Since Last Conflict units. The stronger the challenger is, the more likely he is to engage 




                                                          
1 This variable refers to capability gap between adversaries in an international crisis. Capability is measured by 
six components: size of population, GNP, alliance relationship vis-a-vis major powers, territorial size, military 
capability and nuclear capability (International Crisis Behavior Project, Duke University) 
Coefficients Standard Eror t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 5,81477022 4,583916991 1,2685156 0,294104 -8,773299466 20,40284 -8,7732995 20,40284
Challenger´s head of state 
duration
0,05451205 0,824107265 0,06614679 0,951422 -2,568165071 2,6771892 -2,5681651 2,6771892
Defenders head of state 
duration
-0,9294702 4,546992549 -0,20441427 0,851112 -15,40002979 13,541089 -15,40003 13,541089
Power Discrepancy 
(Challenger´s perspective)
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Chart 1.1 – Defender´s Head of State Term Length & Conflict Frequency 
 
The chart on the previous page presents the relationship between Conflict Frequency and 
Defender´s Head of State Term Length. The conflict frequency decreases with duration of 
defender´s head of state in power. That implies the following: the shorter the defender´s head 
of state is in power, the more likely it is that the challenger will try to redefine the status quo.   
Chart 1.2 – Challenger´s Head of State Term Length & Conflict Frequency 
 
The chart above shows the same variables from the challenger´s perspective. It shows that 
newly appointed head of state on challenger´s side is on average more likely to get engaged in 
a conflict with its adversary.  
The qualitative analysis of particular crisis Cold War crisis will be conducted in the next part 
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3.1 Berlin Blockade of 1948 
The Berlin Blockade of 1948 marks the definitive beginning of the Cold War. Since it is the 
first significant crisis of the Cold War, attribution of credibility to previous interactions makes 
little sense. Despite the absence of any previous crises between the USSR and the US, the 
origins of two superpowers rivalry can be traced to World War II period. 
The world was heading to a new standoff even before the World War II officially ended. It is 
important to point out the situation in Europe started to deteriorate straight after 1945. Stalin 
tried to intimidate Turkey hoping it will de facto pass its control of Bosporus and Dardanelles 
straits to USSR. Moreover, the inflow of arms to communists in Greece was gaining pace 
with an aim to spread Soviet influence into the Mediterranean. The US tried to deter the 
Soviets from its expansionist policies, but assertive Soviet policies which ignored the US 
concerns forced the US to answer Soviet actions in Europe. 
Applying the doctrine of containment, the Americans encouraged Turkey to resist Soviet 
claims to rights over naval bases in the Bosporus. They also secured the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Iran. In the meantime, since March 1947, efforts to crack down on Soviet 
espionage had been coordinated and the United States set up its Central Intelligence Agency. 
These changes to external policy marked a real turnaround in the history of the United States, 
which had previously remained on the sidelines of European disputes. For the US, 
isolationism was no longer an option since the USSR was increasingly willing to test the US 
commitment to its European counterparts 
That thinking came to a head during 1947, as relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union deteriorated to a point where—in the context of conditions in Western Europe 
and the Mediterranean—Washington felt compelled to take on responsibilities abroad 
heretofore unheard of in peacetime. In March the Democratic administration of Harry S 
Truman presented a bill to Congress for $400 million in economic and military aid to Greece 
and Turkey. 
In 1948, the conventional prospects of the United States forces in Europe and its allies were 
grim especially due to extensive demobilization of Western armies immediately after the 
World War II. Between 1945 to 1946 the number of American men under arms fell from 3.1 
million to 391,000, while British armed strength dropped from over 1.32 million to 488,00. At 
the same time, Soviet force figures remained at just over 4 million and continued to grow 
throughout the 1950s while the USSR kept its war industries going at full blast. (Bitzinger, 
1989, 5) While the Soviets had significant advantage conventionally-wise, they still did not 
acquire technology to produce its own nuclear bomb. Despite nuclear parity absence, the 
Soviets were willing to accept the risk by using the series of steps to test the US credibility. 
In June, however, the Soviet were dealt a double blow to their German policy. On the 7th the 
Allies announced their decision to create a West German state as a reponse to Soviet actions 
in east Europe. On the 20th the new currency was introduced into the western zones and three 
days later into the western sectors of Berlin. (Williamson, 2003, 4) The US decided to prevent 
the Soviets from their goal of dragging the entire Germany under their sphere of influence. 
Stalin thought he might force the Allies to drop their planes for the establishment of West 
German state by blocking western sector of Berlin.  
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Consequently, the Soviets announced a multiple measures aimed at curbing access to West 
Berlin, culminating in the suspension of all rail passenger and freight traffic with an aim to 
bully the city into the submission of the Soviet rule. The ostensible reason for the blockade 
was in response to plans for currency union in the newly merged Western sector, but its 
deeper purpose was to test the commitment of the US to West Berlin. (Broderick, 1998, 28)  
Finally, when the Soviet Army closed the gates of Berlin in the summer of 1948, a fact which 
had been hard to accept up to then became crystal clear: The Soviet Union was willing to use 
military force to dominate Europe. One of the first goals was to create a unified German state 
under the Soviet rule. Although General Lucius D. Clay, the American military governor, 
preferred to test Soviet resolve with an armed convoy, at the suggestion of his British 
counterpart, General Sir Brian Robertson, he countered with an airlift. The U.S. Army and 
U.S. Air Force, with some help from the British and U.S. Navies, loaded, flew in, and 
distributed food, fuel, and other necessities to keep the Allied sectors of Berlin supplied. 
(Elsberg, 1989, 221)  
The American resolve was signaled by moving 60 nuclear capable B-29 bombers to the 
United Kingdom. Such a move should have supported the credibility of US commitment. 
Despite extensive use of signaling methods, neither party wanted the crisis to escalate into an 
all-out war. Soviet fighter just rarely buzzed American planes, and threats of aerial gunnery 
practice and formation flying in the air corridors never materialized. (Altman, 2014, 35) The 
lack of additional Soviet forces in East Germany was interpreted as important indicator that 
no attack was imminent. 
The Soviets, who themselves had not any first hand airlift experience, were convinced that the 
airlift to West Berlin could not be maintained over the winter, decided to play for time and 
avoid any compromise. Fortunately for the US and its allies, the winter was very mild. The 
airlift and American pressure in form of countersanctions made Soviet leadership to abandon 
the blockade. Soviet leadership was caught by a surprise facing the tremendous economic 
power of the US which managed to supply the entire city for a year – something the USSR 
could not have. 
Since 1948, the city became a thorn in the US-Soviet relations in the years to come. The 
Berlin Blockade Crisis galvanized the creation of NATO and accelerated the Cold War. 
Despite the distinct legal and historical status of defeated, occupied, demilitarized Germany, 
American policymakers clear saw a need to incorporate it into one broader whole (NATO) 
that they could more credibly threaten to protect. (Altman, 2014, 43) 
The unresolved problem of West Berlin was frozen until 1958, when Nikita Khrushchev 
opened the issue with unilateral request to western allies to make concessions. 
Berlin Crisis of 1948 was the first crisis of the Cold War, which was provoked by the series of 
American steps that lead to formal establishment of West German state independent of Soviet 
influence. Soviets, who wanted to prevent the US from setting up and ally on the territory of 
western occupation zones, tried to bully Americans into secession of West Berlin, an isolated 
enclave in the hearth of what was about to become German Democratic Republic. Soviet 
establishment was driven namely by US introduction of new currency, which de facto 
prevented USSR from reaching its main objective; a unified Germany under the Soviet sphere 
of influence. There is a lack of evidence to suggest the Soviets launched Berlin blockade after 
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making an assessment of previous US interactions. Most likely, the Soviet Politburo gave 
little attention to US previous actions. It is though likely that the new confrontation was 
escalating since late 1945 and that the Soviets could have felt threatened by certain US 
moves, which were perceived as aggressive and hostile. Namely the US decision to nuke 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Churchill´s Fulton speech, and increasing tensions in Greece and 
Turkey had impact on Soviet strategic calculus 
3.2 Korean War 1950 – 1953 
The Korean War provided one of the defining moment of the Cold War between East and 
West. As Jeffrey Grey claims, it was probably the single most dangerous moment of the Cold 
War in Stalin´s time, and Korea constituted a potential flash-point in superpower rivalry until 
the Soviet Union´s collapse. (Grey, 2004, 675) 
The invasion of South Korea by forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 25 
June 1950 was one of the defining moments of the Cold War. The North Korean attack so 
alarmed Washington that President Truman abruptly reversed the meticulously considered 
policy recently formulated by both the Department of State and Department of Defense that 
had placed Korea outside the American defense perimeter, and instead committed U.S. armed 
forces to the defense of South Korea. Viewing the North Korean assault as a case of Soviet 
aggression, likely a probing action to test Western resolve, the Truman administration 
concluded that the conflict with the Soviet Union had entered a new and more dangerous 
stage. (Weathersby, 1993, 5) 
North Korea could not have developed a decisive military advantage over its enemy to the 
south without Soviet assistance in the form of tanks, heavy artillery, and airplanes. Approval 
for the attack by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was a prerequisite to provision of the necessary 
materiel assistance and aid in devising a detailed plan for a major military offensive. Although 
North Korea’s Kim Il-Sung had pleaded for Stalin’s several times during 1949, it was not 
until January 30 of the following year that his Soviet mentor indicated a willingness to 
consider the idea sympathetically.1 During Kim’s visit to Moscow from March 30 to April 
25, 1950, Stalin gave his blessing to an attack, but only if Chinese Communist leader Mao 
Zedong gave his consent as well. (Stueck, 2010,2) Stalin approved Kim’s reunification plan 
and provided the necessary military support, but only after repeated appeals from Kim and 
only after having been persuaded that the United States would not intervene in the conflict. 
Stalin was reluctant and did not support the idea of invading South Korea due to his belief that 
standoff with the West will be decided in Europe. Asian theater was in his eyes insignificant 
and not worth the risk. According to Weathersby, the flaw in Soviet policy toward Korea was 
that while Stalin was not interested in extending Soviet control into southern Korea, the 
highly nationalistic Korean communists whom Soviet occupation officials placed in power in 
North Korea were quite determined to extend their authority over the rest of the country. 
(Weathersby, 1993, 5) This illustrates the importance of regionality in terms of credibility and 
deterrence. The Soviets under Stalin thought of Asian theater as independent of European 
issuers. At least in the initial phase of the Cold War. 
What made Stalin to change his mind, though? 
The best answer is twofold. First, as a result of US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s 
National Press Club speech of January 12, 1950 omitting South Korea from the US defense 
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perimeter in the Pacific and possibly Soviet espionage in Washington, Stalin believed that the 
United States would not intervene militarily to save the Republic of Korea were it attacked. 
(Stueck, 2010, 2) Acheson´s speech became a classic example of credibility failure. South 
Korea missing on his list of countries US is willing to protect made Soviets believe the US 
will most likely abandon South Korea should it be invaded by its northern counterpart. 
Moreover, a couple other factors have to be taken into consideration, notably the US relations 
with South Korean leadership which was far from perfect in late 1940s, the establishment of 
communist rule in China, and last but not least the first Soviet nuclear test conducted in 1949 
which brought the US monopoly to an end. 
The events in Berlin of 1948 however, had no impact at all on Stalin´s reasoning according to 
available evidence. 
President Truman decided that the US could not afford to allow communist North Korea to 
overrun non-communist South Korea. His first action was to ask the Soviet Union to urge 
their client state to halt its attack and withdraw its forces. Truman´s second step was to ask his 
ambassador to the UN to introduce a motion asking North Korea to desist its attack. When 
these measure failed the President ordered US forces to assist South Korean troops in 
stemming the tide of the invasion. (Landenburg, 2007, 72) 
In his memoirs, Truman stated that during his discussions with State and Defense officials one 
thing that stood out to him was “the complete, almost unspoken acceptance on the part of 
everyone that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be done. There was no 
suggestion from anyone that either the United Nations or the United States could back away 
from it.” (Truman, 1996, 222) In order for the U.S. to maintain its position in relation to the 
Soviet Union, it had to respond to the growing conflict quickly and decisively. Since the end 
of World War II, the U.S. had built both its image and foreign policy on a basis of resisting 
potential communist threats. The decision to act was, as Truman understood it, a “test of all 
the talk of the last five years of collective security. (Truman, 1996, 222) 
The outbreak of war in Korea also led the United States to conclude a separate peace with 
Japan and maintain military forces in Okinawa and South Korea. The image of “naked Soviet 
aggression” in Korea remained a powerful force in the making of U.S. foreign policy for 
many years; Washington’s goal was to “prevent a Korea” in Europe or the Middle East. 
(Weathersby, 1993, 5) 
American decision to step in with direct military intervention was executed with a task to 
prevent the communist from annexing southern part of Korean peninsula. The objective of 
American military operations changed, though, from initially saving South Korea to unifying 
the peninsula under a democratically elected government, thereby effectively rolling-back 
communism. A change in strategy gave the US a permission to operate north of 38th parallel.  
Kennan and Allison of the State Department believed American victory in Korea would deal a 
strong blow to the Soviet Union, possibly encouraging the Kremlin to become directly 
involved at the prospect of facing a resounding defeat in Korea. (Ovodenko, 2007, 280) In 
addition, too much US success in Korea could have eventually provoked Soviet retaliation in 
Europe. Such a scenario got even more likely, when Chinese entered the war with the force of 
approximately 3.000.000 men in arms. General MacArthur proposed to use nuclear weapons 
against the Chinese with an aim to prolong the military campaign in an attempt to topple the 
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communist regime in mainland China. Such a plan was scrapped since it would not find 
international support and even worse, it could have led to a full-scale nuclear war.  
In 1953, after Stalin´s death and three years of combat operations, all stakeholders agreed to 
freeze the conflict. An armistice was finally signed in July 1953 in the climate of international 
détente brought about by the death of Stalin four months earlier. 
Interestingly enough, the firm American response in 1948 did not prevent Stalin from giving 
Kim Il-Sung the permission to launch the invasion against the South. Quite likely, credibility 
success in one geographic theatre (Europe) is not applicable to other locations (Asia). Stalin, 
on the other hand, was reluctant to give North Koreans and Chinese a green light to invade 
South Korea. In early 1950s, Soviets believed that the fate of the new world order will be 
decided in Europe, any kind of military confrontation in the Far East was simply not worth the 
risk. The main reason for Stalin to make up his mind was Dean Acheson´s speech in which he 
forgot to entail South Korea in US defense perimeter. The Soviets therefore considered any 
kind of US intervention unlikely. 
3.3 The Second Berlin Crisis 1958 - 1961 
The Second Berlin Crisis was slowly escalating since 1958 when Khrushchev commenced to 
pressure the western powers to make him concessions concerning West Berlin. The Soviets 
claimed France, Britain and the US violated the Potsdam Agreement by establishing 
autonomous and rearmed West German state. Therefore, it cannot be considered an isolated 
crisis but rather a consequence of the postwar occupation of Germany and Soviet initiative of 
1958. 
On 27 November 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had stated he would end the four-
power occupation of Berlin and sign, within six months, a separate peace treaty with the 
German Democratic Republic, threatening the continued presence in West Berlin of British, 
French and U.S. forces. (Pedlow, 2011, 1) 
Harrison and Zubok identified three key reasons of the Soviet behavior in 1958: 
 To gain international recognition of the GDR. 
 To counter the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) expanding role in NATO  
 To differentiate himself from his ousted opponents (Selvage, 1998, 211) 
Khrushchev suggested the West would not risk a war over Berlin, because the Soviet Union 
had the hydrogen bomb and the means to hit the U.S. As Vladislav Zubok and Constantine 
Pleshakov point out, Khrushchev believed that the Soviet threat to use nuclear weapons 
during the Suez Crisis exactly two years earlier had played a crucial role in forcing Great 
Britain and France to back down. His nuclear-missile romanticism also led him to believe that 
in order to avoid nuclear confrontation, the Western powers would have to acquiesce in East 
German control over the transit routes to Berlin. 
In the end, the United States, United Kingdom, and France replied to the ultimatum by firmly 
asserting their determination to remain in, and to maintain their legal right of free access to, 
the entirety of Berlin. Being confronted with the strong stance of the West, the Soviets 
withdrew their ultimatum. The series of ongoing meetings at various places continued amid 
rising tensions caused by the U2 spy place being shot over USSR. (Carmichael, 2011, 4) 
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The winter of 1960-1961 was a time of Soviet diplomatic reconnaissance. Khrushchev had 
reasons to expect that U.S. President-elect John F. Kennedy did not see eye to eye with 
Adenauer on the West Berlin issue and German settlement. It has become known from 
recently declassified Western sources that Adenauer doubted Kennedy's resoluteness to hold 
firm on the German and Berlin questions. (Zubok, 1993, 20) The window of opportunity was 
believed to be opened and Kremlin was ready to exploit it. 
The experience of the 60s shows the importance of the variable represented by particular 
country´s head of state. Khrushchev believed that young and politically relatively 
unexperienced though charismatic Kennedy might be easily politically outmaneuvered and 
made to concede, in particular on Berlin. An early profile by the Soviet embassy in 
Washington in July 1960 described Kennedy as a "typical pragmatist" whose election would 
allow "a possibility of mutually satisfactory settlement" of U.S.-Soviet relations "on the basis 
of mutual willingness to avoid nuclear war."(Zubok, 1993, 21) 
Contrary to Soviet hopes, John F. Kennedy assumed the office of President in January 1961 
determined to maintain the previous Administration's policy toward Berlin, while at the same 
time hoping, somewhat idealistically, that a face to face meeting with the Soviets could 
facilitate a mutual understanding. (Coleman, 1995, 40) 
Kennedy had decided after the Vienna summit that Western rights in Berlin would be 
protected at any cost, including the risk of nuclear war. The sealing of the border to German 
civilian traffic did not present a well-defined threat to these American interests though. The 
American people would not sanction a war of atomic destruction over border restrictions for 
civilian traffic in Berlin. (Coleman, 1995, 60) All in all, the idea to seal the border by 
constructing the wall was at least a temporary solution which defused the crisis and reduced 
the likelihood of a conflict triggered by miscalculation. 
The failure in many summits left Kruschev with no more room for procrastination. Pressure 
on him to act had been mounting. In the spring of 1961 the flight of refugees from the GDR 
over West Berlin had become an acute embarrassment. Even Khrushchev's aides joked that 
"soon there will be nobody left in the GDR except for Ulbricht and his mistress." (Zubok, 
1993, 24) The situation was desperate as East Germany was losing its best people. 
The construction of the Wall began on 13 August 1961. On Saturday August 12, 1961, East 
Berlin mayor Walter Ulbricht signed an order to close the border and erect a Wall. The tide of 
East Germans flooding to the West through the many roads, canals, crossings, and trains, 
came to an abrupt end. It is estimated that 3.7 to 4 million East Germans escaped to the West. 
The daily flow of refugees in the beginning of August was roughly 1, 500 East Germans, but 
after Khrushchev’s “bomb-rattling” speech, the daily number had risen to 1,926. On August 
11, unbeknownst to all, the last 2,290 refugees seeking the freedoms of the west, entered the 
Marienfelde reception center in West Berlin. Overnight, in a swift, unexpected manner, the 
door to freedom closed, and was to remain so for 28 years. (Carmichael, 2011, 3) 
The failure of the West to react to it other than verbally meant that Khrushchev's plan 
succeeded. From Soviet diplomats and intelligence Khrushchev learned that the idea of 
"something like a Wall" had indeed been afloat in political Washington, especially among 
people close to or part of the Kennedy Administration, among them Sen. William Fulbright 
and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Khrushchev also studied a KGB report on a conference of 
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Western powers in Paris on August 5-7. Soviet intelligence found out that Western powers 
were not ready to risk a war over West Berlin. Secretary of State Dean Rusk had proposed 
economic sanctions "to spread discontent throughout Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland 
and Czechoslovakia" and to speed up the nuclear armament of NATO countries, a euphemism 
for the nuclearization of West Germany. Unlike West German foreign minister Heinrich von 
Brentano, who insisted on a show of force, Rusk "spoke in favor of talks with the Soviet 
Union about preservation of the status quo." (Zubok, 1993, 28) 
Despite neither the Soviets, nor the Americans were willing to go into an all-out war, a 
military conflict could have broken out by miscalculation. On October 27, 1961, the 
provocative games took a serious turn as another probe prompted the Soviets to deploy 10 
tanks on the Eastern side of Checkpoint Charlie. The US had been using tanks to support their 
escorts of vehicles into East Berlin, and now was met by equal force. The Soviet and 
American tanks stood a mere 100 yards apart from each other, and both sides readied for 
battle. The showdown of tanks at the wall became a visual emblem of the dangerous situation 
these world powers were locked into. The confrontation made headlines around the world and 
it looked as if the Cold War was soon to become a hot, shooting war with grave 
consequences. It was only after more sanguine heads prevailed that Moscow and Washington 
mutually agreed to pull back from the standoff, and the confrontation eased. 
The Berlin Crisis was not a product of Khrushchev's bad temper. He started the Crisis because 
he was genuinely concerned by West German designs against the GDR and for nuclear 
armament. Even the threat of the "loss" of the GDR was intolerable in those times for the 
Soviet leadership. Inspired in all likelihood by the crisis in the Far East, Khrushchev hoped to 
force the United States to acquiesce to the existence of "two Germanys" just as they had 
acquiesced in, indeed supported the existence of, "two Chinas" in the Far East. (Zubok, 1993, 
31) 
Khrushchev’s decision to provoke the Berlin Crisis in November 1958 was the product of 
economic, as well as military-political, miscalculation. The Soviet leader overestimated not 
only the potential of the changing strategic balance to squeeze concessions out of the West, 
but also the economic ability of the GDR and the entire Soviet bloc to withstand the economic 
pressures — both potential and real — arising from a prolonged conflict with the West over 
Berlin and the German question.  
Khrushchev also believed that its nuclear capability made UK and France to back off from the 
Suez Crisis of 1956. He believed his nuclear card will force the West to withdraw its support 
to independent West Berlin. Soviets, after the firm response of the West, withdrew their 
ultimatum of 1958. Another window of opportunity appeared only after President Kennedy 
took office. Young and unexperienced President was believed to sacrifice Berlin. By 1961 
however, East Germany’s socialist-bloc allies were no longer willing to sacrifice their own 
economic development for the sake of the GDR. (Selvage, 1998, 211) The only way out of the 
crisis was to erect a wall which would cut off the outflow of people leaving East Germany. 
Freezing the conflict in its current form was in fact a win-win situation for both the West and 
the East. 
For a while, Berlin disappeared from the agenda of both Khrushchev and Kennedy. I months 
to come, both statesmen´s attention was drawn to an island in the Caribbean – Cuba. 
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3.4 Caribbean Missile Crisis of 1962 
The Cuban missile crisis has assumed genuinely mythic significance. Dean Rusk called it "the 
most dangerous crisis the world has ever seen," the only time when the nuclear superpowers 
came "eyeball to eyeball." Theodore Sorensen called it the "Gettysburg of the Cold War." For 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., it was "the finest hour" of the Kennedy presidency; a moment of 
maximum nuclear peril traversed without catastrophe. Many people believe that the missile 
crisis of October 1962 represents the closest point that the world has come to nuclear war. For 
that reason alone, it is worth continued attention. (Blight, Nye, Welch, 1987, 1) 
The Cuban Missile Crisis is generally considered to have started on Tuesday, October 16, 
1962, when President Kennedy was informed that U-2 photos showed Soviet missiles being 
installed in Cuba, and to have ended on Sunday, October 28, 1962, when Khrushchev agreed 
to remove those missiles. (Hellman, 2012, 3) 
Situation was extremely delicate and the world happened to be on the brink of a nuclear war. 
On October 25, for example, the JCS raised the alert status to Defcon 2 after receiving 
authorization from the White House. At the time, US wielded an overwhelming force of 145 
missiles and 1,436 bombers, ready to go a day later. When the Soviets intercepted the 
transmission of the DEFCON change, they raised their own military alert, particularly for the 
ICBMs. This Soviet counter-alert may have appeared to be attack preparations and thus had 
the possibly of encouraging a U.S. preemptive strike, but the Americans did not detect this 
change. The Soviet interception of the increase in DEFCON was an accurate piece of 
intelligence, but Soviet intelligence passed along an incorrect conclusion on October 25, that 
the United States was about to invade Cuba. (Weaver, 2014, 176) Soviet assumption was also 
supported by many US covert attempts to topple Castro´s regime. 
 
Multiple theories were formulated about the reasons why Soviets decided to move their 
missiles and warheads to Cuban soil.  
1) Cuba´s defense 
2) Limited range of USSR´s missile 
3) Cold War politics 
4) Berlin-win, Trade or Trap 
Especially the second and fourth point are valuable for the purpose of this analysis due to 
clear causal link between Cuban missile crisis and the Berlin crisis and direct impact of 
military balance. 
In 1961, over strenuous Soviet objections, America started deploying nuclear-armed Jupiter 
IRBM’s in Turkey. From American perspective, installing these weapons made sense. They 
secured NATO’s southern flank, helped cement relations with Turkey, and enhanced our 
nuclear deterrent. The Russians viewed these missiles very differently. From their perception, 
warheads deployed so close to the Soviet territory put them in a very unfavorable position 
which somehow had to be compensated. 
At the time, Soviet Defense Minister and Nikita Khrushchev sailed in the Black Sea. 
Malinovsky pointed out to sea and said that on the other shore in Turkey there was an 
American nuclear-missile base. In a matter of six or seven minutes, missiles launched from 
that base could devastate major centers in the Ukraine and southern Russia. … Khrushchev 
asked Malinovsky why the Soviet Union should not have the right to do the same as America. 
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Why, for example, should it not deploy missiles in Cuba?” (Hellman, 2008, 17) Such a move 
could have helped the Soviets narrow the gap between them and the US in terms of nuclear 
capabilities. 
After examining American threats against Cuba and his own country’s nuclear imbalance vis-
a`-vis the United States in the spring of 1962, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev decided, 
with the unanimous support of the Presidium of the Central Committee, to ship medium- and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Cuba. (Weaver, 2014, 176) 
 
Firstly, the perception of the power balance in Washington was different. Kennedy had come 
into office railing about a missile gap that was giving the Soviets a dangerous edge over the 
West. The spy satellite photos revealed, however, that the gap went the other way. According 
to Kaplan, the Soviets had no more than eight ICBM´s. Their bombers sat out on open 
runways. Their air-defense batteries were virtually worthless. (Kaplan, 2001, 82) 
Objectively, the Soviet Union faced a serious and widening window of vulnerability. In 1962 
the Soviet government found itself with only twenty intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) capable of launching nuclear weapons that could reach American territory from 
bases inside the Soviet Union. The Soviets also had well-founded doubts about the technical 
reliability and accuracy of these missiles. In addition, Soviet strategic forces included 200 
long-range bombers and only six submarines with submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs). (Allison, 1999, 263) According to some sources, the Soviets did not have any 
SLBMs at their disposal at all. (Smoke, 1992, 190) Khrushchev’s boasting about USSR´s 
ability to mass-produce ICBM´s was just a pure bluff. 
 
The American strategic nuclear arsenal in 1962 was substantially more robust, consisting of at 
least 180 ICBMs, twelve Polaris submarines (each carrying twelve missiles), and 630 
strategic bombers stationed in the USA, Europe, and Asia, from which they could attack 
Soviet targets from all angles. This arsenal was rapidly being expanded by the Kennedy 
administration. (Smoke, 1992, 190) Moreover, Soviet ICBM´s were vulnerable due to the 
absence of hardened silos. Their exposure made them an easy prey for American bombers. 
Soviet bombers would eventually had to penetrate US and Canadian air defense. All in all, the 
total number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Stockpile in October 1962 was approximately 
26,400 and the Soviet Union approximately 3300. (Norris, 2012, 80) 
 
For Kennedy, however, a more plausible answer dawned on him; It must be Berlin. 
Khrushchev would use the missiles to solve the Berlin problem—on his terms. As a prelude to 
a confrontation over Berlin, Khrushchev’s maneuver made sense. If the Americans did 
nothing, Khrushchev would force the West out of Berlin, confident that the missiles in Cuba 
would deter the Americans from starting a war. If the Americans tried to bargain, the terms 
would be a trade of Cuba and Berlin. Since Berlin was immeasurably more important than 
Cuba, that trade would also be a win for Khrushchev. If the Americans blockaded or attacked 
Cuba, Khrushchev could then use this as the excuse for an equivalent blockade or attack on 
Berlin. (Allison, 1999, 263)  
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Kennedy explained his firm stance to his brother in the following way: “If they get this mean 
on this one in our part of the world what will they do next?” (Jervis, 1973, 34) Kennedy 
assumed the Soviets are willing to gamble with an aim to expand their influence in the remote 
of only a marginal influence to them. President Kennedy´s reasoning is therefore in line with 
commitment theory under which failure to stand firm against challenger in a certain 
geographic location will inevitably increase. 
U.S. military and diplomatic initiatives had indeed created conditions in which the Soviets 
possessed few choices besides acceding to the American offer. Soviet intelligence sources had 
even informed the premier that a U.S. attack on Cuba was imminent, although in fact no such 
strike was going to take place unless JFK gave the final order. A combination of U.S. military 
power and diplomatic flexibility had coerced the Soviet Union into complying, but 
Khrushchev believed that the USSR had achieved some of its goals since missile deployment 
had led to an American promise to not invade Cuba and the “unexpected” removal of the 
missiles in Turkey. (Weaver, 2014, 176) 
 
Perhaps Soviet leaders might have reacted differently had positions been reversed; but it 
seems clear that nuclear deterrence had a good deal to do with the fact that Khrushchev did 
not respond with a Berlin blockade or pressure on Turkey, as some of the participants 
expected. The specter of nuclear catastrophe lurking at the end of a chain of events had a 
powerful cautionary effect on both sides. It fostered a caution that, as George Ball noted, 
would not have been present to the same degree if only conventional forces had been 
involved. And that is the other side of the same lesson. If a little nuclear deterrence goes a 
long way, some may be necessary. Talk of stable conventional deterrence may miss this 
important lesson of the missile crisis—at least as long as intense political competition exists 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. (Blight & Nye, 1987, 13) 
 
The Soviets decided to move their missiles to Cuba for multiple reasons, namely the US 
deployment of nuclear missiles in Turkey, Cuba´s defense, Soviet missiles limited range, 
prestige and a bargaining chip used to be exchanged for Berlin (It has to be noted though, 
particular weigh of every reason on the final Soviet decision to move warheads to Cuba is 
impossible to gauge) For the purpose of this research paper, especially the last point appears 
to be crucial. US firm decision on Berlin Crisis of both 1958 and 1961 did not prevent the 
Soviets from deploying their missiles on Cuban soil. The Soviets rather than backing off were 
willing to find alternative ways to pressure the US to make concessions on Berlin. Such a 
logic refutes the very logic of deterrence-credibility causal nexus since even a firm response 
(credibility success) in one area of the world can result in a spillover effect elsewhere. In 
addition, Castro pledged its allegiance to USSR only after continuous US meddling into 
Cuba´s affairs (Bay of Pigs). If it was not for such a hostile policy, Cuba might have not 




3.5 Vietnam War (1965) 
Despite the full scale ground military presence just in 1965, the problem of Vietnam begun 15 
years earlier. 
 America´s direct involvement there spanned the quarter century between the February 1950 
decision to aid France in suppressing the Vietminh revolution and the fall of Saigon in April 
1975. The commitment pended incrementally, from economic and military aid France during 
the first Indochina war, to support for independent South Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva 
conference, to the commitment of US forces in 1965. (Herring, 1991, 102) Through 
apparently small decision throughout the period of 15 years, the US involvement gradually 
spiraled from simple military aid to its ally to a direct military confrontation with North 
Vietnam. 
In 1950, the Truman administration extended containment policy that had originally been 
applied in Europe to East Asia. The first American commitment in Vietnam, a commitment to 
help the French suppress the Vietminh revolution lead by Ho Chi Minh, was part of the 
broader quest to stop Communism in Asia. The US failed to distinguish what they believed 
was a Soviet attempt to dominate East Asia from liberation movement aimed at gaining 
independence on French colonizers. 
True, Ho Chi Minh and his top associates were communists, deeply committed to establishing 
in Vietnam at the first opportunity a state based on Marxist Leninist dogma. In addition, after 
1949, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union assisted the Vietminh and later 
North Vietnam in many important ways.  
On the other hand it is equally clear that Ho initiated the revolution without explicit direction 
from Moscow and sustained it until 1949 without external support. The revolution grew in 
strength because it was able to identify with Vietnamese nationalism, and it had a dynamism 
of its own quite apart from international communism. Moreover, the support provided by the 
Soviet Union and China was neither unlimited, unconditional nor unequivocal, and there is 
ample evidence that at numerous crucial points in the war the three nations did not share 
anything approaching unanimity of purpose. (Herring, 1991, 106) Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, The USSR adopted a very careful approach to Vietnam in a similar manner as in 
Korea. The concern of Stalin and the Soviet leaders was mainly about the power competition 
in Europe and they paid almost no attention to Southeast Asia in general and to Vietnam or 
Indochina in particular. Besides, Stalin never forgot that Ho Chi Minh was not a “true 
communist” but a man of “stinking nationalism”. (Lai, 2012, 163) 
The collective leadership that succeeded Stalin in the Kremlin after 1953 continued the 
cautious approach to Indochina. Eager to pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence with the 
West, Soviet leaders did not want their involvement in Indochina to jeopardize that policy. 
Together with the Chinese Communists, Soviet diplomats pressured Ho's negotiators to reach 
a compromise solution with the French at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Moscow's national 
self-interest overrode its ideological obligation to provide full support to a fraternal 
Communist movement. The Geneva Agreement divided Vietnam into two parts, and Soviet 
leaders were satisfied with this outcome because it removed the danger of a possible direct 
clash with the United States. (Zhai, 2005, 431) In addition, Soviets were falling into 
disadvantageous position due to their rift with the Chinese, who had the upper hand in terms 
of access to Vietnam due to their ability to block Soviet rail supplies. 
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On the contrary, U.S. policymakers viewed the conflict in Vietnam as an integral part of their 
broader struggle with communism. From this flowed yet another key assumption, that the 
"loss" of Vietnam would threaten interests deemed vital. There is more than a bit of irony 
here, for at least until 1940 Vietnam had been of no significance to the United States, a 
position to which it quickly reverted in the aftermath of the war. 
The "domino theory" held that the fall of Vietnam would cause the loss of all Indochina and 
then the rest of Southeast Asia, with implications extending far beyond. The communists had 
just taken over in China. Indochina, Burma and Malaya were swept by revolution, and the 
newly independent government of Indonesia seemed vulnerable. Because of its location on 
China's southern border and because it appeared in the most imminent danger, Vietnam was 
considered crucial. If it fell, all of Southeast Asia might be lost, denying the United States 
access to important waterways and strategic raw materials. (Herring, 1991, 107) 
In the Kennedy-Johnson era the domino theory was sup planted by the notion of credibility, 
the idea that the United States must stand firm in Vietnam to demonstrate its determination to 
defend vital interests across the world. During this most intense and dangerous period of the 
Cold War, U.S. policymakers felt certain that if they showed firmness in one area, it would 
deter the adversary in another; if they showed weakness, the adversary would be tempted to 
take steps that might ultimately leave no option but nuclear war. The so called Manchurian or 
Munich analogy, the lessons of the 1930s, reinforced the idea of credibility, the obvious 
conclusion being that a firm stand must be taken against aggression at the outset. (Herring, 
1991, 108) The only problem with this way of reasoning is the inability to distinguish cause-
consequence relationship since the events in Vietnam were not orchestrated by the USSR. In 
any case, a firm reaction was believed to prevent both USSR and China from future 
adventurism and was likely to kick start general trend towards détente.  
French withdrawal from Vietnam did not help to calm the situation down. The Geneva 
agreement in 1954 had envisaged a unified Vietnam as the consequence of the free elections. 
In a few months however, Vietnam experienced a partition along the 17th parallel. While the 
North Vietnamese leadership focused its attention on strengthening of the communist regime, 
in the South the US favored the end of French influence and the rise to power of stubborn 
anti-French and anti-communist leader Ngo Dinh Diem. (Varsori, 2013)  
Despite President Kennedy’s efforts to bolster Diem’s position in South Vietnam, the 
situation deteriorated. Diem’s government had increasingly become a family-based, 
authoritarian regime without any legitimacy in the countryside, which represented 80 percent 
of the total population. By 1963, Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, had become 
controversial figures, having raided South Vietnamese Buddhist pagodas and used military 
troops to suppress demonstrators in Saigon. As a result, Americans witnessed on the evening 
news a number of Buddhist riots and self-immolations. (Cantu, 2006, 6) 
Following the assassination of President Kennedy, Lyndon Baines Johnson continued to 
increase America’s commitment in Vietnam. The political situation in South Vietnam, 
however, required serious modification of the strategy Johnson had inherited from JFK. It 
became clear that the generals who succeeded Diem were even less effective than he in ruling 
the nation. In addition, the Viet Cong—with North Vietnamese assistance—was becoming so 
powerful that Johnson either had to send in ground combat troops or pull out of Vietnam. 
Without American intervention, the Viet Cong would have won the war by early 1966.  
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The catalyst, therefore, that allowed LBJ to redefine America’s foreign policy in Vietnam 
occurred in early August 1964, when the American vessel USS Maddox, on patrol in 
international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, was attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. 
This was followed by another highly disputed report of a subsequent attack days later against 
the Maddox and its escort ship, the C. Turner Joy. In response, President Johnson successfully 
petitioned Congress to pass what has become known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which 
bestowed upon the President expansive war powers. (Cantu, 2006, 7) The limited American 
presence, however, spiraled out of control. 
On January 27, 1965, national security advisor McGeorge Bundy and Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara told the president that America’s limited military involvement in Vietnam 
had failed and that the United States had reached a point in Vietnam where they had either to 
escalate the war or withdraw. Meanwhile, American casualties continued to mount. On 
February 6, 1965, Vietcong guerrillas attack the U.S. military compound at Pleiku in the 
Central Highlands, killing 8 Americans, wounding 126, and destroying 10 aircraft. In 
retaliation, Johnson approved Operation Flaming Dart, a series of limited air strikes, 
beginning with the bombing of a North Vietnamese army camp near Dong Hoi by U.S. Navy 
jets from the carrier Ranger. This was followed up a few weeks later on March 2 with the 
beginning of Rolling Thunder, a massive air campaign against North Vietnam designed to 
destroy their ability to support the Vietcong in the south. Rolling Thunder continued, with 
occasional pauses, until October 31, 1968. (Westheider, 2007, 14) 
Only the events of 1965 triggered resolute Soviet reaction to US meddling in Vietnam. To a 
large degree, such a stance was supported by the fact that Khrushchev was replaced by much 
more adventurous Brezhnev who did not want to back off at any cost. The turning point 
became obvious when Soviet Premier Kosygin visited North Vietnam in 1965. The Soviet 
Union gradually begun to supply North Vietnam with financial aid, arms, fighter jets, food 
and others. (Minh, 2003, 15) Costly war of attrition culminated in 1968.  
In January, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces launched an offensive during Tet, the 
Lunar New Year, in which over 80,000 troops attacked nearly all major cities in South 
Vietnam. Even the U.S. embassy in Saigon came under attack. Although it was a major 
military defeat for the Communist forces, which lost half of their attacking force and greatly 
weakened the Viet Cong’s insurgent base, the Tet Offensive ironically was a great 
psychological victory. Within days, America public support for involvement in Vietnam—
which was already waning— plummeted even further; while at the same time the anti-war 
movement and public criticism of the government reached new levels. (Cantu, 2006, 7) 
Despite Nixon´s attempt to win the war shortly due to intensive use of aerial bombing, the 
campaign in Vietnam eventually failed becoming national trauma for the US society. 
The Vietnam War was largely misinterpreted by the US establishment. Rather than typical 
Cold War East & West axis conflict, it was a product of broader decolonization process. The 
Vietnamese were seen with a great suspicion in the USSR and did not really explicitly favor 
the communist notion of their fight for independence against the French. Soviets were 
extremely careful to openly support Vietcong, because of both their rising tensions with China 
and their limited logistic abilities. The policy of détente which emerged after 1962 suited the 
Soviets and they did not want to reverse the trend. The full support of North Vietnam became 
only after direct US intervention in Vietnam. The Soviets were paradoxically not responsible 
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for deteriorating situation in Vietnam. They picked up their proxies only in response to hostile 
US action. 
3.6 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) 
Afghanistan became a field of superpower contest in mid-1970s, when both the US and USSR 
begun to support groups of their interest. The invasion of Afghanistan was the first major 
operational movement of Soviet ground forces outside the USSR since the unopposed 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Though initially visualized as by Soviet leaders as a 
small-scale intervention, it grew into a decade-long war involving nearly one million Soviet 
soldiers, killing and injuring some tens of thousands of them.  
Western scholars and analysts have suggested that Soviet leaders were suffering from a sort of 
Czechoslovakia syndrome, when they intervened in Afghanistan. In 1968, Soviet troops had 
managed to restore a pliable conservative regime in Czechoslovakia, after several months of 
worry over the nation´s experiment with a more liberal version of communism. Although the 
invasion had been condemned by Western countries and even by some Soviet citizens, the 
mere presence of Soviet arms had settled the situation, and a sort of calm quickly returned. 
There is nothing in the documents to suggest that Soviet leaders were thinking of 
Czechoslovakia when they considered sending troops into Afghanistan, although there were 
certain similarities in the way the actual invasion was planned. (Kalinovsky, 2011, 25) 
The Islamic revolution in Iran made senior Soviet planners wonder if the US would now look 
at Afghanistan as a new base for its forces in the Persian Gulf. The Carter administration´s 
decision to move naval forces into the area in the fall of 1979 only fueled Soviet suspicions. 
(Kalinovsky, 2011, 21) Soviets were afraid should Afghanistan become a client state of the 
US, it could supposedly turn into the staging area for missiles directed at the Soviet Union. 
In 1978 to 1979, Afghanistan in the midst of the political turmoil. The socialist revolution led 
by Nur M. Taraki who orchestrated a coup d´état angered many influential members of the 
military, intellectuals, clerics and tribal leaders. Consequently, the power was seized by 
former Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin. Instability rocked the country as it plunged into civil 
war. Despite requesting Soviet military advisors and troops to combat the insurgency, the new 
president remained fiercely independent from Communist control. Soviet Politburo was 
getting increasingly nervous that eventually, Amin might change the political orientation of 
the Afghanistan´s regime. (Collins, 1986, 77) 
The CIA begun covert action against the Communist government in Afghanistan, which was 
closely tied to the Soviet Union. Sometime this year, the CIA begins training militants in 
Pakistan and beaming radio propaganda into Afghanistan. By April 1979, US officials are 
meeting with opponents of the Afghan government to determine their needs. (Blum, 1995, 
344) 
Robert Gates, who will become CIA Director in the early 1990s, will later recall that in a 
meeting on March 30, 1979, Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocumbe wonders aloud 
whether there is “value in keeping the Afghan insurgency going, ‘sucking the Soviets into a 
Vietnamese quagmire.’” (Gates, 1996, 145) Soviets at the time recognized the US meddling 




In addition the failure of US Congress to ratify SALT II in the summer of 1979, which 
seemed to signal an American turn away from détente was one reason to believe the US will 
soon get increasingly hostile, the decision to deploy Pershing missiles in Europe was other. 
(Kalinovsky, 2011, 22) The loss of a client state would be particularly embarrassing at the 
time when the USSR´s main adversary seemed to be abandoning détente. If so, it would 
represent an unacceptable blow to Soviet prestige. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was modeled after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968. Both operations featured elaborate deception, subversion of an unreliable communist 
government, the introduction of airborne troops to seize key objectives in the capital, the 
movement of motorized rifle troops to link-up with air-landed elements, and, finally, the 
replacement of an unreliable government with more loyal comrades. (Collins, 1986, 77) 
The Soviet leadership wanted an Afghanistan that would be similar to other Soviet satellite 
states and under virtual Soviet imperial rule with the only façade of independence. (Riedel, 
2009, 2) The invasion was the result of a decision reached by several key foreign-policy 
figures within the Politburo, not by the Politburo as whole. This was characteristic of decision 
making in late Brezhnev era.  
On Christmas Days, 1979, the Soviet 40th army crossed the USSR´s border with Afghanistan 
at Kushka & Termez. The 40th army had allegedly come to save Afghan President Hafizullah 
Amin´s socialist revolution. The true intensions of the USSR did not become apparent until 
two days later, when an explosion destroyed the main communication hub in downtown 
Kabul. (Rhys Hill, 2008, 18) 
President Carter, however, was shocked by the invasion and immediately urged Soviets to 
stay out of the Gulf. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military 
forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Strait of Hormuz – a waterway 
through which much of the world´s oil must flow. The Soviet Union was attempting to 
consolidate a strategic position that posed a grave force to the free movement of the Middle 
Eastern oil. (Fullerton, 1984, 38) Soviets did not have such ambitious goals and their actions 
were largely misperceived. Understanding American way of reasoning, one must bear in mind 
that the Brezhnev regime was the same one that invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, did nothing 
to stop the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in 197, conducted a successful military operation 
in Angola in 1975, and armed both attackers and the defenders in the Ethiopian-Somali War 
in 1977. (Collins, 1986, 102) Contrary to conventional wisdom, the presence of the Soviet 
Airforce in Afghanistan did not significantly improve its operational radius. 
Contrary to Carter´s perception, Joseph Collins identified a few main reasons for the Soviet 
decision to invade Afghanistan: 
 Security concerns (Potential US client at southern border) 
 Commitments (Shoulder up friendly regime facing uprising) 
 Prestige (Superpower policy) 
 Absence of constraints (Soviet conventional supremacy in the region) 
The key element in Soviet decision making process was a belief the campaign won´t last long. 
The military seized control of the government, killed President Amin and installed Babrak 
Karmal as a soviet marionette. The Kremlin viewed the intervention as a short-term 
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commitment – the limited contingent of forces would assume garrison and urban security 
duties, while the Afghan Army deployed to the countryside to fight the insurgents. (Fivecoat, 
2012, 2) The Soviets were mistaken. The poor performance of the local army pulled the 
USSR into its last war. In addition, there is no evidence that any kind of American credibility 
was taken into account. Soviet Union miscalculated the events not only in terms of feasibility 
of the Afghan invasion, but also in terms of US approach. 
Despite some US scholars drawing a link between US inaction to Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, no evidence was found in Soviet archives that the USSR actually 
considered US credibility in this regard. The invasion was a product of misperception, the 
Soviets were afraid of Americans trying to install a friendly regime in Afghanistan after the 
revolution of traditionally pro-American regime in Iran. Americans interpreted the Soviet 
move as a clearly hostile act aimed at further expansion south to the Indian Ocean or the 
Middle East area, which would give them a leverage over important oil trade routes and naval 
chokepoints. In addition, the Soviets perceived US Congress failure to ratify SALT II 
agreement as an indicator of increasingly hostile nature of US foreign policy. Weak position 
of President Carter and Soviet rapid military success in Czechoslovakia made USSR believe 
its campaign in Afghanistan will take only a few months without the world even noticing. 
3.7 Able Archer (1983) 
The year 1983 has entered historical memory and imagination as the year of maximum 
danger, the most recent of one of the relatively few moments during which the world was, or 
was believed to be, palpably close to superpower nuclear war. Some analysts see the Soviet 
response to Able Archer exercise as having brought world closer to direct nuclear exchange 
than the Cuban Missile Crisis. This case perfectly shows how easily one´s nuclear ambitions 
can be misread and how fragile deterrence relationship might be amid heightened tensions. 
 
The war game was conducted from Nov. 7 to 11, 1983. It was designed to practice high-level 
staff procedures and interactions, with a particular emphasis on “the transition from 
conventional to nonconventional operations, including the use of nuclear weapons,” according 
to an unclassified NATO summary of its operations. The notional action of the war game 
spanned Europe, from Norway (launching pad for attacks on the Kola Peninsula) to the intra-
German border (fighting along a broad front) to the United Kingdom (attacks on NATO 
airfields) to Bulgaria and even Crimea. To Soviet leadership, such a large scale operation 
resembled very much about Operation Barbarossa, a surprise attack perpetrated by Nazi 
Germany in 1941. 
 
Overall situation of the USSR at the time was serious. At the time, the Soviets were embroiled 
in their Afghan adventure without having found the way out. Soviet satellites and friendly 
regimes in Cuba and Angola were draining decreasing resources. The tensions have been 
escalating throughout a couple of years and Moscow was worried about increasing presence 
of American forces in Western Europe. 
 
In 1982, the U.S. and NATO countries had some 5 million people in uniform and the Warsaw 
"Pact" 4.8 million. The Soviets themselves had only 3.7 million people in uniform, of which 
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one million were stationed on their long border with China. In Europe, NATO had 2.1 
million, the "Pact" 1.6 million, and the Soviets less than one million. The respective figures 
for ready reserves were 5, 7.1, and 5.2 million. So, even if the Warsaw Pact had been a bona 
fide military alliance, the West had enjoyed ground forces superiority in Europe and the 
world. (Nissani, 1992, 96) The only advantage the USSR could have rely one was the fact its 
nuclear arsenal outnumbered the one of the US. 
Andropov declared that the new American administration was actively preparing for nuclear 
war and that a nuclear first strike was possible. He then announced that, by a decision of the 
Politburo, the KGB and the GRU were for the first time to cooperate in a worldwide 
intelligence operation code-named RYAN (the Russian acronym for ‘Nuclear Missile 
Attack’) (Barrass, 2016, 9) 
Now, for the first time, the KGB was placing strategic military intelligence at the top of its 
collection priorities. The KGB’s primary task was to provide advance warning of any decision 
by the US and its NATO allies to launch a nuclear attack. The underlying concept of RYAN, 
which had been developed by the KGB, was the belief that deviations from peacetime 
routines in a wide variety of spheres – military, political, economic, health administration, and 
civil defense – could provide preliminary warning of Western preparations for a first strike. 
(Barrass, 2016, 9) 
Moreover, the tensions with the USSR were gradually culminating. The entire string of 
dangerous events regarded by the Soviets as hostile acts prior the Able Archer military 
exercise fueled Soviet paranoia and made Politburo believe that NATO attack was imminent. 
Moreover, Soviets concluded that the US nuclear first strike might occur under the disguise of 
apparently routine military exercise with an aim to catch the Soviets off guard. 
 
These are the events which had a serious impact on deterrence stability in the early 80s. 
1) Euromissile deployment 
2) Raegan´s SDI 
3) Shooting down of KAL 007 airliner in the Soviet airspace 
4) False alarm in a Soviet early warning installation 
5) US invasion of Grenada 
 
Military-wise. The Soviet military establishment was most concerned about the Pershings. 
Pershing IIs deployed in West Germany could be launched across trajectories that Soviet early 
warning installations were poorly equipped to detect in good time. In addition, a Soviet 
intelligence appreciation in February 1983 estimated that the Pershings could strike at long-
range targets in the Soviet Union within four to six minutes. This compared very unfavorably 
with the 20 minutes or so that Moscow assumed it would have to detect and react to missiles 
fired from the continental United States. (Cimbala, 2000, 3) 
 
On 23 March 1983 President Ronald Reagan surprised many of his own advisors as well as 
American listeners with his proposal for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), rapidly dubbed 
'Star Wars' by media pundits and critics. Reagan also surprised allied NATO and Soviet 
audiences. The President shared with the US public his vision of a peace shield that would 
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protect the US homeland from nuclear attack, even a large-scale attack of the kind that the 
Soviets could mount in the early 1980s. The reaction in Moscow was predictably negative, 
but unpredictably hysterical. (Milevski, 2014, 1079) This entirely new geopolitical reality 
might have literally nullify the Soviet nuclear capability. The combined effort of US 
resources, finances, management and industrial capacity could have not been matched by the 
USSR whose economy was increasingly uncompetitive. 
 
Massive military exercise Able Archer 83 took place only a few weeks after one of the Soviet 
satellites sent a signal to his command bunker in the warning facility that a missile had been 
launched from the United States and was headed for Russia. Soon the satellite was reporting 
that five Minuteman ICBMs had been launched. The warning system was white hot with 
indicators of war. However, the Soviet colonel in charge decided that the satellite alert was a 
false alarm less than five minutes after the first, erroneous reports came into his warning 
center. He based this decision partly on the fact that Soviet ground-based radar installations 
showed no confirming evidence of enemy missiles headed for the Soviet Union. Petrov also 
recalled military briefings he had received, stressing that any enemy attack on Russia would 
involve many missiles instead of a few. (Cimbala, 2000, 8) 
 
In addition, Soviets believed the US is willing to achieve its objectives by the use of force. 
They did so just weeks ago in Grenada. 
 
On October 25, international tensions were ratcheted up further when the United States 
launched an invasion of the small Caribbean island of Grenada. The official purpose was to 
rescue 250 American students at St. George’s School of Medicine who were caught in the 
middle of a power struggle between two communist factions. It took little more than 48 hours 
for the American invasion force to overwhelm the 1,200-man Peoples’ Revolutionary Army 
and a 780-man Cuban contingent. The fighting, while brief, was fierce, with the Americans 
suffering 134 casualties to 500 Grenadian and Cuban losses. The invasion was the largest 
American military operation since Vietnam and the first time that a communist nation had 
been invaded since North Korea. (Raffensperger, 2016, 3) 
 
Analysts have asserted that the Soviets went so far as to put their entire ballistic missile force 
on an elevated alert status. Under these conditions, another false-alarm ICBM launch 
detection—like the ones the Soviets experienced in September—could have been 
catastrophic. Reagan, writing in his book An American Life, said he had a hard time believing 
the Soviets could have imagined the US striking the first blow in a nuclear war, but developed 
a profound worry that leaders on either side could apply “reason” in such a crisis, with “six 
minutes to decide” what to do about a detected incoming strike. (Grier, 2014, 109) 
 
Soviets were ready to immediately launch their retaliatory strike. For two years, SU-24 
nuclear capable tactical bombers were deployed in East Germany and Hungary greatly 




 Air armies in East Germany and Poland were placed on alert; 
 A suspension of all flight operations from 4–10 November, with the exception of 
intelligence flights, of which there were 35 (significantly more than in previous years); 
 Increasing the number of Mig-23s on strip alert and fully armed (these fighter-
interceptors were designed to track and shoot down the low-flying Gryphon cruise 
missiles with conventional armaments); 
 Invoking a 30-minute, round-the-clock readiness time and assigning priority targets. 
(Barrass, 2016, 12) 
A flurry of diplomatic cables flashed from Washington to Moscow, giving repeated and 
wholehearted assurances that Able Archer was simply an exercise. Reagan sent presidential 
adviser Brent Scowcroft to the Soviet capital to give further assurances, face to face, on behalf 
of the president that the United States would never launch a surprise attack on the USSR. The 
effort was not enough to convince Andropov of Reagan’s good intentions, but it was enough 
for him to watch and wait. Throughout the rest of the Able Archer exercise, Soviet forces 
stayed on alert, braced and ready to move at a moment’s notice. Only when the exercise 
finally concluded on November 11 did the Soviet Union give the order for its strategic forces 
to stand down. (Raffensperger, 2016, 3) 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, tough US approach to USSR and the series of measures taken to 
bolster up the deterrence were perceived differently by the Soviets who were certain that 
NATO is ready initiate first strike at any moment. Adamsky describes as culminating point of 
deterrence. This concept refers to a moment after which additional threats may become 
counter-productive; instead of leading to an actor’s restraint they will provoke escalation. 
When the ‘culminating point of deterrence’ is crossed a threat becomes more likely to incite 
the opponent to attack rather than to back down. Thus, ‘culminating point of deterrence’ is 
similar to ‘diminishing marginal return’ in economics theory. After this point, credible threats 
become so convincing that the adversary feels cornered with nothing to lose, assumes that the 
enemy is about to strike anyway, and decides to pre-empt, thus overreacting. (Adamsky, 
2012, 33) In fact, this description supports Jervis´ conclusion of miscalculation and 
misperception as key elements of potential conflict. 
 
In 1983, the Soviets were suspicion about real American intensions. Firm rhetoric of President 
Reagan, SDI initiative and Pershing missiles deployment in Europe lead Andropov to a 
conclusion that US is about to initiate a preventive nuclear war against the USSR. For more 
than two years Soviet agents were searching for evidence that the US is getting ready to 
perpetrate a surprise nuclear strike on Russia with an aim of leadership decapitation. The 
shooting of Korean airliner in the Soviet airspace and blunt US criticism and false Soviet 
early warning alarm bolstered the atmosphere of insecurity and paranoia. Able Archer 
exercise therefore supported this self-fulfilling prophecy leading Soviets to a conclusion 
Americans might be ready to initiate nuclear first strike. The US willingness to resort to force 
was clearly demonstrated by US invasion of Grenada. This whole string of events therefore 
lead to confidence erosion and to increasing likelihood of preemptive war initiated by the 
USSR in self-defense. It is important to note the Soviets did not analyze previous US behavior 
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in any way. While Reagan´s policy was thoroughly analyzed and interpreted, neither 
intelligence nor military planners cared about behavior of previous administrations. 
3.8 Cold War Conclusions 
Only in very few cases leaders of the US and the USSR considered previous behavior when 
calculating their strategy.  
In 1948, the Soviets decided to initiate Berlin Blockade namely due to the US plan to 
introduce a sovereign West German currency despite its previous effort to contain communist 
movement in Greece and to oppose Soviet pressure on Turkey. 
When assessing situation on the Korean peninsula in 1950, Stalin agreed with Mao´s and 
Kim´s idea to reunite Korea only after Dean Acheson´s speech of US defensive perimeter in 
Asia, which excluded South Korea. According to available documents, the successful US 
credibility demonstrated during the Berlin crisis of 1948 was completely ignored. 
Interestingly enough, The Second Berlin Crisis was caused because the successful US 
protection of Berlin 1948 denied the USSR of its objectives, which in fact did not change in 
the meantime. Khrushchev increased its pressure especially when President Kennedy took 
office. USSR put Kennedy under much higher pressure, even though it withdrew its first 
Berlin ultimatum in 1958 under Eisenhower. A change of American President brought in hope 
that the US commitment vis-à-vis Berlin might slightly erode.  
The Soviet decision to move nuclear missiles to Cuba, contrary to deterrence-credibility logic, 
was partially motivated by Kennedy´s firm stance on Berlin question. Khrushchev possibly 
might have wanted to use Cuba as a bargaining chip which could be eventually exchanged for 
West Berlin.  
Sure, the United States believed, especially in the 50s and 60s that not containing the Soviet 
Union will result only in its faster expansion, but in most cases during this period of time 
USSR was no pulling the strings behind the world events. The revolution in Cuba and 
decolonization process in Cuba were products of broader historical shift rather than direct 
result of Soviet support. Soviets did affiliated with Ho and Castro only after the US meddling. 
The US, by contrast, did not care about the previous actions of the USSR when deciding to 
invade Vietnam. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not affected by previous record of US response to 
Soviet actions. Some scholars suggested that Soviets might have been influenced by no US 
action during 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, but no hard evidence to support this claim 
was found. 
Operation Able Archer launched in 1983 put Soviets on high alert because of Reagan´s firm 
stance on USSR. His invasion of Grenada, SDI, Pershing II deployment in West Europe and 
criticism of Soviet downing of Korean Airliner created the atmosphere of fear, which only 
increased Soviet paranoia. 
Based on the list of crisis behavior above, actual situation (elections, party politics, balance of 
power, rhetoric and signaling) had greater impact on decision-making process than previous 
interactions between the US and the USSR.  
These claims support Theory of Inherent Credibility rather than Commitment Theory. 
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4 Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Arab Israeli conflict shaped Middle-East´s destiny for almost seventy years to date. Along 
with the Cold War, Arab-Israeli wars has gradually become a point of interest to many 
researchers focused on deterrence and relationship. Many deterrence failures, preventive and 
preemptive wars provide a valuable empirical evidence necessary to validate deterrence-
related theories validity. Moreover, the most likely presence of nuclear weapons in Israeli 
military inventory make conflict even more important, as it can escalate from conventional to 
nuclear level. 
To analyze Arab-Israeli conflict, the most significant conflicts were chosen. Conflicts related 
to non-state actors such as Wars in Lebanon were not considered. 
Table 2.1 Arab-Israeli Conflict Dataset 
  
Based on the dataset above, a regression analysis has been conducted in order find a possible 
link between independent variable (Number of Years Since Last Conflict) and multiple 
dependent variables (Challenger´s Head of State Term Length, Defender´s Head of State 
Term Length and Power Discrepancy Challenger´s Perspective). 
Below are the results of regression analysis for the Arab-Israeli Conflict Dataset. 
Table 2.2 – Arab-Israeli Conflict Regression Database 
 























head of state 
duration
Defenders 






1948 The War of Independence Israel - 0 1 0 0 12 0,1 -28
1956 Sinai War Arabs - 0 1 8 8 1 0,2 -27
1967 The Six Day War Arabs Israel 0 1 12 11 1 11 -8
1969 The War of Attrition Arabs Israel 0 1 2 1 13 0,3 -2
1970 Black September Arabs Israel 1 0 0,1 1 0,5 0,6 27
1973 The Yom Kippur War Arabs Israel 0 1 3 4 3 5 14




Adjusted R Square 0,472982
Standard Error 3,359534
Observations 7
ANOVA df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 94,63487 31,54496 2,794935 0,210528012
Residual 3 33,85942 11,28647
Total 6 128,4943
Coefficients Standard Eror t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 4,669367487 2,43883576 1,914589 0,151441 -3,092096366 12,43083 -3,092096 12,430831
Challenger´s head of state 
duration
-0,4071675 0,301691283 -1,34962 0,269948 -1,367283809 0,552949 -1,367284 0,5529488
Defenders head of state 
duration
0,599640381 0,375775911 1,595739 0,208819 -0,59624628 1,795527 -0,596246 1,795527
Power Discrepancy 
(Challenger´s perspective
-0,11794444 0,072891008 -1,61809 0,204073 -0,349916161 0,114027 -0,349916 0,1140273
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Value of Significance F is much greater than generally recommended level of 0,05 the results 
of regression analysis for such a limited number of observations are not very accurate. 
Based on the regression analysis, the following function can be formulated: 
Y (No. of Years Since Last Conflict) = 4,669367487 – 0,4071675 * (Challenger´s Head of 
State Duration) + 0,599640381* (Defenders´s Head of State Duration) – 0,11794444 * 
(Power Discrepancy) 
Chart 2.1 – Challenger´s Head of State Term Length & Conflict Frequency 
  
The chart above presents the relationship between Conflict Frequency and Challenger´s Head 
of State Term Length. The conflict frequency increases with duration of challenger´s head of 
state in power. That implies the following: the shorter the challenger´s head of state is in 
power, the more likely it is challenge the status quo. In addition, the longer he is in power, the 
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Chart 2.2 – Defender´s Head of State Term Length & Conflict Frequency 
 
The chart above presents the relationship between Conflict Frequency and Defender´s Head 
of State Term Length. The conflict frequency decreases dramatically with duration of 
defender´s head of state in power. That implies the following: the shorter the defender´s head 
of state is in power, the more likely it is that the challenger will try to redefine the status quo.   
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The chart above shows a relationship between a Conflict Frequency and Challenger´s relative 
power. The more powerful the challenger is vis-à-vis its adversary, the more likely he is to 
challenge the status quo. 
Detailed analysis of the major crisis of Israeli-Arab conflict in the 20th century is focused to 
verify these claims. 
4.1 The independence War of 1948 
In the afternoon of May 14, 1948, as the British made final preparations to depart from Haifa, 
David Ben-Gurion, standing under a portrait of Theodor Herzl in a museum in Tel Aviv, 
proclaimed the State of Israel. The United States extended de facto recognition to the new 
state eleven minutes later, and the Soviet Union followed with de jure recognition. (Bickerton, 
2010, 97) Shortly thereafter, various Arab armies entered Palestine: The Arab Legion and 
Iraqis went into the area allocated to the Arabs in Judea and Samaria; the Egyptian army 
moved through Gaza and Beersheba; the Lebanese went into Arab Galilee; the Syrians 
remained seated at the border. 
Miracles rarely, if ever occur in wars. Usually, the stronger belligerent wins, and the Israeli 
War of Independence was no exception. A detailed examination of the balance of power 
reveals that throughout 1948 war, the Jews were superior in personnel, equipment, logistics, 
and organization. The sole exception of to this rule was the period from the outset of the 
invasion on May 15 to the first truce in June 1948. (Bar-On, 2006, 53) 
During this period the Arab armies enjoyed a considerable superiority over the IDF in the air 
artillery, and light armor forces. Moreover, Jewish troops were exhausted after six months of 
combat operations and had already sustained heavy loses. 
Prior to May 1948, it was assumed that the numerical superiority of the surrounding Arab 
states would nullify the prospects of a Jewish victory in Palestine. This changed with the 
Jewish forces’ acquisition of illegal arms, chiefly from Czechoslovakia, but also from other 
Eastern European states, such that from mid-May 1948, the Israel Defense Forces emerged in 
a superior position with respect to men and arms despite Arab reinforcements. (Gendzier, 
2011, 47) 
Israelis usually tend to describe the war of 1948 in the manner similar to that of historian 
Michael Oren whom put it in an interview in a following way: “Israel was being invaded by 
hundreds of tanks, hundreds of warplanes, and countless artillery pieces and machine guns . . . 
and Israel didn’t have a single tank. That was a thoroughly existential situation.” (Siegel, 
2008, 6) 
Just as Arabs tended to exaggerate Jewish strength, the Jews tended to exaggerate Arab 
strength- and Yishuv strategy cannot be understood without taking account of this. Jewish 
fears of defeat and possible annihilation were very real, and they began to dissipate only after 
the Arab armies proved to be much smaller and, by and large, less competent than anticipated. 
(Morris, 2008, 205) Estimated of both sides military strength varied a lot. 
On the eve of the war, the number of Arab troops likely to be committed to the war was about 
23,000 (10,000 Egyptians, 4,500 Jordanians, 3,000 Iraqis, 3,000 Syrians, 2,000 ALA 
volunteers, 1,000 Lebanese and some Saudi Arabians), in addition to the irregular Palestinians 
already present. The Yishuv had 35,000 troops of the Haganah, 3,000 of Stern and Irgun and a 
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few thousand armed settlers. (Kurzman, 1970, 282) What Jewish military lacked were 
weapons, both heavy and light alike. In the initial phase of the conflict, the Israeli state was 
able to arm only a half of its military force. 
Despite believed Arab advantage in terms of tanks and combat aircraft, the most of it never 
reached the Palestine theatre or was unserviceable. According to estimates, Arabs had 
maximum 45 tanks while Israelis just 16. (Tal, 2000, 120) 
In fact, Arabs undeterred by the newly created Jewish state heavily underestimated Jewish 
resistance ability. Gamal Nasser, who at the time served in Palestine as a young colonel, later 
summarized the Egyptian preparations and intensions: “There was no concentration of forces, 
no accumulation of ammunition and equipment. There was no reconnaissance, no 
intelligence, no plans. It was to be a political war. There was to be advance without victory 
and retreat without defeat.” (Morris, 2008, 185) 
True, in the initial phase, Haganah/IDF lacked sufficient arms, having only rifles for 
approximately 40 % of the mobilized fighting force. What the myths often fails to mention, is 
that Israel had already purchased vast amounts of weapons and only awaited their delivery. 
By the end of May, these weapons were arriving in the ports and on the airfields of Israel. 
One single airlift from Czechoslovakia on the 20th of May carried 10,000 rifles and more than 
3000 machineguns along with other kinds of arms and ammunition. With this delivery alone, 
the IDF could muster between 25,000 and 30,000 armed men in the defense of the nation. 
(Westbye, 2012, 64) 
If you were to count all armed personnel of the Kibbutz defenses and the members of the 
Irgun and Stern-gang, the numbers would be even higher.  
By mid-June the IDF numbered 41,000 and were still mobilizing. By December 1948, the 
number of Israeli troops reached its peak at 96,441 men and women at arms. The invading 
Arabs on the other hand, probably never counted more than 24.000 fighting men, including 
the Arabs of Palestine taking part in the fighting. (Flapan, 1987, 196) 
Arab armies, by contrast, were much smaller and underequipped – and they deployed only 
part of their strength in Palestine, usually leaving large number of troops at home to guard 
against internal upheaval by minorities or political opponents. In addition, the Jews managed 
to handle the international embargo in a much better way than Arabs. The embargo imposed 
by the UN hit primarily the US and the UK – the traditional suppliers of Egypt, Iraq and 
Jordan at the time. 
Consequently, the Jewish state managed to defend herself from the Arab invasion. All 
reservations notwithstanding, the War of Independence was, at least in certain respect, Israel´s 
most successful campaign against the Arabs. It was the only contest in which Israel succeeded 
in translating a military victory into a political settlement, one that survived for eighteen 
years. At first, Israel regarded the armistice agreements of 1949 as interim phase leading to a 
permanent peace settlement. These hopes did not materialize. The armistice persisted until 
1967, and permanent settlement is still remote. Nevertheless, Israel survived and managed to 
establish herself as a credible military power. Israel came out victorious with three main 
achievements: 
 Survive the attack of its Arab neighbors 
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 Territorial expansion compared to the UN partition resolution 
 Improved geographic ration favoring Jewish population 
Regardless the military triumph, the war was also the most costly that Israel has ever fought. 
The number of fatal casualties exceeded 6,000 and was about 1% of Jewish population in 
Palestine at the beginning of the war. Lack of preparedness, dilettantism, and mistaken 
concept – not Arab might- were the main reasons for the death toll. (Bar-On, 2006, 55) 
Interestingly enough, the Independence war did not turn Israel into military power in the eyes 
of its Arab adversaries. Until 1956, the Arabs did not attached much military importance to 
Israel. It seems that they viewed the outcome of 1948 as mishap, a historical accident, not as a 
reflection of military forces or of the IDF´s qualitative superiority. They thought that the 
outcome of the war reflected their own flaws and inefficiency, and thus they engaged in much 
mutual finger-pointing. Israel seemed a passing episode, the existence of which depended on 
the grace of others. (Tal, 2000, 129) 
In 1948, Arab armies were confident about their swift victory against newly established state 
of Israel. According to many sources, regardless of conventional wisdom, they did not have 
any decisive advantage in terms of technology or mobilized manpower. The decision to strike 
was therefore hasty and unprepared. Nobody was willing to take any responsibility and 
everyone was waiting on someone else to defeat the Jews. Since it is the first Arab-Israeli 
conflict, no prior deterrence could have been established. 
4.2 Sinai War of 1956 (Suez Crisis) 
On 29 October, Israel launched a war against Egypt. Two days later it became clear that 
Britain and France were Israel´s senior partners and that the central target of the two colonial 
powers was to restore their hold over the Suez Canal. Nasser, who become a symbol of 
resistance in the Middle East to “colonialism, imperialism, and Zionism”, became too 
dangerous, thus the UK, France and Israel decided to combine their effort with an aim to 
topple his regime (Bickerton, 2010, 122) Nasser´s intention to nationalize the Suez Channel 
and closing Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli or Israeli-bound shipping was a significant blow to all 
actors, but each had a different goal. Main focus of this part is devoted to Israeli rationale for 
a war with Egypt in 1956, despite Israel went to the war in response to its strategic ally, 
France. (Bar-On, 2006, 84) 
The Suez War etched in the minds of Israel´s decision makers and affected their decision 
making a decade later during the Six-Days War and, later, the Yom Kippur War. Its further 
significance lies in the fact that this was the first time Israel´s cabinet approved a war since 
the establishment of the state in 1948. (Lahav, 2010, 62) 
Prior to the events of 1956, the Egyptians adopted a strategy of low-intensity conflict. Arab 
leaders were comfortable with subversive actions on the Israeli territory delivered by militias 
known as Fedayeen, therefore, it was necessary for Israel to escalate the intensity of a conflict 
up to the level Arab leadership was unable to sustain. Since 1949, the Egyptian border raids 
were gradually escalating. These armed bands of volunteers were encouraged to cross the 
border to spy, commit acts of sabotage, murder Israelis and attack their settlements at night. 
(Bickerton, 2010, 116) 
With the use of this shameful strategy, Arabs were able to inflict significant damage to Israeli 
society without taking the risk of a frontal conflict. In order to face such a challenging threat, 
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Dayan promoted the strategy of deterrence by punishment. To justify such a controversial 
decision, Dayan stated in one of his speeches to his officers: “We cannot guard every water 
pipeline from explosion and every tree from uprooting. We cannot prevent murder of a 
worker in an orchard or a family in their beds. But it is in our power to set a high price on our 
blood, a price too high for Arab community, the Arab army, or the Arab government to think 
it worth paying.” (Rid, 2012, 132) Escalating this conflict on a level unbearable for Egypt was 
a notion Israeli leadership toyed with, but there was a need for a pretext the international 
community would be willing to accept. 
Throughout the 1950s, Israeli intelligence carefully monitored the balance of power vis-à-vis 
its Arab adversaries. Although Israel had never been able to match Egypt in terms of the 
numbers of armaments, it had always been able to rely on qualitatively superior weapons, 
morale, and technical skills. Author Levy & Gochal argue Israeli leaders were willing to 
accept an overall 3:1 numerical inferiority in relation to the Arabs, and a 2.5:1 ratio with the 
Egyptians. (Levy & Gochal, 2010, 25) 
The so called Czech arms deal of September 1955 (Soviet arms to Egypt) was the greatest 
single transformation in the regional arms balance but only of the several changes during this 
decade. (Levey, 2008, 30) The deal of 1955 increased the imbalance to a point the Israelis 
considered a threat to their national survival. Soviet arms to the Nasser regime brought about 
a radical change in the arms balance and were profound shock to Israel. According to terms of 
the deal, Egypt would receive more than 200 jets, 100 heavy tanks, torpedo boats, submarines, 
and a large quantity of heavy artillery, small arms, and ammunition. (Levey, 2008, 30) 
Once the weapons were delivered to Egypt and integrated into the Egyptian arsenal, it would 
increase the number of Egyptian tanks from approximately 170-200 in summer 195 (already 
20% more than Israel) to well over 500. It would also give the Egyptian tank fleet an infusion 
of new technology. Most of the new tanks were T-34 medium tanks and Stalin-III heavy 
tanks, among the very best in Soviet arsenal. Although Israel had recently completed and 
arms deal with France that called for integration of 30 French AM-III tanks into the IDF in 
1956, Israel´s ensuing qualitative superiority would be challenged by the Czech arms deal. 
(Levy & Gochal, 2010, 24). The deal also increased the number of Egyptian jet fighter frim 
around 80-100 (compared to Israel´s 30 – 50) to over 200, and in the process replaced Egypt´s 
first generation Vampire jets with more advanced Mig-15s and Mig-17s that rivaled, if not 
surpassed, the quality of Israeli Meteor and Ouragan fighters. (Levy & Gochal, 2010, 24) 
The new arms would provide Egypt with superiority in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms, and negate the qualitative military advantages upon which Israeli security had rested 
since its independence. The shift in the balance of power would be particularly dangerous in 
the context of ongoing border incidents and reprisals; The Egyptian blockade of Israeli 
shipping; Israeli perceptions that President Gamal Nasser´s pan-Arabic ideology would lead 
to the strengthening and unification of the Arab coalition arrayed against Israel; the 
inevitability of a second round of war within a few years.; the continued diplomatic isolation 
of Israel; and the belief that American unwillingness to send small arms to Israel would make 
it impossible to correct the growing imbalance through external purchases. (Levy & Gochal, 
2010, 18) 
The war was a consequence of the idea that relative decline often leads to war through better-
now-than-later logic; Perception that one´s military power and potential are declining of that 
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of a rising adversary, and by the fear of the continuing deterioration of the status quo, the 
erosion of one´s bargaining power, and the risk of war occurring under worse circumstances 
later. 
All in all, Israel´s policy of limited warfare was an unqualified success. Since October 1956 
the Fedayeen raids from Egypt have completely halted. The Arab nations appear to have been 
convinced that a continuation of the raids would bring down a large-scale military response. 
The end of the raids has also been guaranteed by the establishment of the UN Emergency 
Force in Gaza, a direct result of invasion, aby by the United State guarantees as well. Israel 
also achieved free access to the Gul of Aqaba; part of the IM force is stationed at Sharm-el-
Sheikh, guarding the Strait of Tiran. (Blechman, 1966, 411) Most importantly, the primary 
objective of ending the threat of a full-scale Egyptian offensive was achieved at least for the 
short run. The Egyptian army was severely beaten and huge quantities of its new armaments 
either destroyed or captured. 
The Israeli participation of 1956 war was caused by a fear that Egypt could became too 
powerful. Israel initiated the war before Egypt accumulated enough capability, which could 
also greatly enhance its credibility. In addition, Israel had a secret agreement with France and 
the UK, which offered her a supposed protection from outside intervention. As a consequence 
of Israeli war in the Sinai Peninsula, there was no war between Israel and Egypt for 11 years 
due to credible reputation for offense that Israel developed through its preventive attack. A 
decisive Israeli military victory on Sinai taught Arabs a lesson. 
4.3 The Six Day War of 1967 
One of the most significant examples of the successful use of Israeli force is undoubtedly the 
Six-Day War of 1967. In 1967, another delicate situation emerged right behind Israeli 
borders. On May 14 1967, Cairo announced that the Egyptian armed forces were in a state of 
maximum alert, and combat units crossed the Suez into Sinai. (Bickerton, 2010, 143)  
Though no single event can be said to have sparked the Six-Day War, it is possible to trace 
the evolution of that conflict to November 1966. The Baathist regime in Damascus tried to 
challenge Nasser with an aim to establish its primacy over domestic rivals and to arrogate the 
leadership of the Arab world by provoking Israel and thus forcing Egypt to maintain its 
commitment to Syria since both countries had a formal defense treaty signed since 4 
November 1966. (Stein, 2007, 125) 
Such a claim supports Zeev Maoz who credits the decision to occupy Sinai by Egypt was an 
act of extended deterrence. Egyptians were dragged into the spiral of military escalation, 
which was possibly triggered by Syria´s water diversion projects and military provocations on 
the northern front. Main aim of this tactical move was to send Israel a clear message: back off 
Syria! (Maoz, 2006, 90) Despite formal support to Syria, Nasser was not confident of its 
ability to engage Israel in war; Mohamed Haykal, a close confidante of Nasser at the time, 
made clear that obligation to Syria extended only to the defense of Arab territory but not to 
defense of Egypt´s capability to engage Israel in war. (Stein, 2007, 125) 
Nasser decided to flex his military muscle and managed to persuade the UN forces to leave 
the Sinai Peninsula. He issued an order to concentrate the force in Gaza and the Sharm al 
Sheikh, the Sinai promontory overlooking the Straits of Tiran, thereby exposing Israel´s 
border to tens of thousands of soldiers who then paraded into the peninsula. Nasser´s aim was 
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to win a bloodless political victory over Israel, and not to initiate war by opening fire or by 
blockading shipping through Tiran to Israel´s vital southern port of Eilat.  
The de facto commander of Egypt Field Marhsal Abd Hakim Amr who performed poorly in 
both 1956 and in Yemen wars, was eager to prove his mettle against Israel. (Bar-On, 2004, 
135) Amr, Nasser´s principal contender for power revised the orders of UNEF, instructing the 
unit to exit the region entirely, and sent paratroopers to occupy Sharm Al Sheikh. Thus 
positioned, Egypt had little choice but to close the Straits providing Israel with casus belli. 
Among other things, the strategic situation decisively favored Arabs over Israel. Moreover, as 
public opinion in the Arab world reached an almost frenzied pitch at the prospect of Israel´s 
demise, king Hussein of Jordan realized that he could not stay out of the fray any longer. 
(Bar-On, 2004, 137) Few days after shutting Israeli access to Strait of Tiran, Jordan´s King 
decided to bandwagon by concluding a defensive treaty with Egypt. 
Alliance of Arab states under the leadership of Egypt had been formed very quickly. Egyptian 
pressure and expanding influence of Nasser resulted in conclusion of mutual defense pact 
between Egypt and Jordan. However, the similar treaties with Syria and Iraq were signed even 
before, which meant Israel was successfully surrounded by its enemies. In such a situation, it 
would be very unwise to wait and see what happens. All the odds favored Arabs over Israelis. 
Although Israeli decision makers were firstly reluctant to strike first, it was necessary to act 
carefully and quickly, especially due to the unclear positions of both superpowers. Their 
interference might have altered the variables as in 1956 and possibly turned Israeli situation 
into a huge disaster.  
Moreover, Nasser threatened to annihilate Israel and to cast all the Jews into the sea. It is 
obvious that Israeli leadership could not just wait and see if Nasser is speaking the truth or it 
is just a gamble. Moreover, Egypt at the time was rumored to have ready-to-use chemical 
weapons, which eventually were used during Egypt´s intervention in Yemen against the 
Saudis. (Oren, 2005, 2)  
Regardless of Nasser´s previous actions, the armies of United Arab Republic and its allies 
enjoyed significant military advantage over Israelis. The scale of asymmetry can be seen 
below: 
Table 2.4 – Balance of power between Israel and Arabs in 1967 
Balance of power between Israel and Arabs in 1967 
  Israel Arabs Egypt Jordan Syria 
Man power 250,000 328,000 210,000 55,000 63,000 
Brigades 25 44 22 10 12 
Artillery pieces 200 1153 575 263 315 
Tanks 1,000 2338 1,300 288 750 
APC´s 1,500 1,845 1,050 210 585 
SAMs 50 160 160 0 0 
AA Guns 550 2,093 950 143 1,000 
Combat Aircraft 286 576 431 18 127 
 (Bickerton, 2010, 145) 
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In such a delicate situation, Israeli leadership believed Egyptian army is ready to strike first. 
In this situation, waiting too long might have led to terrible consequences. Moreover, Israel 
was in a less favorable situation than back in 1956. She could not rely on its former allies, 
France and the United Kingdom. After all-diplomatic efforts have been exhausted without any 
significant results; Israel was forced to act militarily. Therefore, Israeli military operation 
might be clearly seen as an act of self-defense. (Maoz, 2006, 83) With Dayan in the Cabinet, 
and with the Israeli belief that the existence of entire nation was in jeopardy, it was almost 
certain that would strike the first blow. (Bickerton, 2010, 144) 
Israel launched the Six-Day war with a devastating offensive counter air campaign against 
Egypt, followed by similar efforts against Jordan, Syria and Iraq. In the early hours of 5 June 
1967, the IAF launched an extremely well planned and executed series of airstrikes against 18 
Egyptian airbases. Some 200 Israeli fighter jets took off and flew south and southwest to hit 
the targets where Egypt stationed the bulk of its air force. (Bar-On, 2006, 131) 
In three hours of constant hammering, the Israelis destroyed over 300 hundred of Cairo´s 450 
combat aircraft, and killed 100 of 350 Egyptian combat pilots. (Pollack, 2007, 474) 
Before the war, Egyptian military staff was confident that if the IDF attacked, the Egyptian 
military would be strong enough to parry the attack. Such unexpected success of the military 
air force surprised not only Egyptians, but also Israelis. “It may be that Egypt had not 
expected victory, but nobody had been prepared for defeat on such shattering scale. 
Everybody was shocked, including Russians. (Mearsheimer, 1983, 155) 
Even though Egypt managed to replace majority of its military losses within a few months 
after the war, the shock effect of IAF was strong enough to deter Egyptians from a 
conventional all-out war for a few years, until the entire strategy was changed when Sadat 
came to power. 
One may argue that, somewhat paradoxically, Israeli victory in the Six Day War damaged its 
ability to deter enemies with the limited use of force. By achieving decisive victory over 
quantitatively larger Arab armies, Israel deepened the Arab frustration and fueled their 
passion for revenge, which eventually resulted in the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur 
war of 1973. However, this might have been caused by the dramatic shift of Egyptian foreign 
policy with Sadat replacing Nasser. The decisive Israeli demonstration of its military 
capabilities forced Egypt to abandon their strategy of annihilating Israel. New goal was far 
less ambitious, but much more feasible – to conclude a peace treaty and get Sinai back.  
Likelihood of Israeli defeat plunged, but the probability of another war to break out stayed 
more or less the same. Nevertheless, Israeli victory delivered a huge blow to Nasser´s political 
prestige while restoring Israel´s image of decisive military power strong enough to handle its 
opponents. Beres agrees that batteries of Israeli deterrence where recharged, but only for six 
years. Israeli conquest of new territories only reinforced Arab grievance. In fact, it created a 
situation to which not only the Palestinians but also – and far more important strategically – 
the Egyptians and Syrians could not possibly be resigned. Second, contrary to view of many 
Israelis at the time, the occupation of the Sinai depreciated the deterrent halo of the IDF. It 
denied the IDF advantages of casus belli and forced the IDF into static forward deployment. It 
faced it with permanently vas Egyptian army at a range so close that it increased the 
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likelihood of a successful surprise attack. Due to this fact, the lag between alert and the arrival 
of reserve reinforcements became unacceptably long. (Beres, 1986, 57) 
As strange as it may seem, Israel´s clear-cut victory changed the strategic reality of the 
Middle East. Strategy of capturing territories, which could be used as a bargaining chip to 
bring Arabs to the negotiation table (Golan Heights, Sinai) , had implications Israelis were 
unable to comprehend at the time. These far-reaching changed circumstances of the regional 
security situation, but Israel failed to adjust its foreign and defense policies to reflect them. 
(Tal, 2000, 143) Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank also resulted into new 1.3 
Palestinians who suddenly appeared under the Israeli legal rule. Palestinian nationalism which 
was somehow restrained when Palestinians lived under Arab governments now grew into 
authentic manifestation of the desire of Palestinian Arab self-determination. 
Another implication of the Six-Day war was the decision to turn the air force into the major 
leg of the Israeli defense forces. As Pollack argues, the Israelis became so confident in the 
ability of their air force to act as a flying artillery that, after war, they bought few artillery 
pieces in favor of more fighter-bombers – much to their regret in the October war of 1973. 
(Pollack, 2007, 482) 
In 1967, Israel was reluctant to start an offensive war to the very end. A series of events lead 
to Israeli decision to strike first. Under unfavorable military conditions, Israel decided tried to 
tip the balance to its favor by striking first. Instead of analyzing Nasser´s behavior in 1956, 
Israelis were alarmed by Nasser´s occupation of Sinai, decision to block Strait of Tiran, 
Egyptian army´s use of chemical weapons in Yemen, strong anti-Jewish sentiment and 
spontaneous demonstrations and by formal military alliance of all Arab states neighboring 
Israel. 
4.4 The War of Attrition (1969) & Black September in Jordan 
(1970) 
It was clear in the wake of the 1967 war that the Arabs could not soon regain their territory by 
directly attacking Israel. In the wake of 1967 defeat, Egyptian leaders learned that they could 
not eradicate Israel in military campaign from the prevailing lines behind the Canal. Since 
they were not willing to regain the Sinai at the cost of recognition of Israel and they could not 
tolerate the status quo, they faced a painful dilemma. This dilemma stimulated a search for 
military options that which would impose unsustainable costs on Israel so that it would be 
forced, directly or indirectly, to return Sinai to Egypt. (Stein, 2007, 133) Nasser’s strategy 
evolved to one of increasing military pressure along the Suez Canal with the aim of 
reclaiming the Egyptian land by making continued occupation too costly for Israel. His “War 
of Attrition” from March 1969 to August 1970 consisted mainly of artillery and commando 
raids designed to impose this unacceptable cost on Israel. (Buckwalter, 2012, 119)  
 
Nasser knew Israel needed its wars to be decided quickly by the kind of superior initiative, 
maneuverability, accurate firepower, ingenuity, technology, and organization that only a 
modern society and sophisticated military machine could provide. Nasser designed this war in 
a way that prevented these advantages of Israel from coming to the fore; his version 
emphasized the Egyptian advantages – low regard to casualties, massive firepower, with 
random consequences, and proven absorption capability both in the battlefield and on the 
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home front. (Bar-On, 2006, 151) The ultimate goal of Nasser, according to Israeli scholar Dan 
Schueftan was to escalate a local conflict to a global level. Under this logic, the USSR fearing 
of another straight humiliating defeat of its client could intervene into a conflict with Israel. 
Such a situation would present the US with a choice between letting Israel be defeated by the 
Soviet Union on the one hand, and major American involvement that could deteriorate into 
global confrontation, on the other. (Bar-On, 2006, 150) Under these circumstances, the US 
was believed to pressure Israel into making territorial concessions to Egypt. 
 
Egyptian forces began shelling Israeli positions on the East bank of the Suez Canal in 
September 1967. On October 21, the Egyptian navy sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat. After an 
Israeli retaliation in which oil installations and refineries were attacked, the Egyptian-Israeli 
front was quiet for a year. (Lieberman, 1995, 5) Then, in September 1968 Egypt began 
massive artillery shelling of Israeli positions accompanied by troop crossings of the Canal. 
This stage lasted until the end of October, and, as in the previous round, Israeli retaliation 
brought about four months of stability. In March 1969 however, Egypt began a costly war of 
attrition. (Lieberman, 1995, 5) 
 
The Soviets were quick to resupply the Egyptians after the 1967 defeat, although the marriage 
between the two countries was always one of convenience. Russian advisors arrived, along 
with the Russian equipment, and many areas of Egypt were declared off-limits to the 
Egyptians themselves. The Soviet Union began to establish impressive military and naval 
support facilities in the eastern Mediterranean. As early as 1968, once the news Soviet 
military equipment was in place, the Egyptians began to harass the Israelis dug in on the other 
side of the Suez Canal. (Bickerton, 2010, 155) Egypt´s main objective was, if possible, not 
only of forcing a political solution but of recovering territory by force if necessary. 
Egypt shelled Israeli positions along the Canal; Israel responded by attacking Egyptian oil 
installations and refineries, and Egypt did not resume massive artillery shelling for a year. 
During this period, Egypt strengthened its capability with enhanced surface-to-air missiles, 
Soviet advisors, and newly trained pilots. Soviet personnel on the ground advised strongly 
against any resumption of a strategy of attrition, anticipating that Israel would escalate in 
return. (Stein, 2007, 135) Unable to tolerate the status quo, Nasser ignored the advice and 
began a heavy round of artillery shelling on 8 September 1968 and again on 26 October. Israel 
retaliated by a raid deep into Egypt to strike an electric transformer and switching station that 
supplied power to Cairo. When American—and Soviet officials—cautioned Egyptian officials 
against heating up the ceasefire lines, Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad replied that if they 
thought the firing had been intense, "You haven't seen anything yet." (Stein, 2007, 135) 
Egyptian military leaders waited another four months before launching an intensive war of 
attrition which lasted until August 1970. In preparation, Egyptian civilians in cities along the 
Canal were evacuated. (Stein, 2007, 135) 
 
By 1969, Israel adapted to the new military challenge. Resorting to her advanced air power, 
Israel took the war gradually into Egypt by systematic destruction of Egypt´s massive air-
defense system. By the winter, Israeli campaign was so successful that Egypt was completely 
helpless, with its cities and infrastructure at the mercy of Israeli jets. In January of the 
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following year, after Israel started deep penetration air raids against military targets in the 
outskirts of Cairo and in the Nile Valley, the USSR realized that both Egyptians and the 
Soviets as their patrons were about to be compromised. (Bar-On, 2006, 151) Therefore, the 
Soviets supplied Egypt with the most sophisticated AA defenses and with massive, practically 
unlimited resources a superpower can commit when its prestige is at stake. (Bickerton, 2010, 
155) Nasser came to Moscow seeking to convince his global patron to prevent another 
collapse of an important client. He had to threaten the Soviets with resignation, imply 
replacement with pro-American leader in Egypt, and explicitly mention exposure of the 
uselessness of the Soviet superpower umbrella to convince his host to send its own armed 
forces to protect Egypt from Israel´s superior power. (Bar-On, 2006, 152) 
 
In 1970, situation escalated to a degree that it was the Soviet pilots who were flying patrols all 
along the Canal Zone; Soviet military advisors and technicians were supervising Egypt´s 
armed forces. By the beginning of 1970 the war became intolerable to Egypt. Egyptian cities 
along the canal were deserted, Egypt suffered thousands of casualties and the Egyptian capital 
was at the mercy of Israeli pilots. This outcome combined with the relative inability of Egypt 
to inflict heavy costs on Israel forced Egypt ultimately to accept a ceasefire. (Lieberman, 
1995, 29)  
 
Nasser lost his gamble since neither USSR, nor the US were willing to risk a thermonuclear 
war because of its pawns. The Soviets were eager and determined no less than Americans to 
stop the war regardless of Nasser´s preference. The Soviets had only a limited objective – to 
make the point to the Americans that Israel could not, again, with impunity defeat Egypt and 
demonstrate the impotence of Egypt´s patron.  
 
Black September in Jordan 
 
In the same year, however, the Israel used this opportunity to improve its relationship with the 
United States. The ongoing civil crisis in Jordan forced both Israel and the United States to 
cooperate amid possible intervention of Syria and Iraq in Jordan. The violent clashes between 
the Palestinian Fedayeen and King Hussein´s loyalists were gradually escalating since 
summer.  
The ultimate goal of the Fedayeen were aimed towards a third party: Israel. Their demands 
from Jordan were focused, in the early stages of the conflict, on freedom of action against 
Israel, and they undertook not to take advantage of their own armed presence in Jordan to 
interfere in this country´s domestic affairs (Nevo, 2008, 221) 
 
On 17 September, Hussein established a military government that fought more efficiently 
against the Fedayeen, and soon the civil war was over with a decisive victory to the royalists. 
But the threat to Jordan´s existence immediately shifted from the Palestinians to Syria. 
Meanwhile, acting Prime Minister Yigal Allon met with Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan 
and the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Rafael, to discuss 
developments in Jordan, including intervention scenario involving the help of Syria and Iraq 
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against Hussein (17,000 Iraqi soldiers had been station in Jordan since 1967, and both Israel 
and the United States focused on them as potential interveners). (Rubinovitz, 2010, 619) 
 
Damascus committed a reinforced division to the Jordanian civil war on September 20, 
probably in hopes of facilitating a quick Palestinian victory. The Jordanian army was making 
halting progress in defeating the Fedayeen, and Syrian leaders probably reasoned that a 
limited commitment might be sufficient to tip the scales on behalf of the Palestinians (or at 
least to help create a safe haven for them in northern Jordan without triggering Israeli 
intervention). Syria’s Fifth Division (including elements of four Syrian brigades and the 
Palestinian Hittin Brigade) began invading northern Jordan at approximately 2 a.m. local time 
on September 20. (Mobley, 2009, 164) More than 170 T–55 tanks and 16,000 troops initially 
supported the invasion, but Syria declined to commit its air force even after Jordanian fighters 
started to attrite the invasion force. (Mobley, 2009, 164) 
 
As invasion continued, Syrian reinforcements combined with already deployed units heavily 
outnumbered the Jordanian military loyal to King Hussein. Amman was in real danger. The 
US aircraft carrier battlegroups were still without reach – the only force capable of saving the 
current regime was Israel. 
 
On September 21, Israel finally decided to take an action against Syrian military on Jordanian 
territory. During the crisis, Prime Minister Allon warned publicly that the Syrian invasion and 
the Iraqi alert were endangering Israel´s security interests and that Israel reserved its right to 
defend its interest in its eastern front. (Rubinovitz, 2010, 699) Israel Air Force Phantom jets 
underscored the threat by flying low over the Syrian armored forces and created sonic booms, 
suggesting that word might come about if they did not return to Syria. Israel also moved many 
of its forces toward its border with Jordan in the Beth Shean Valley and toward the border 
with Syria on the Golan Heights, but it did not strike. (Rubinovitz, 2010, 699)  
 
The Israeli military might surely affected Syrian calculus vis-à-vis Jordanian war. The 
credible threat of military intervention helped protect Jordan without firing a single bullet. 
More importantly, the United States finally begun to realize how valuable and mutually 
beneficial cooperation with Israel on sensitive matters might be. 
 
4.5 Yom Kippur War (1973) 
Yom Kippur War dealt a significant blow to Israeli military prestige; it has shaken the image 
of Israel as an undefeatable power in the Middle East. The war is often described as the 
example of strategic surprise similar to that of 1941 Operation Barbarossa and the Japanese 
attack on the US fleet stationed in Pearl Harbor. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom of deterrence, its causes are deeply rooted in the events of 
1967 and the War of Attrition which brought a dramatic shift to Arab strategic mindset. 
Unlike Nasser before him, Sadat´s strategy of dealing with Israel was built on a major, even 
historic shift in Egypt´s global orientation. While Nasser tried to coerce the United States by 
inducing deeper and deeper Soviet involvement, Sadat attempted to win the Americans over 
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by bringing them in, at the expense of previous patron. According to Israeli scholar Dan 
Schueftan, Sadat´s military political lessons converged on October 16, 1973, when he realized 
that Israel´s strategic predominance was beginning to show and he called on Kissinger to save 
Egypt from another defeat. This time Kissinger did play one part of the role Nasser has 
expected him to, because he realized that this would be the first step in Egypt´s abandonment 
of its intimate ties with the Soviet Union, opening the door for American hegemony in this 
crucial region. (Bar-On, 2006, 154) 
As George Friedman, a founder of Stratfor points out, President Sadat conceived of the war 
for three reasons. First, Israel´s defeat of Egypt in 1967 cost it Sinai Peninsula and created a 
sense of hopelessness and cynicism among the Egyptian people that threatened the stability of 
the regime. Second, in the six years, since 1967, the Soviets kept a crippled Egypt dependent 
on them and demonstrated that they were incapable of helping Egypt defeat Israelis. Third, 
Sadat realized that only the United States could facilitate a respectable conclusion to the 
conflict. (Friedman, 2016, 1) 
The Agranat Commision, which was appointed by the Israeli Government in 1974 to examine 
the responsibility of military and civilian authorities for the failure to anticipate the Yom 
Kippur War concluded three key point of Israel´s ability to expect the incoming war even on 
its very verge: 
1. Stubborn adherence to "the conception," resting on two assumptions: (a) Egypt would 
not go to war until she was able to stage deep air strikes into Israel, particularly against 
her major military airfields, in order to neutralize Israel's Air Force; (b) Syria would 
not launch a full-scale war against Israel un- less Egypt was in the struggle too. 
 
2. Director of Military Intelligence had guaranteed that his department would give 
sufficient advance warning of such an all- out attack to permit the orderly call-up of 
the reserves. This promise became the firm foundation of the IDF's defense plans. The 
Com- mission tersely observes that it found no grounds for such a definitive guarantee 
 
3. Director of Military Intelligence and his assistants did not correctly evaluate the 
warning this information contained because of their doctrinaire adherence to "the 
conception" and their willingness to ex- plain away the enemy's deployment at the 
front lines-although it was unprecedented in its scale and direction-as evidence of a 
defensive move in Syria and a multidivisional exercise in Egypt. (Shlaim, 1976, 353) 
 
If in the Six Day War the Arab states had a military advantage of 1.47:1 in the air, 1.71:1 in 
tanks and 1.09:1 in manpower, before the 1973 war the ratios improved from the Arab 
perspective to 2.54:1 in the air, 2.8:1 in tanks and 2.16:1 in manpower. Yet, despite the 
widening gap in the military balance in terms of force ratios, all the actors in the area, as well 
as the superpowers involved, doubted Egypt's and Syria's ability to wage a successful war 
with Israel. Statesmen and analysts alike referred to Egypt as the militarily weaker party. 
(Lieberman, 1995, 46) Israel was blinded by its superiority and ignored increasingly efficient 
capability of Arab states to wage war. 
 
It was a given that Egypt would not go to war while still inferior in the air. Therefore, 
although the Israelis believed Syria was preparing for some sort of military action, by the 
tenets of the “concept,” Syria would not attack. Ironically, the “concept’s” elements actually 
still applied in October 1973. The Arabs had solved the “air superiority problem,” not with 
long-range aircraft to attack Israeli airfields, but by acquiring Soviet SAMs and SCUD 
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missiles. (Buckwalter, 2012, 121) Technological progress represented by new short range 
missiles and SAMs Israel did not entailed in its strategic assumptions compensated for the 
missing combat aircraft in Egypt´s military arsenal.  
 
In the 1967 war, the Israeli Air Force was decisive in the lightning victory, nearly destroying 
the Arab air forces in the opening salvo and providing effective air support for the subsequent 
Israeli armored thrusts. By 1973, however, the Egyptian SAM umbrella provided air cover for 
their ground troops, and their SCUDs could threaten deep strikes and target Israel's population 
centers. Thus, Egypt's population centers were no longer held hostage to Israeli air 
superiority, and Egypt could affect a limited ground attack without the fear that Israeli 
superiority in the air and in mobile warfare would come into play. 
 
The second part of the concept which concerned Syrian-Egyptian alliance did not 
encompassed the fact Hafez Assad in Syria proved to be more amenable to use of 
conventional military action than his predecessor who favored guerilla tactics. 
 
Chorev adds a very important point to the discussion which reflects to the problem of the 
rationality issue and deterrence theory; Israel's military logic was "western" in the sense that 
war did not appear to be a viable option, unless victory was assumed. Unlike Israel, the Arab 
states could lose a war and still exist. Moreover, they assumed that they could lose the battle 
and still win the war politically. This was the reason for Israel's failure to perceive the Arabs 
willingness to accept high risks in order to change the political status-quo. (Chorev, 1996, 10)  
 
In fact, Sadat knew Egypt could not have destroyed Israel. But together with Syria, it could 
have strike it a significant blow which could be translated into political concessions.  
 
The tactical goals of the attackers were clear: 
 To recapture territory lost in 1967 (Sinai, Golan Heights) and possibly some new 
(Nazareth) 
 To inflict unbearable damage and heavy casualties on Israel and wear it down (Tal, 
2000, 166) 
 
The infamous war started on Yom Kippur, 6 October 1973, at two o´clock in the afternoon. 
The Egyptians and Syrians attacked simultaneously on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai. 
Under these opening conditions, only Israel´s standing forces confronted the enemy, and most 
of its ground forces were not yet mobilized. (Tal, 2000, 173) The assault commenced along 
the entire Sinai and Golan Heights fronts. 
Within days, Americans immediately mounted an airlift to support Israel. 
The U.S. saw a huge opportunity. It had defeated the Soviets in a proxy war in Turkey and 
Greece in the 1940s. The Soviets had responded by cultivating pro-Soviet regimes in Syria, 
Iraq and Egypt and using the threat of Israel to cement the relationship. The Soviets did not 
want a settlement between Arabs and Israelis, as it would undermine their utility to these 
regimes. The Americans did not want Syria and Iraq to threaten Turkey from the south. 
Turkey blocked a sustained Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. Iran tied down Iraq. 
Israel tied down Syria. The U.S. had supplied almost no weapons to Israel prior to 1967. After 
France abandoned its relationship with Israel, the U.S. stepped in, not only because it wanted 
to threaten Syria, but because Israel was vital in maintaining U.S. control of the eastern 
Mediterranean. But this moment gave the U.S. the opportunity to keep the Soviets out of 
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Egypt, and the U.S. was not letting the chance pass. The U.S. wanted Sadat to become a hero, 
but it also wanted to make him reach out to the U.S. to save him. This difficult maneuver took 
rearming the Israelis, having the Israelis cross the border and cut off the Egyptian army and 
then having the U.S. intervene and conduct negotiations for an Israeli withdrawal from 
blocking positions west of the canal. For this, Sadat had to be willing to directly negotiate 
with Israel for the first time on this matter. (Friedman, 2016, 1) 
Americans were interested in driving Soviets out of Egypt, but it was necessary not to let 
Israel humiliate Sadat. Israel was persuaded not to crush surrounded Third Egyptian Army on 
the Sinai. In a friendly move, water was distributed to demoralized Egyptian soldiers. US 
worked as an efficient mediator which managed to resolve the conflict. Its conflict 
management also led to a historic Camp David accord and the conclusion of a formal peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel. 
Despite heavy losses, Egypt came out of the war psychologically and diplomatically 
victorious. Egypt has proven that it can successfully cooperate with other Arab nations, its 
soldiers can run sophisticated intelligence gathering and can handle sophisticated and 
technologically advanced weapons. The Yom Kippur war proves, that despite loss in both 
War of Attrition and Six Day War, Egypt designed an entirely new strategy whose aim was to 
leave the Soviet orbit and to negotiate new conditions of status quo with the assistance of the 
United States. Somewhat paradoxically, a country can initiate a war even knowing it cannot 
win. Such a fact ignores traditional sense of credibility-deterrence relationship. 
4.6 Operation Babylon (1981) 
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, Israel adopted a doctrine of calculated 
ambiguity. Regardless a lot of leaked information, the existence of Israeli nuclear weapon has 
been wrapped in the mist of mystery. This threat is ambiguous, however, because Israel has 
never openly admitted to possession of nuclear weapons. The conception Israel has sought to 
convey – through veiled threats and signals of various kinds – is that its nuclear weapons 
serve as an ultimate insurance policy designed to deter the annihilation of the state by massive 
force. (Maoz, 2006, 16) 
Apparently, Israeli nuclear weapons, if there is any, is meant only as a weapon of last resort. 
Going public with the bomb could possibly trigger the regional nuclear arms race. In order to 
prevent this from happening, Israel keeps its nuclear capability in secrecy. In such a 
complicated situation, Israel logically wants to prevent its Arab adversaries from discovering 
the secrets of nuclear weapons´ technology while having the ultimate weapons should the 
worst-case scenario happen.  In September 1978, Ariel Sharon had argued that the 
development of nuclear potential by an Arab state should be treated as casus belli requiring 
preemption. (Avner, 1995, 314) Israel simply cannot afford to wait and see what happens 
should its neighboring Arab states acquire nuclear weapons. 
IDF´s further enhancement of its air raid capability gave Israel new means to face nuclear 
challenge by conventional means. This tactic is based on Duhet´s strategy. Duhet believed 
that the airplane could restore decisiveness to warfare that ground combat seemed incapable 
of achieving. It could fly over the ground battlefield to directly attack enemies will.  
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(Bartholomees, 2010, 38) When planned appropriately, AIF is able to deliver precise strikes 
on enemy targets, in case diplomacy fails.  
This tactics was for the first time used on the beginning of the 80s, when Israeli leadership 
decided to put Iraqi nuclear ambitions to its end. On June 7, 1981, sixteen Israeli F-15 and F-
16 jet fighter-bombers dropped sixteen MK.84 iron bombs on Osirak nuclear reactor in 
Bagdad, knocking it out of commission, ending the threat – for the time being – of a second 
Jewish holocaust, and letting loose a firestorm of protest in the international community. 
(Beres, 1986, 154) 
At the time, Israelis were strongly convinced that the destruction of Iraqi nuclear reactor was 
the matter of national survival. Israel´s bombing raid on Iraq´s nearly completed nuclear 
reactor was indeed a preemptive strike, but it also was a precisely calculated and planned act 
of deterrence, faced with the prospects of an Arab nuclear weapons capability. (Beres, 1986, 
154)  
Israelis exhausted or their diplomatic efforts to convince Saddam Hussein to give up on its 
objective to acquire enriched uranium rods. After these diplomatic efforts failed, it was clear 
that Israel would have to use different means. At the time, the attack drew near universal 
condemnation, but it soon came to be seen as a milestone in non-proliferation, showing that 
force could be practical a practical option to halt a suspected nuclear weapons program 
without harmful repercussion of the attacker. (Ramberg, 2014, 1) 
Israel flexed its military muscle and showed to the Arabs that she can bomb their nuclear 
facilities without almost any civilian casualties thus simply denying them to gain the nuclear 
capability of their own. This interpretation was strengthened especially after the First Gulf 
War. Ten years after the strike on the reactor, following revelations that came after Saddam´s 
capitulation of in the war, it was proved that Iraq had been only one year away from realizing 
military nuclear capability. This information lead many politicians throughout the world, 
including those in Europe, to justify the strike on the reactor after the fact, though Israel had 
been the target of harsh diplomatic criticism in 1981. (Fuksman-Sha´al, 2003, 35) 
Perception of Israeli strike on Osirak and its evaluation changed significantly throughout the 
years. Nevertheless, there is a certain parallel between the events of 1956 and Israeli decision 
to bomb Osirak nuclear facility. In 1956, based on the information we have now, Nasser did 
not really want to attack Israel. Many studies prove, that Israeli air raid on secret Iraqi nuclear 
facility helped to forge an alliance between Iraqi nuclear entrepreneurs and the leadership of 
their country. According to this assumption, Israeli strike lead to quite the opposite. Based on 
the information gather after the second Gulf War, analysts found out that the real purpose of 
Osirak´s existence was nuclear energy. By 1981, Iraq was capable to build up a facility that 
could facilitate developing the building blocks for a nuclear weapons program, but that would 
not easily facilitate production of nuclear weapons. (Braut-Hegghammer, 2011, 110) 
As Bennet Ramberg claims, the raid on Osirak did not work out as Begin anticipated. Rather 
than stopping Iraq’s nuclear program, the raid stimulated it. For Hussein, what at first blush 
seemed to be a disaster turned out to be a liberation of sorts. Ridding the country of French 
government oversight, contractors, managers, and monitors while feigning NPT fidelity, he 
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embarked on what became a decade-long secret quest to build a uranium bomb. He settled on 
electromagnetic isotope separation and centrifuge technologies and, by the time the Gulf War 
started, was within a few years of fulfilling his ambition. (Ramberg, 2014, 1) 
Based on this statement, Israeli interference paradoxically motivated Iraqi leadership to divert 
all the financial and technological efforts to deliver its own nuclear capability. Paradoxically, 
the Israeli attack on Osirak opened the window of opportunity for Iraqi nuclear ambitions. 
The motivation was driven by following aspects. First, the violation of Iraqi sovereignty 
created a strategic imperative to respond. Second, the attack refocused Saddam’s inconsistent 
attention on the issue of nuclear weapons. In his public response to the attack, Saddam warned 
the international community of the consequences of denying Iraq access to advanced nuclear 
technology. In July 1981, he stated that the attack “will not stop the course of scientific and 
technical progress in Iraq. Rather, it is an additional strong stimulus to develop this course. 
(Braut-Hegghammer, 2011, 116) 
The relevant question is why did it so long to develop a nuclear capability? Some of the 
scholars argue that Iraqi nuclear efforts were slowed down by long lasting war with Iran, 
which eventually resulted in a slow-down its progress. Although one may argue neither attack 
on Osirak entirely thwarted Iraqi nuclear ambitions, nor ultimately denied them, it provided 
Israel with enough time to prepare itself for this challenge. As David Ivri, then Commander of 
the Israeli Air Force stated, the decision of Begin´s government was right. The unconditional 
and clean success produced numerous results including an improvement in Israel´s overall 
deterrence, which later had repercussions for Israel and the United States in the 1991 Gulf 
War. (Fuksman-Sha´al, 2003, 35) Regardless what the real purpose of the nuclear facility in 
Iraq was, Israeli military doctrine suggest that a preemptive or even preventive strike against 
such a target is going to be the preferred option under the logic of better safe than sorry. 
Israel´s deterrence was enhanced because its military and political brass reinforced its 
credibility by sending out a clear message that it won´t hesitate to deny its adversaries nuclear 
projects by the use of surgical, conventional means.   
The Operation Babylon proves that when it comes to nuclear proliferation, an issue existential 
to Israel, its military is willing to take any measures needed deny other regional actors the 
ability to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Israel is therefore willing to act singlehandedly, 
and cannot be deterred, because its military doctrine is primarily based on the concept of 
preventive attacks against conventional and non-conventional threats. 
  
 
4.7 Arab-Israeli Conflict Conclusions 
The War of Independence was caused due to the absence of Israeli credibility simply because 
the country did not exist before. Arabs were overconfident, despite their combined strength 
and military manpower did not outnumber Israel in any significant way. The lack of planning, 
combat experience and intelligence gathering combined with Czechoslovak weapon supplies 
to Israel deemed Arab offensive to fail. 
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The new round of Israeli-Arab rivalry was renewed only in the mid-50s with the rise of 
Gamal Nasser who toppled king Farooq´s regime. Israel could not allow Egypt to gain 
potential advantage over Israel by receiving heavy Soviet aid via Czechoslovakia. The future 
balance of power with the assistance of United Kingdom and France were strong enough to 
persuade Israeli leadership to strike first. 
The Six Day War of 1967 was initiated under conditions similar to Sinai War of 1956. Egypt 
formed military alliance with Syria, Jordan and Iraq, made UN forces to leave Sinai and 
decided to block Strait of Tiran. Under such circumstances unfavorable to Israel, hers 
leadership decided to strike first rather than to wait for Arabs to attack. Somewhat 
paradoxically, Nasser did not want to attack Israel. The decision to block Strait of Tiran was a 
result of his overambitious generals who competed for power. Swift Israeli victory, however, 
changed the geopolitical reality in the Middle East and unintentionally led to the Yom Kippur 
War of 1973. 
The War of Attrition in 1969 was in fact a direct consequence of the Six Day War. Nasser 
changed his strategy and wanted Israel to bleed out in protracted war of attrition. His further 
aim was to make Israel prevail so decisively over Egypt so the USSR won´t be able to stand 
back and will have to intervene on Egypt´s side. Under this logic, the USSR was believed to 
attack Israel and resolve the conflict for Egypt. Despite the logic of rationality and deterrence, 
Sadat was willing to take the risk and provoked militarily superior Israel which annihilated 
Egypt´s Air force in matter of hours only a couple months ago. Deterrence failed despite 
Israeli threat being credible because of the presence of another variable – the patronage of the 
USSR. 
In other words, Egypt ignored Israel´s credibility because it expected the USSR to win the 
war for him. 
The Black September in Jordan proves otherwise. Syrian forces decided to refrain from 
occupation of Jordan right after Israel demonstrated its will to protect the local regime. 
The Yom Kippur War of 1973 caught Israel by surprise. Sadat and Assad, the leaders of 
Egypt and Syria ignored Israeli credibility and designed a brilliant operation with an aim to 
recapture some territory lost in 1967. Moreover, Egypt again relied on great power politics; it 
wanted to get away from the Soviet orbit and hoped the US will be able to force Israel to 
make territorial concessions in return for Egypt becoming a US client state. 
Operation Babylon in 1981, by contrast, is similar to 1956 and 1967 wars. Israel 
singlehandedly launched surgical airstrike operation to deny Iraq its nuclear capability. 
Israeli doctrine is based on military primacy and credibility, which has to be restored by 
repeating preventive and preemptive strikes against its adversaries. To achieve this condition, 
Israel purposely makes deterrence fail. Arabs, on the other hand, did not hesitate to wage wars 
they could not win because they wanted to drag in the great powers which could shift the 






5 Indo-Pakistani Conflict 
Indo-Pakistani Conflict serves as a very important source of deterrence related information, 
especially due to its dynamics. Among all three enduring rivalries, Indo-Pakistani Conflict 
was the only standoff which resulted in an open war of two nuclear powers. 
The most notable crises were chosen to be analyzed in this part of the paper. This conflict has 
never been resolved, but the events which took place after 2001 were not entailed during the 
global paradigm shift caused by infamous 9/11. 
Table 3.1 - Indo-Pakistani Conflict Dataset 
 
Based on the dataset above, a regression analysis has been conducted in order find a possible 
link between independent variable (Number of Years Since Last Conflict) and multiple 
dependent variables (Challenger´s Head of State Term Length, Defender´s Head of State 
Term Length and Power Discrepancy Challenger´s Perspective). 
Below are the results of regression analysis for the Indo-Pakistani Conflict Dataset. 
Table 3.2 - Indo-Pakistani Conflict Regression statistics 
 






















Head of State 
Term Lenght
Defender´s 






1947 KASHMIR I India - 0 1 0 0 0,2 0,2 -6
1951 PUNJAB WAR SCARE I India - 1 0 3 4 4 4 1
1965 RANN OF KUTCH India - 0 1 16 14 2,5 0,8 1
1965 KASHMIR II India - 0 1 0,3 1 2,5 1 -1
1971 BANGLADESH India India 0 1 6 6 2,5 5 -13
1984 Siachen India India 1 0 13 13 3,5 6 10
1987 PUNJAB WAR SCARE II India India 1 0 3 16 2,5 9 11




Adjusted R Square -0,4501733
Standard Error 7,45094076
Observations 8
ANOVA df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 45,91268 15,304226 0,27566977 0,840933484
Residual 4 222,0661 55,516518
Total 7 267,9788
Coefficients Standard Eror t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 4,33794645 7,425811053 0,5841714 0,590463641 -16,2794103 24,9553032 -16,2794103 24,955303
Challenger´s head of 
state duration
1,90165615 2,960011299 0,6424489 0,555553292 -6,316652736 10,119965 -6,31665274 10,119965
Defenders head of 
state duration




0,20185488 0,432598616 0,4666101 0,665059049 -0,99923143 1,40294119 -0,99923143 1,4029412
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Value of Significance F is much greater than generally recommended level of 0,05 the results 
of regression analysis for such a limited number of observations are not very accurate. 
Based on the regression analysis, the following function can be formulated: 
Y (No. of Years Since Last Conflict) = 4,33794645 + 1,90165615 * (Challenger´s Head of 
State Duration) – 0,7062242* (Defenders´s Head of State Duration) + 0,20185488 * (Power 
Discrepancy) 
Chart 3.1 - Conflict Power Discrepancy & Conflict Frequency 
 
The chart above shows a relationship between a Conflict Frequency and Challenger´s relative 
power. Unlike in case of the Cold War and Arab-Israeli conflict, the trendline shows that the 
conflict frequency decreases with the relative strength of a challenger. 
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The char above represents a relationship between Conflict Frequency and Defender´s Head of 
State Term Length. Despite being almost flat, the trendline shows that the longer the 
defender´s head of state is in power, the lower is the frequency of a conflict. The line is 
however skewed too little to be considered relevant. 
Chart 3.3 – Challenger´s Head of State Term Length & Conflict Frequency 
 
The chart above presents the relationship between Conflict Frequency and Challenger´s Head 
of State Term Length. The conflict frequency increases with duration of challenger´s head of 
state in power. That implies the following: the shorter the challenger´s head of state is in 
power, the more likely it is challenge the status quo. In addition, the longer he is in power, the 
more likely it is that a new conflict will emerge. 
In the following part, the presented findings will be confronted with thorough qualitative 
analysis. 
5.1 Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 & 1951 Punjab War Scare 
The seemingly endless conflict that became an integral part of the history of twentieth century 
and continues to reverberate into the twenty-first century had its origins in the birth pangs of 
these two independent nations. Fueled by a religious and ethnic conflagration across much of 
Northern India and the area that is now Pakistan, the conflict in Kashmir took on a life of its 
own and continues to echo in the political rhetoric in both states even today. Affecting their 
ability to craft rational and mutually advantageous economic and political relationships and 
play a joint role as regional actors not only in the Indian Ocean but also in the Central Asia. 
(Nawaz, 2008, 115) 
 
The two countries were born in conflict, as the 1947 partition of the subcontinent did not fully 
settle the distribution of territory. Both countries went to war almost as soon as the British 
colonial authorities announced the end of their rule in India in August 1947. The act of British 
withdrawal from India created two new dominions which were given freedom of choice either 
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The First Kashmir War of 1947-1948 was fought over the erstwhile princely state of Kashmir. 
The princely states of India were remnants of the pre-colonial order that were being forced to 
accede either to India or Pakistan.) Five hundred sixty two princely states at the time of the 
partition were before bounded to the United Kingdom through treaties which allowed them to 
have a free hand in suppression of their subjects. Once British Paramountcy disappeared, the 
rulers were given three options. Firstly, they could join of their own free will as independent 
entities, Indian dominion, and Pakistani dominion or could choose to remain independent. 
(Mushtag, 2014, 103) After the partition of British India based on religion, the decision of the 
562 princes to join India or Pakistan was mainly based on grounds of demography (majority 
Hindu or Muslim subjects) or location (no contiguity with India or Pakistan). Thus, the 
Muslim prince of Hyderabad, despite presiding over a sizable minority of Muslims, was 
forced to accede to India. (Banerjee & Hosur, 2015, 62) Kashmir was exactly the opposite 
case. 
 
Pakistan contested the state’s accession to India on the irredentist ground that the majority of 
the population affected was Muslim. On the other hand, India was unwilling to give away the 
portion of Kashmir it controlled, arguing that such a concession would be tantamount to a 
second partition of the subcontinent on the basis of religion. India’s behavior is not unique; 
new states, especially multiethnic ones, tend to be extremely wary of territorial concessions 
because they are attempting to consolidate their hard-won independence and territorial 
integrity. They tend to fear that conceding some territory to an opponent or allowing it to 
become independent could lead to the unraveling of the state by encouraging other 
subnational movements to rise up with similar demands in other parts of the country. It is thus 
argued that India cannot afford to give up Kashmir as that will generate nationalist 
movements elsewhere. 
 
Hindu Maharaja in Kashmir, the region with Muslim majority, was very indecisive which 
raised alarm especially in India which feared of Maharaja taking either autonomous position 
or worse, opt for Pakistan or allow it to enter Kashmir. (Nawaz, 2008, 117) The prince used 
current circumstances to parlay for independence or better terms for accession. 
 
First hostilities occurred by October 1947, two months after Britain withdrew its forces, 
Muslim peasants of Poonch (strategic location between the Jhelum and Chenab rivers, and the 
Pir Panjal Range the border of Kashmir with Pakistan) refused to pay their land taxes to 
Hindu landlords whose guards opened fire. The Muslims fled to Pakistan where tribal frontier 
Pathans were inflamed by their reports and volunteered to help them liberate Kashmir from 
Hindu control. Tribal elements and irregular Pakistani forces invaded Kashmir, through the 
prince had signed a stand down agreement with Pakistan. As the under-equipped, ill-trained 
and badly officered princely army started to collapse, the harried Prince signed an accession 
agreement with India. (Banerjee & Hosur, 2015, 63) After receiving Kashmir´s formal 
accession, India immediately responded by opening an airlift of troops, supplies and 
equipment into the area. 
 
India hold an advantage over Pakistan because it inherited the central political, administrative 
and military command structure of the departing Brits while Pakistan lacked coherent and 
centralized decision making at both military and political levels. As the invaders were being 
driven out by the Indian army and the occupied areas being freed from the invaders, Pakistan 
moved her army to fight the Indian army in early 1948, and Indian and Pakistan soldiers 




The first Governor-General of Pakistan Muhammad Jinah tried to send two of Pakistan´s 
regular divisions into the battle, but was blocked by Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, 
supreme commander of British Commonwealth troops of both dominions, who flew to 
Pakistan to warn Jinnah that unless he withdrew his order, he would have to order every 
British officer in the Pakistan´s army to stand down. Since Pakistan at the time relied much 
more heavily than India on British officers, commanded by General Sir Douglas Gracey, 
Jinnah was forced to relent. Pakistani volunteer soldiers in mufti were sent in, but proved an 
insufficient force to drive out the Indian army. (Wolpert, 2010, 23) In response, India brought 
charges of Pakistan´s aggression to the UN Security Council. 
 
Pakistan, however, never accepted the results of 1947 thus leaving the question of Kashmir 
unresolved. 
 
The relations between India and Pakistan deteriorated again in 1951. In June, Prime Minister 
Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan informed British Commonwealth colleagues that heavy fire had 
been exchanged across the Kashmir cease-fire line, along which nine-tenths of India´s army 
was deployed. India countered by charging Pakistan with sending armed terrorists over the 
line and encouraging them to wage jihad. (Wolpert, 2010, 25) The crisis was triggered on 7 
July 1951 when Pakistan moved a brigade to within 15 miles of the Kashmir district of 
Poonch. These military movements, along with the perception of talk of jihad and the growing 
evidence of political instability in Pakistan (a recent coup attempt which was thwarted) led 
Prime Minister Nehru to respond on 10 July with an order to move Indian troops to the 
Punjab border and to Jammu and Kashmir. Leaves for Indian army officers were canceled. 
Nehru´s response constituted the trigger to Pakistan´s crisis. Acting upon advice by Pakistan´s 
Chief of Staff, General Ayub Khan, that Pakistan was unprepared for war, Prime Minister 
Liaquat Khan decided to attempt to manage the crisis through diplomatic channels. (Brecher 
& Wilkenfeld, 1997, 169) According to military staff, capability assessment and deterrence 
was pivotal since Pakistani army was too weak to fight India. (Banerjee & Hosur, 2015, 63) 
Somewhat paradoxically, the cautious military prevented the warmongering civilian 
government from triggering the war. 
After both countries brought up more troops and moved heavy artillery closer to the line, 
Liaquat agreed to meet with his Indian counterpart Nehru in New Delhi to seek some formula 
to settle their dispute over Kashmir. Shortly before the date scheduled for their New Delhi 
summit meeting, however, Liaquat was assassinated at Pakistan´s army headquarters in 
Rawalpindi on 16 October 1951. (Wolpert, 2010, 25) The new government however 
continued with the policy toward a conflict deescalating. 
The war of 1947 emerged as a part of general decolonization process. Its essence was a 
culmination of imperfect British structure of territorially ill-defined administrative boundaries 
of particular districts rather than a result of deterrence failure in traditional sense.  
5.2 Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 - Rann of Kutch 
Internationally, Pakistan was beginning to emerge from its political dependence on the United 
States. Ayub Khan´s successful visit to China in March 1965 had considerably enhanced his 
domestic standing. The masses of people felt elevated by the knowledge that China had 
become Pakistan´s friend and ally against India. During the war with India, Pakistan expected 
China to open the second front, but the threat did not materialize. 
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Distant from Kashmir, the Rann of Kutch affair preceded the outbreak of formal hostilities 
between India and Pakistan in their second war over Kashmir in September 1965. This tract of 
land, equivalent in size to Kashmir, separates Sindh in Pakistan from Kutch in India. Local 
patrols were running into each other in Kutch throughout the second half of 1964. In April, 
Pakistani troops forcibly took the fort, which began the first phase of the war. India reacted 
with the limited force which was unable to dislodge the Pakistanis. The British helped 
brokered a ceasefire agreement that gave Pakistan modest territorial gains. (Bajwa, 2013, 271) 
When Indian forces withdrew, leaving behind them 40 miles of marshland, the Pakistanis 
were jubilant. (Schofield, 2010, 107) 
The Pakistani leadership saw an opportunity in 1965 to initiate a military campaign to control 
Kashmir. India was recovering from the military defeat against China and, in response, had 
begun to the process of military modernization. This period of “weakness” was Pakistan´s 
best chance to impose a military solution on India on the Kashmir issue. Such a line of 
thinking is further elaborated in Pakistani General Mohammed Musa´s account of the 1965 
India-Pakistan war. (Banerjee & Hosur, 2015, 55) India was apparently in the middle of a 
perfect storm. Prime Minister Nehru passed away in 1964 leaving behind political instability. 
The country was suffering from food shortages meanwhile Pakistan was doing well. US was 
sending in arms to Pakistan, including famous Patton tanks. (Bajwa, 2013, 271) Moreover, In 
Kashmir, Pakistanis were convinced that the people became alienated to the government and 
would welcome attempt at liberation. Crucially, the Pakistanis have calculated that the 
international community, which had shown little interest in India in 1962 or in the Kashmir 
negotiations, would turn a blind eye to Pakistan´s military pressure, particularly if operations 
were short and decisive, or even clandestine in nature. (Johnson, 2007, 142) 
Although in the South Asian context, India is larger in physical size, GDP and overall military 
capability, it is not overwhelmingly preponderant in the conflict´s key theater or on the 
international border. Until 1965 India´s overall defense posture against Pakistan was based on 
“matching capabilities.” After the 1965, India shifted its posture to maintain sufficient 
deterrence or a slight edge in its force deployments. During this period, India had seven 
divisions deployed, while Pakistan had six; Islamabad enjoyed qualitative superiority in tanks 
and aircraft. (Paul, 2006, 617) 
1965 crisis was triggered on 5 August when Pakistani “freedom fighters” began infiltrating 
into the Vale of Kashmir to create large-scale uprising against Indian control over most of the 
former princely state. Whilst officially denying any involvement, Pakistan launched its 
irregulars across the border in Operation Gibraltar. Operation Gibraltar involved infiltrating 
thousands of Pakistani troops in civilian clothes into Kashmir to hit Indian targets and 
organize Kashmiri rebels against New Delhi. (Bajwa, 2013, 271) It soon become apparent, 
however, that the Kashmiri population had no intention of rising in support of paramilitaries, 
especially when Indian security forces showed no sign of weakening. The first 5,000 
infiltrators met heavy resistance. (Johnson, 2007, 142) On 25 August India sent several 
thousand troops across 1949 Kashmir Cease-Fire Line, capturing most of the areas through 
which the infiltrators came and triggering a crisis for Pakistan. The latter responded on 1 
September by dispatching an armored column across the cease-fire line in Southern Kashmir 
and threatening the vital road linking the capital city of Srinagar with the plains of India.  
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In response, Pakistani leadership launched Operation Grand Slam as final attempt to secure 
the advantage of offense. Despite the loss of surprise, the Pakistanis decided to go ahead with 
their original war plans. Two infantry divisions spearheaded by seventy tanks constituted the 
Pakistani strike force. The Pakistanis hoped to capture the town of Akhnur, which would have 
enabled them to cut off the state of Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of India. In response, 
India escalated horizontally by initiating assault on Pakistani cities of Lahore and Sialkot, a 
major nexus of roads and railways and a military center in Punjab. 
The expansion of the war into Pakistan´s territory ended any real possibility of securing 
Kashmir by force.  
India´s strategic aims were modest – it aimed to deny Pakistan Army victory, although it 
ended up in possession of 720 square miles of Pakistani territory for the loss of just 220 of its 
own. The Indian operations were marked with caution, especially since it was known that 
Lahore was well defended and street fighting would be costly. Imposing heavy costs on 
Pakistan, it was clear that Islamabad´s political objectives in Kashmir cannot be achieved by 
force. 
Toward mid-September, the war was reaching a stalemate. On September 20, the UN Security 
Council passed a unanimous resolution calling for cease-fire. India accepted the cease-fire 
resolution on September 21 and Pakistan followed the day later. Under the Soviet-brokered 
Tashkent Agreement, which officially ended the 1965 war, both sides agreed in January 1966 
to return to the status quo ante and to renounce the use of force in settling future disputes. 
(Ganguly, 2010, 14) 
The fighting was short but intense with heavy casualties on both sides. Indeed, both sides 
suffered lost almost 30 per cent of their armor in the 22 days of combat: 12,500 Indians 
became casualties, 2,700 of them killed and further 1,500 taken prisoners or missing. Pakistan 
lost 3,000 killed, 2,000 prisoners and missing approximately 9,000 wounded. In the air, 
India´s ageing inventory performed badly with estimated losses of 59 planes while Pakistan 
lost 43. (Johnson, 2007, 143) 
Pakistani leaders failed to consider potential Indian responses to military offensives. India had 
a two-front problem and rough military parity with Pakistan: The Pakistani leaders saw this as 
an opportunity, but refused to recognize that India could just as equally relieve this 
vulnerability by attacking Lahore, 14 miles from the border. This is the very essence of the 
cult of the offensive, where leaders saw no viable defensive strategy. Pakistani military 
thought once a piece of strategic territory was captures or once enemy forces were destroyed, 
India was going to capitulate. (Bajwa, 2013, 242) However, in 1966, Pakistan was awarded 
the northern part of the Rann of Kutch. According to analyst V. Schofield, the Pakistanis drew 
the following conclusion: if the Kashmir dispute could be reactivated by stirring up a 
rebellion in Indian held section, a critical situation would arise which would be sufficient to 
oblige the western countries to intervene. India might be pressurized to submit the dispute to 
mediation, which if successful might lead to a more favorable solution to Pakistan than status 
quo. 
In 1965, Pakistani leadership sought a window of opportunity to resolve the Kashmir issue. 
India was weak after lost military conflict with China, thus Pakistan had to make a swift 
decision before India manages to lick its wounds. Moreover, a few months ago, Pakistanis 
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managed to capture some abandoned forts on the disputed territory of Rann of Kutch Indians 
were unable to dislodge. 
Pakistani army had an advantage of fresh supplies of US heavy tanks India had nothing to pit 
against. Having two powerful allies on its side, the United States and China, Pakistani 
believed that should it intervene in India, world powers will manage to restrain any possible 
India´s retaliation; possibly forcing it to accept any potential Pakistani territorial gains. 
Pakistan, however, did not expect India to strike against its cities. When neither China nor US 
shown their will to support Pakistani cause, both India and Pakistan resorted to diplomatic 
efforts. 
5.3 Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 
From its birth, Pakistan was plagued by the insoluble division of its territory into two wings, 
with thousand miles of northern India between them. In late 60s, the inhabitants of East 
Pakistan demanded their right for self-determination by calling for greater autonomy. The 
unanticipated outcomes of the 1965 Kashmir conflict was the growth of Bengali separatism in 
East Pakistan. The Bengali population realized they had emerged mostly unscathed from the 
war thanks not to the Pakistani military, but rather to India´s sufferance. (Ganguly, 2010, 14) 
Within less than a decade, their growing dissatisfaction with West Pakistani dominance would 
culminate in a civil war and contribute to the third Indo-Pakistani conflict. 
It was the election of December 1970 that brought matters to head. The Awami League won 
160 out of the 162 seats allotted to East Pakistan and they were the largest single party in 
national elections. (Johnson, 2007, 149) The West Pakistani elites opposed the movement by 
claiming that any possible changes to the constitution must take place only after the 
consultation with them. The situation came to the point when the victorious East Pakistani 
party openly begun to demand independence. 
The declaration was signal for Pakistan to initiate a military crackdown, code-named 
Operation Searchlight. In the opening phase, East Bengal regiments were disarmed and police 
headquarters were surrounded. Pakistani troops were flown in and the Navy unloaded heavy 
equipment and more men in just two weeks. By the end of the months, some 70,000 soldiers 
were amassed in East Pakistan. On 25 March, troops opened fire on the territory of Dhaka 
University killing thousands of students and demonstrators in the nearby shanty towns. 
(Johnson, 2007, 149) The violence resulted in masses of refugees fleeing by every river and 
mud road to India. The events of March 1971 augured the birth of independent Bangladesh as 
a nation, reincarnated from the corpse of East Pakistan. (Wolpert, 2010, 41) West Pakistan 
was able to occupy the cities, but it neither could have won the hearts and minds of the local 
population, nor defend the local militias. 
Although, the Indian military planners had been monitoring the developing crisis in East 
Pakistan, the planning process started in earnest only after the meeting between Indira Gandhi 
and Manekshaw on 25 March 1971, where Indira Gandhi accepted Manekshaw’s advise to 
postpone the military action to winter. (Zaki, 2012, 41)The situation became unaffordable for 
India to maintain as its government lacked funds to support so many refugees in such a short 
period of time.  
The India´s strategy was to launch an overwhelming assault on East Pakistan so as to occupy 
as much territory as possible and destroy the bulk of the enemy forces there before the 
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international community had a chance to intervene. In addition, India had to carefully monitor 
the stance of the US, Soviet Union and China. Therefore it was necessary to reach all the 
objectives within 12 to 15 days. (Zaki, 2012, 42) 
On 9 August 1971, Indira Gandhi signed the Twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Cooperation with the Soviet Union, giving her the superpower nuclear cover she required and 
the heavy military support India needed before moving its army into Bangladesh. (Wolpert, 
2010, 43) By concluding alliance with the USSR, India had a powerful nuclear ally in the UN 
Security Council who would veto any resolution aimed against India. Overall Soviet strength 
of 4 to 44 divisions on its borders in China served as a deterrent for Chinese ambitions, should 
they occur. (Kak, 2012, 94) 
The Indians therefore sought to the stop the civil war by severing East and West Pakistan. To 
that end, in October and November, India began backing East Pakistani rebel forces, known 
as Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force). By November, the Indian Army and paramilitary troops 
were regularly providing artillery support to their proxies and, toward the end of the month, 
the army had even made small incursions into East Pakistan in several locations. Cross-border 
raids and artillery exchanges became common. (Gill, 2003, 12) Pakistan had no choice but to 
retaliate on December 3 by launching air strikes against Indian air basis. This move triggered 
a full-scale war between the two archrivals. (Ganguly, 15, 2010) Pakistan´s aim was to buy 
some time before its allies China and the US can react. Although Pakistan expected China or 
the United States to intervene on its side, it was left facing India alone.  
This miscalculation came at a great cost due to India´s significant military advantage. 
Between 1965 and 1971, India had seven divisions deployed while Pakistan had six; 
Islamabad enjoyed a qualitative superiority in tanks and aircraft. This condition had shifted by 
the early 1970s, and the change was decisive factor in India´s military victory in 1971 war. 
(Paul, 2006, 617) 
The forces available to the sides to execute their strategies were among the largest in the 
world at the time. India´s army of 833,800 men could field fourteen infantry divisions and 
four independent armored brigades. Key items if combat equipment included more than 1,450 
tanks and 3,000 artillery pieces. (Gill, 2003, 13) At 365,000 men, the Pakistan Army was 
about half the size of its Indian counterpart, but was nonetheless a formidable force with two 
armored divisions, thirteen infantry divisions and three independent armored brigades with 
approximately 850 tanks and 800 guns. (Gill, 2003, 13) The air arms of both countries were 
commensurately large. The Indian Air Force had some 625 combat aircraft at disposal while 
Pakistan had just 273 fighters available. Moreover, the Indian Air Force had improved in 
quality since its controversial showing during the 1965 war. (Gill, 2003, 13) 
Pakistan´s hasty move provided India with much needed casus belli. The Indian military 
forces immediately swung into action, bearing down on East Bengal with tremendous force. 
Unlike Pakistan, India intended to limit operations to western theater by taking defensive 
stance in order to concentrate on defeating the Pakistani forces in the east. (Johnson, 2005, 
153) Heavy Soviet artillery and tanks supported India´s army as it pushed into Bangladesh, 
shattering Pakistani resistance completely within a month. (Wolpert, 2010, 43) As a symbol 
of its support for India, the USSR moved its vessels to the Bay of Bengal. (Brecher & 
Wilkenfeld, 1997, 173) Nixon order US nuclear armed aircraft carrier Enterprise from the 
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Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal, supposedly to evacuate refugees. All he achieved by 
this gesture was to prod Indira Gandhi into urging India´s nuclear scientist to build their own 
atomic bombs, the first of which would be exploded three years later under Rajasthan´s 
desert. (Wolpert, 2010, 44) 
On 16 December 1971, in what was a humiliating defeat for Pakistan, the Pakistani army 
surrendered to India in Dhaka race course. India retained 94,000 prisoners of war, mainly 
Pakistani soldiers. The Indians also occupied about 5,000 square miles of Pakistani territory in 
Sindh, including the part of Rann of Kutch which they had lost to Pakistan as a result of the 
1965 arbitration. (Schofield, 2010, 133) The consequences of Pakistan´s loss were enormous. 
India had split Pakistan´s Eastern and Western wings, capturing thousands of square miles of 
territory and tens of thousands of prisoners. India´s huge victory made clear that this was 
unlikely to happen in the future. Indeed, the Pakistanis would face the possibility of 
catastrophic defeat if they challenged the Indians again. (Ganguly, 2010, 15) 
India´s victory over Pakistan exalted the status of Indira Gandhi to heights of popularity and 
power never attained by her father. Millions of Indians believed her to be nothing less than the 
mother goddess Durga. Throughout Europe she was admired as a great strategist and brilliant 
diplomat who had defeated both Pakistan and the United States at a single blow. (Wolpert, 
2010, 45) 
Indo-Pakistani relations became more stable following the Bangladesh conflict. Under 1972 
Simla Agreement, which reestablished diplomatic ties between two countries following the 
war, India and Pakistan agreed to settle further disputes bilaterally and to respect the line of 
control separating Indian and Pakistani Kashmir. (Ganguly, 2010, 15) 
In 1971, India took a gamble and tried to provoke Pakistan who was effectively lured into a 
trap. A careful military planning and ambitious military action in Pakistan on East Pakistan´s 
territory resulted in a huge victory of India, which also managed to gain support of the Soviet 
Union which was ready to veto any UN Security Council resolution unfavorable to India. 
According to sources, India did not consider previous interactions with Pakistan, but rather 
sought the guarantees of non-interference of traditional great powers. 
5.4 Siachen Conflict 1984 & 1987 Operation Brasstacks 
Another element of Indo-Pakistani conflict emerged in April 1984, when Indian military force 
s were deployed on the Siachen Glacier in Northern Kashmir, just south of China´s Xianjiang 
province. Pakistani forces soon followed suit, and sporadic battles have been fought between 
two sides from June 1984 to present. (Ganguly, 2012, 50)  
 
The Siachen glacier is a adjacent to the Indo-Tibetian border along the disputed territory as 
Aksi Chen on one side, the Shaksgan Valley to the northwest and the north. The 9842 triangle 
is a wedge that separates a closer Sino-Pakistan territorial nexus. (Adnan, 2015, 131)  
 
The glacier measures some 1.000 square miles of territory in the Karakoram Mountain range, 
much of which lies at elevations above 20.000 feet. The question of which country is 
sovereign over the Siachen Glacier constitutes a dispute within a dispute. Because both India 
and Pakistan claim all of Kashmir as their own, each country also claims complete control 
over the glacier. Competing claims over the glacier itself have their roots in the vagueness of 
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the 1949 Karachi agreement, which demarcated the CFL between India and Pakistan after the 
first Kashmir war. 
 
The Indian troops had started their activities in the region during the years of 1982-1983. By 
the end of 1983, India had taken decision to move into Siachen to secure Saltoro passes. This 
was done on the pretext that Pakistan was planning to occupy these passes. Thus, a decision 
of the Indian leadership to pre-empt a supposed Pakistani action resulted in India being 
involved in costly and difficult activity on a hostile glacier. (Adnan, 2015, 131)  
 
It is quite clear that India did deploy its troops first on the glacier in 1984 to establish its 
formal claim. On the other hand, there is also evidence that the pre-emptive Indian action in 
April 1984 stemmed from its awareness that Pakistan had been issuing mountaineering 
permits to foreign nationals interested in scaling the heights leading to the glacier. 
Specifically, intelligence reports that the Pakistani military was planning a similar operation 
establish a presence on the glacier. (Ganguly, 2012, 145) 
 
On April 1984, after intelligence reports indicated that Pakistan planned to move a military 
force onto the glacier, the Indian Army responded with Operation Meghdool an air assault 
operation that deployed two infantry battalions, inexperienced in mountain warfare, onto the 
key passes of Bilafond LA, Sia La, and Gyong La. In accordance with standard mountain 
doctrine, the Indian commander established strongpoint defenses on the Saltoro Ridge on the 
southwest border of the glacier, overwatching the Pakistani approaches into the Siachen 
region. (Fry, 2010, 28)  
 
Thus when the Pakistani forces arrived, they found their passage onto the glacier blocked by 
an Indian brigade holding tactically superior ground. What followed over the next year was 
textbook mountain warfare – both sides emplaced artillery positions to support their 
operations, established lines of communication between base camps in the valleys and the 
observation posts on the ridges, and began a war to attempt to gain or retain the key terrain 
onto the Saltoro Ridge. (Fry, 2010, 30) Pakistan tried to mount a counteroffensive, but its 
military was unable to dislodge Indians under the harsh conditions of the mountain warfare. 
Since then, there have been pitched artillery duels as Siachen ever since, especially in 1989. 
(Ganguly, 2010, 146) 
 
Since 1986, Pakistan and India had several rounds of talks on the issue of Siachen glacier, but 
no consensus was developed to resolve this issue.  
 
While other factors were also significant, the Siachen issue became one of the reasons for the 
emergence of Kargil war in 1999 since Pakistan´s aim was to cut Indian force stationed on the 
glacier from its supply roads. 
 
Operation Brasstacks 
Both India and Pakistan typically conduct large-scale military exercises in the winter months. 
During the 1980s, India established a pattern of holding annual military exercises, with larger-
scale exercises every third year. Brasstacks built upon and shared some commonalities with 
its predecessor, exercise Digvijay, in 1983. Like Digvijay, Brasstacks was held in the north of 
the border state of Rajasthan. This desert area is conducive to mechanized and tank warfare 
exercises, is sparsely populated, and does not support the intensive agriculture that would be 
disrupted by a military exercise. (Krepo & Cohn, 2011, 29) 
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In 1987 India undertook the largest military exercise in its history. The exercise held in the 
Thar Desert on India´s western front war organized on an East-West axis rather than the usual 
North-South Axis, which increased fears that the exercise could turn into an operation against 
Pakistan. (Banerjee & Hosur 2015, 68) The exercise was carried out very close to the Indian 
border with Pakistan which was again very unusual. In response, Pakistan mobilized its forces 
and deployed them by the border. The decision-makers from both sides were successful in 
managing the crisis without reaching the point of unmanageable escalation and eruption of an 
all-out war across the international border. (Khalid, 2012, 35) Thus after a series of escalatory 
moves the crisis was defused. 
In addition, the military operation was surrounded by considerable amount of secrecy. 
Pakistani intelligence had the rough assessment that a large exercise might be coming, but its 
knowledge of its size and scale was limited. A newly appointed Pakistani Prime Minister, 
Mohammed Khan Junejo sought to ascertain some details about the exercise from Rajiv 
Gandhi in November 1986 at SAARC meeting in Bangalore, India. Gandhi, without providing 
any significant details, suggested to his counterpart that the exercise has been scaled down. 
(Ganguly, 2012, 73) 
A large-scale Indian military exercise involving about 250,000 troops and 1,500 tanks took 
place in Rajasthan. The troops were issued with live ammunition and practiced a simulated 
counter-offensive into Pakistan. (Mumtaz, 2010, 24) The stated purpose of the exercise was to 
test the ability of a strike corps to conduct joint operations with combat squadrons from the 
Indian Air Force (Ladwig, 2007, 179) 
The size and location (30 to 50 miles from Pakistani border), and a lack of communication 
convinced Pakistan that Brasstacks was not an exercise at all, but an operation aimed at 
provoking an attack, which would then be met by massive retaliation. (Bajpai & Cohen & 
Ganguly, 1996, 57) 
There is little question however, that one of the principal goals of the exercise was to send 
unequivocal political and strategic message to Pakistani decision-makers about India´s robust 
military capabilities and its willingness to use them as the occasion demanded. Though no 
clear-cut evidence exists in the public domain, it can be inferred that the exercise was 
designed to send a message to Pakistani military that, despite India´s troubles in the 
insurgency-wracked state of Punjab, it still possessed sufficient military capabilities and the 
requisite political resolve to impose significant military costs on Pakistan. Conveying this 
message was extremely important from the standpoint of India´s decision-makers given 
Pakistan´s feckless support to the Sikh insurgents. (Ganguly, 2010, 72) Therefore, the 
operation entailed an element of compellence since one of its aims was to dissuade Pakistan 
from its actions in Punjab. 
The operation begun by the end of 1986, but poor communication and lack of information 
transformed the situation from bad to worse in January 1987. Both countries placed their 
entire armies on high alert and engaged themselves in ominous maneuvers on either side of 
the border. Prime Minister Ganghi´s decision to begin airlifting troops to Punjab on January 
20, 1987 threatened an escalation transforming into an all-out war. In addition, India 
demanded Pakistan to withdraw its military to peace time positions and it also sealed the 
border of Punjab. 
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By the end of January 1987, the Brasstacks crisis had reached its apogee. Military forces were 
in position along fighting corridors in the desert and across the Kashmir divide. Military 
maneuvers appeared increasingly provocative and bilateral discussions were unsatisfactory. 
By mid-December, the hotline between the Directors General of Military Operations had 
effectively been de-activated. Pakistani leaders were dissatisfied by what they saw as a lack of 
forthright responses to their queries about Brasstacks. Indian political leaders recognized the 
severity of the crisis but were concerned that information provided via the hotline could be 
turned against them. (Krepo & Cohn, 2011, 33) 
Prime Misiter Gandhi’s lack of interest and inadequate knowledge of the ongoing 
developments in relation to exercise Brasstacks was a major factor in the spiral of events he 
could not initially anticipate and, in the end, he confessed to the Pakistani leadership that he 
was not in total control of his own government. While Gandhi may have unconsciously 
contributed to initiating the crisis owing to his inactivity and lack of interest, General Sundarji 
was perhaps the person most responsible. There are serious credible apprehensions that he had 
ulterior motives in staging the exercises. After the crisis, numerous individuals within the 
Indian military were vocal in blaming him as a reckless adventurer who brought the country 
to the brink of war. (Khalid, 2012, 52) 
At the time a commonly accepted interpretation was that this was an accidental crisis 
provoked by India‘s military exercises which were misinterpreted by the Pakistani side. But 
evidence has since come to light that the then chief of the Army Staff, General Krishnaswami 
Sundarji, was planning a preventive war. The concept was that the Brasstacks exercise would 
provoke the Pakistani military to react by initiating hostilities and provide a pretext for India 
to move into Pakistani territory and implement contingency plans to take out the Pakistani 
nuclear program. Pakistani military commanders became alarmed when there was no full 
notification about the plans for the Indian exercises and requests for clarification via the 
special hotline were not provided. These plans for a preventive attack were not known to 
India‘s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Plans to attack the Pakistani Army Reserve South and 
Pakistani nuclear facilities were finally rejected by Gandhi after consultations with senior 
officials and General Sundarji who continued to lobby for an attack, arguing that India‘s cities 
could be protected from a Pakistani counterattack. (Mumtaz, 2010, 24) 
The de-escalation of the crisis took place fairly quickly. On 27 January, Pakistan Prime 
Minister Junejo called up Rajiv Gandhi and expressed interest in reducing the ongoing border 
tensions. Gandhi promptly extended an invitation to his Pakistani counterpart for the onset of 
high-level talks. (Ganguly, 2012, 75). During multiple rounds of talks, the gradual withdrawal 
of forces was initiated as both parties agreed to confidence-building measures. 
The Operation Brasstacks was in its core very similar to 1983 Able Archer military exercise. 
It´s main purpose was to prepare Indian army for the actual war with Pakistan. Its scope was 
different from traditional small-scale military exercises India initiated before. According to 
many testimony´s, Indian military (without the knowledge of Prime Minister), expected 
Pakistan to preempt against India´s possible strike, which would gave India an opportunity to 
retaliate against Pakistani nuclear facilities. 
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5.5 Indo-Pakistani War of 1999 (War of Kargil) 
Between Many and Mid-July 1999, India and Pakistan fought the fourth war in their 
independent history. The Kargil conflict was the first limited military operation between 
Pakistan and India after the nuclear proliferation in South Asia. The war was short in duration 
but very intense. 
Historically after the partition of India, Kargil has occupied a strategic position and has 
therefore been the cause of the intrusion to Pakistan. During the 1948 India-Pakistan conflict, 
Pakistani forces managed to occupy the Kargil heights. In both of the India-Pakistan wars of 
1965 and 1971, Kargil was a zone of confrontation between the countries. In the 1965 war 
India occupied three posts in Kargil only to cede them under the Soviet-brokered Tashkent 
agreement that formally ended hostilities. (Bommakanti, 2011, 284). In 1971, India seized 
control of a number of posts in the Kargil sector and never returned them back. 
It had become clear that sentiments expressed by Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India 
during the Lahore Summit had received a setback due to developments in Kargil. (Adnan, 
2015, 129) Kargil also has a significant strategic value. It overlooks National Highway 1A, 
which connects Srinagar with Leh in Ladakh. Traversing the heights of Kargil is easier from 
Pakistan´s side of the Line of Control because the terrain is less steep and rugged than in 
India. (Bommakanti, 2011, 285) The situation was even more delicate due to Pakistan´s 
nuclear ambitions. 
In May 1998 India tested its nuclear weapons, and Pakistan, despite the halfhearted attempts 
of the international community to prevent it, soon followed suit.(Qadir, 2012, 1) The Indian 
decision to resume nuclear testing in May 1998 provided Pakistan—for all its 
encumbrances—with an incredible opportunity: first, to technically validate the weaponry it 
had assiduously sought to create since 1972; and second, to conclusively demonstrate to the 
world at large and particularly to India that Pakistan possesses capabilities previously only 
suspected (and in India often denigrated). The new public recognition of Pakistan’s nuclear 
capabilities—as evidenced through Pakistan’s tests in May 1998—provided Pakistan’s 
leadership with new windows of opportunity and more-robust forms of immunity. (Tellis & 
Fair, 2011, 48) 
Pakistan’s military leaders were all but surely emboldened by their country’s acquisition of a 
nuclear weapons delivery capability within the preceding year. They may also have been 
encouraged by a derivative belief that the awareness of that capability in key leadership 
circles in New Delhi would more than offset any conventional military advantage India 
enjoyed in the region. (Lambeth, 2012, 6) 
While preparations were under way for an upcoming meeting of India’s and Pakistan’s prime 
ministers in Lahore, Pakistan, senior leaders in the Pakistan Army, led by the chief of the 
Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, and the chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General 
Mohammed Aziz, were conducting initial reconnaissance and laying the logistical 
groundwork for the impending operation. The most likely aim of the planned gambit, apart 
from seeking to internationalize the Kashmir issue in Indo-Pakistani relations, was to take 
control of India’s sole line of communication to troops on the Siachen glacier by obstructing 
the use of the key two-lane national highway NH-1A in Ladakh running from Srinagar 
through Kargil to Leh. It provided access to the IAF’s airfield at Thoise on the axis to 
Siachen. (Lambeth, 2012, 6) 
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Many analysts viewed this development as dangerous. Almost an equally large number felt 
that it was for the best, however, since this brought deterrence fully into place. It was not long 
before the latter were rudely shocked out of their assessment. In February 1999, Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister, visited Pakistan as part of the much touted ‘bus 
diplomacy’, on the invitation of his counterpart, Mr. Nawaz Sharif. Vajpayee was greeted 
with great pomp and show, unaware that Kargil had been (or was being) occupied. (Qadir, 
2012, 1) 
The incursion’s planners took full advantage of the relaxed atmosphere that had come to 
prevail in New Delhi after the visit of Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee to Pakistan to help 
promulgate the Lahore Declaration, which was signed by Vajpayee and his Pakistani 
counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, on February 21. With it, the governments of both countries swore 
their commitment to the vision of peace and stability embodied in the United Nations charter. 
The Pakistan Army leaders chose to exploit the nascent, and ultimately short-lived, feeling of 
goodwill that had emanated from that declaration in a way that might irreversibly change the 
status quo along the Line of Control to Pakistan’s advantage. (Lambeth, 2012, 7) 
Alternative goal of Pakistan was to draw the attention of the international community since 
Kashmir dispute had not been a central issue for more than ten years. An operation like Kargil 
was likely to bring the issue back to the spotlight. Once the mission was put into operation, 
the Pakistani leadership assessed, the Western fear of a nuclear conflagration would translate 
into their interference and force India to come to the negotiating table. This would facilitate a 
third-party mediation and Islamabad would be able to negotiate from a position of strength. 
The outcome, Islamabad expected, would be a resolution of the issue on terms favorable to 
Pakistan. (Chakma, 2010, 10) 
In the winter of 1999, units of Pakistani military and paramilitary forces, acting as 
mujahedeen operating on their own initiative, penetrated the Indian side of the Line of 
Control. (Krolikowski, 2016, 403) The Pakistani infiltration operation dubbed “Badr” had the 
aim of breaking connections between Kashmir and Ladakh, which was to lead to the 
withdrawal of Indian troops from the Siachen Glacier. 
Ultimately, in what turned out to be a phased infiltration in uniquely challenging mountain 
terrain, Pakistani troops moving by foot and helicopter occupied roughly 130 outposts on 
India’s side of the LoC before the intruders were first detected by local shepherds on May 3. 
(Lambeth, 2012, 7) At least eighteen artillery batteries, most of them from across the Line of 
Control in Pakistani-controlled territory, were said to have supported the operation. Indian 
sources later reported that the occupying force numbered from 1,500 to 2,000 combatants, 
with perhaps four to five times that many troops mobilized to help supply the most forward 
elements on the Indian side of the Line of Control. (Lambeth, 2012, 7) The activities of 
Pakistani Special Forces remained unnoticed for several reasons. In winter, the number of 
patrols was usually decreased. Moreover, Indians did not sent their troops into the infiltrated 
areas, and Pakistanis masked movements of their troops with intense artillery fire. The fact of 
Pakistani presence has has been recognized by Indians only during the second week of their 
presence. (Krolikowski, 2016, 405) 
It took more than another week in all for the Indian Army to take stock of its challenge at 
hand and to develop the beginnings of a course of action to drive the invaders out. 
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The initial Indian reaction was clumsy and lacked tactical and strategic sense since Indians 
heavily underestimated the magnitude of Pakistani presence. Indian troops attempted to push 
their way up to heights of 16,000 feet and beyond. Due to the lack of ground cover, they 
became easy target for Pakistani snipers and gunners. After taking substantial casualties, the 
Indians realized they needed considerably greater firepower to dislodge the Pakistani 
intruders. 
In response, India was willing to open conflict on multiple fronts as last resort, a move which 
could have eventually spiraled out of control leading to all-out war. Preferable option 
however, was limited response named operation Vijay (Victory).  
Operation Vijay´s aim was to force Pakistani soldiers behind the Line of Control with the use 
of infantry, artillery and Air Force. In total, around 200,000 Indian soldiers were amassed. 
(Krolikowski, 2016, 405) 
By the second week of July, the Pakistani forces were facing relentless artillery barrages and 
air attacks from the Indian military. A more sympathetic American might have emboldened 
him and allowed Pakistani military to continue on with their plans. However, in the face of 
escalating losses and paucity of international diplomatic support for its position, Sharif was 
forced to reconsider the value of continuing military operations. (Ganguly, 2012, 157) After 
two months of fighting, Indians regained around 80% of the occupied territory. As for the 
losses incurred by Pakistan, the government of that country confirmed that 453 soldiers were 
killed, but US estimated Pakistan lost as minimum 700 men in arms. (Krolikowski, 2016, 
408) 
By 9 June, Pakistan was expressing a willingness to send a special envoy to New Delhi to 
discuss a de-escalation of the crisis. Initially, India expressed little express but later agreed. 
(Ganguly, 2012, 157) 
Pakistani high ranking officials called for the mujahedeen to withdraw, but never referred to 
fighting soldiers as Pakistani army, thus the official presence of national military was never 
publicly admitted.  
Even though there was no formal declaration of war, this conflict proved to be among the 
costliest of the Indo-Pakistani war in terms of both men and materiel. While the estimates of 
casualties vary, it is believed that India lost 1,714 military personnel and Pakistan lost 772. 
(Ganguly, 2012, 143) In addition, it has been reported that both sides of the conflict prepared 
their nuclear arsenals for possible deployment; some nuclear bombs were ready to be mated 
with delivery vehicles at short notice. (Chakma, 2011, 10) 
The fearlessness of the Pakistanis demonstrated in the Kargil crisis proves the point that only 
nuclear weapons acquisition could give them the confidence to launch such an offensive 
against India. P.R. Chari believed that Kargil revealed that proxy wars and “sub-conventional 
conflicts” or support for cross-border terrorism and militancy were common in the India-
Pakistan conflict due to the presence of nuclear weapons. He further argues that Pakistan 
“could with impunity indulge in salami slicing tactics to capture small pieces of territory 
under the rubric of nuclear deterrence, and in the confidence that India would not find it 
possible to escalate the conflict lest it approach the nuclear level.” (Paul, 2005, 169) 
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The Kargil War of 1999 is similar to Rann of Kutch war of 1965. Pakistani relied on its 
international allies to get involved and renegotiate the Kashmir dispute in its favor after the 
issue has been frozen for nearly a decade. Pakistan was aware of its military inferiority vis-à-
vis India, but it hoped that great powers political intervention might tip the balance to its 
favor. 
5.5 Indo-Pakistani Rivalry Conclusions 
The first Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 was a chaotic event which emerged after vacuum 
created by the absence of British colonial rule. The newly established entities were fighting 
for its identity and for the future borders of Pakistan and India. Prior to this conflict, 
deterrence could not have been established. 
In 1951, Pakistani political instability (thwarted coup) led to spontaneous actions of Pakistani 
paramilitary units which operated on Indian soil. Minor clashes resulted artillery exchanges 
alongside the Line of Control. Only careful diplomacy and willingness to negotiate prevented 
another all-out war. Despite the absence of any kind of military advantage, Pakistani military 
was largely independent of political establishment and it acted on its own. In this case, 
Pakistani military was acting irrationally despite India´s threats being credible.  
Pakistan initiated the War of 1965 because it concluded that present balance of power favors 
Pakistan over India. Despite Pakistan being militarily weaker, India was at the time shaken by 
the war lost to China. Moreover, Indian Prime Minister Nehru passed away in 1964 which 
resulted in appointment of a new, inexperienced administration. 
Unlike India which had no significant allies in the international arena, Pakistan also enjoyed 
alliance with China and the United States. Should Pakistan wait, the conditions would shift 
only in India´s favor. Despite previous loses, India was believed to quickly give up at least on 
parts of its territory without bringing the fight to Pakistani soil. 
In 1971, India used the opportunity to deal Pakistan a significant blow while it was stuck in 
rebelling East Pakistan (todays Bangladesh). India could not have sustain influx of refugees 
and swift action was needed. The military recommended to postpone any kind of military 
operation till winter, because the summer rainy terrain was not friendly to heavy weapons 
deployment. India did not care about Pakistan´s previous behavior, but it was afraid of its 
allies possible response (China, US). Prime Minister Indira Gandhi therefore concluded an 
alliance with the USSR which would veto any UN Security Council resolution aimed to curb 
India´s effort. 
1984 operation on Siachen Glacier, on the other hand, can be classified as a preemptive 
operation to prevent Pakistan from doing the same, while Operation Brasstacks of 1984 has a 
lot in common with Able Archer military exercise executed by the US in 1983. Only after 
many years, it was revealed that one of the generals wanted to provoke Pakistan into striking 
India´s forces in self-defense, a move that would provide India with casus belli to strike 
Pakistani nuclear facilities. 
1999 War of Kargil was initiated by Pakistan whose top brass hoped to bring Kashmir to 
spotlight after a decade of peace. Despite being weaker, Pakistani leadership hoped again that 
possible US or Chinese interference might reopen the issue of Kashmir. Any kind of India´s 
possible retaliation was hoped to be averted by conducted a covert operation and any denial of 
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regular Pakistani army presence on India´s soil. India, contrary to Pakistani belief, was ready 
to retaliate against Pakistan in major while neither US nor China were willing to act on 
Pakistan´s behalf in terms of Kashmir´s territorial settlement. 
Indo-Pakistani conflict proves that competing countries are willing to initiate a conflict 
despite lacking clear military advantage. Pakistan hoped for many times that its hybrid 
warfare tactics might enable it to draw attention of great powers without any significant 
political consequences in the way similar to Nasser´s behavior during the War of Attrition 
waged against Israel. A proof of Pakistani leadership assessing India´s previous behavior prior 
any military campaign was not found in available literature. Moreover, Pakistan resorts to 
aggression in times of internal political crises which gave direct impact on country´s foreign 
policy. Increasing hostilities and escalating confrontation with India provide local politicians 
or the military easy way to draw attention away from internal problems country might face. 
Pakistani decision-makers rather resorted to actual assessment of the given situation, which 




















6 Confronting Qualitative & Quantitative Findings 
In the last part of this text qualitative and quantitative findings are confronted with an aim to 
find possible similarities or differences between them. Under the logic similar to previous 
three chapters, regression analysis is conducted to test general deterrence failure and to 
analyze a relationship between Power Discrepancy and No. of Years since last conflict 
variables. In addition to this, a regression analysis was run to examine the relationship 
between challenger´s and defender´s head of states. Equation showing the relationship among 
these four variables is created and evaluated. Findings and figures are also represented by 
charts and then analyzed in comparison to qualitative analysis. Potential flaws and 
discrepancies between these two methodological approaches are discussed. 
The most important element of this chapter is logistic regression conducted on No. of Years 
Since Last Conflict and Deterrence/Credibility Failure. Should there be any relationship 
between these two units of observation general deterrence-wise, the frequency of a conflict 
has to increase with every deterrence/credibility failure. In other words, every credibility 
failure should follow. 
Dataset below was formed by combining three previous datasets. It contains necessary 
quantitative data related to Cold War, Arab-Israeli Conflict and Indo-Pakistani Rivalry. 
Regression analysis was run on the following dataset. 
Table 4.1 – Enduring Rivalries Dataset 
 
Multivariate regression analysis was run on the cumulative dataset above with a special 
emphasis on three key dependent variables: 
 Power Discrepancy 
 Challenger´s Head of State Term Length 
 Defender´s Head of State Term Length 



























1948 The Berlin Crisis USSR US 1 0 0 22 3 -34
1950 Korean War USSR US 0 1 2 24 5 24
1961 The Second Berlin Crisis USSR US 1 0 11 8 0,2 -42
1962 The Carribean Crisis USSR US 1 0 1 9 0,5 9
1965 The Vietnam War USSR US 0 1 3 2 1 16
1979 The War in Afghanistan US USSR 0 1 14 15 2 -5
1983 Able Archer US USSR 1 0 4 2 1 0
1948 The War of Independence Israel - 0 1 0 12 0,1 -28
1956 Sinai War Arabs - 0 1 8 1 0,2 -27
1967 The Six Day War Arabs Israel 0 1 12 1 11 -8
1969 The War of Attrition Arabs Israel 0 1 2 13 0,3 -2
1970 Black September Arabs Israel 1 0 0,1 0,5 0,6 27
1973 The Yom Kippur War Arabs Israel 0 1 3 3 5 14
1981 Operation Babylon Arabs Israel 0 1 8 4 2 -1
1947 War of 1947 India - 0 1 0 0,2 0,2 -6
1951 Punjab War Scare India - 1 0 3 4 4 1
1965 Rann of Kutch India - 0 1 16 2,5 0,8 1
1965 War of Kashmir India - 0 1 0,3 2,5 1 -1
1971 War of Bangladesh India India 0 1 6 2,5 5 -13
1984 Siachen Conflict India India 1 0 13 3,5 6 10
1987 Operation Brasstacks India India 1 0 3 2,5 9 11
1999 War of Kargil India India 0 1 12 2 1 -2
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Before interpreting results of statistical analysis, it has to be noted that Value of Significance 
F is much greater than generally recommended level of 0,05 the results of regression analysis 
for such a limited number of observations are not very accurate. The way to increase 
relevance of regression analysis is to increase the number of observations.  
Based on the regression analysis, the following equation of deterrence relationship to head of 
state can be modelled: 
Y (No. of Years Since Last Conflict) = 5,38666 – 0,17682 * (Challenger´s Head of State 
Term Lenght) + 0,38757 * (Defenders´s Head of State Term Length) – 0,07408 * (Power 
Discrepancy) 
According to this equation, the frequency between crises is a function of three different 
variables: Challenger´s Head of State Term Length, Defender´s Head of State Length and 
Power Discrepancy. 
Chart 4.1 – Enduring Rivalries Power Discrepancy & Conflict Frequency 
 
ANOVA df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 73,45727021 24,48575674 0,861272392 0,479059984
Residual 18 511,7354571 28,42974761
Total 21 585,1927273
Coefficients Standard Eror t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 5,38666 1,89680 2,83987 0,01087 1,40163 9,37169 1,40163 9,37169
Challenger´s head of state duration -0,17682 0,17180 -1,02920 0,31702 -0,53777 0,18413 -0,53777 0,18413
Defenders head of state duration 0,38757 0,39284 0,98657 0,33693 -0,43776 1,21290 -0,43776 1,21290
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Chart above shows a relationship between Power Discrepancy and Conflict Frequency. Axis 
X represents Power Discrepancy from the perspective of a challenger while Y axis represents 
number of years since last conflict (crisis, war). Blue points stand for selected military 
conflicts. 
 Before analyzing the chart itself it has to be noted that Power Discrepancy does not represent 
purely military dimension of a conflict.2 Military power balance surely represents the ultimate 
yardstick of national military capability vis-à-vis its adversary, but deterrence failure should 
not be reduced only to purely military dimension. 
Certainly, one or two individual measures—the number of personnel under arms, for example, 
or the number of tanks or missile launchers in a nation’s inventory—are unlikely to capture 
the key factors for assessing military power, just as a single measure does not provide a useful 
assessment of a country’s overall power. A single measure may be useful for ranking states by 
particular dimensions of military capability, but it will not capture more than a small part of 
the variance in the effectiveness of military forces. It is obvious, for example, that the largest 
armies may not necessarily be the most effective. In the 1960s and 1970s, Israel’s small forces 
defeated larger opponents. The People’s Liberation Army is numerically the largest military 
in the world, but today China cannot project significant power beyond its borders. The 
capability of a military force, therefore, depends on more than just the resources made 
available to the coercive arms of the state. Consider, for example, the contrast in the military 
capabilities of Israel and New Zealand. Both have modern economies, well-educated 
populations, access to world markets and modern technologies, and freely elected 
governments. Yet their armed forces are quite different. Though their resources are 
significantly different (Israel’s GDP is twice that of New Zealand), Israel is directly 
threatened by nearby neighbors and defends itself without formal allies. New Zealand is an 
island nation, faces no apparent external threats, and is allied with Australia and the United 
States. So military threats, geography, and alliances also help shape a country’s force 
architecture and, ultimately, its effective military capabilities. (Tellis, Bialy, 2000, 134). 
USSR, by contrast, enjoyed quantitative superiority over the United States in key regional 
theaters of war. In the initial stage of the Cold War, Unlike the United States, the Soviets still 
did not have the technology to produce atomic bomb which made them extremely vulnerable 
to possible US strike. The question is who wielded more power? Conventionally superior 
Soviets or Americans having a couple dozens of nuclear bombs in their inventory? These 
arguments prove that relative power of countries can´t be reduced only to question of pure 
military balance of power. 
For reasons identified above, Power Discrepancy variable defined by authors of International 
Crisis Behavior dataset is therefore much more accurate to gauge relative power of a country 
rather than just pure military balance.  
Based on observations represented in previous chart, it is evident that stronger the challenger 
is, the more likely he is to engage in a conflict. However, there are many exceptions to this 
rule according to findings presented in the qualitative part of this paper. 
                                                          
2 The variable refers to the capability gap between adversaries in an international crisis, whether individual 
states or coalitions. Its measured by six components: size of population, GNP, alliance relationships, territorial 
size, military and nuclear capability. 
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In history, many cases were traced in which militarily weaker country-against all odds-
decided to attack its relatively stronger adversary with an aim to benefit from moment of 
surprise. Pearl Harbor, Operation Barbarossa, the Six Day War, 1999 War of Kargil, 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis to name a few. Decision makers might have many reasons to take the 
risk and perpetrate attack while being aware of a fact that power balance favors their 
adversaries.  
Take the tail wags the dog principle, for instance. Some countries might tend to drag their 
opponents into armed conflicts hoping their patrons or allies might be forced to enter these 
conflicts in order not to lose their face. Nasser in late 60s threatened the USSR that losing 
War of Attrition to Israel would result in humiliation of USSR as patron which is unable to 
protect its client. He purposely attacked Israel hoping the Soviets will have to protect Egypt 
by entering the war and defeating Israel. 
Sometimes, a case of initiating an unwinnable war might be a part of broad geopolitical 
calculus. President of Egypt Anwar Sadat launched the Yom Kippur with clear objective of 
leaving the Soviet orbit in exchange for US pressure on Israel to make concessions 
concerning Sinai territorial issue. 
An approach of a country hoping for great powers to tip the odds in their favor is not 
exclusive to Arab-Israeli rivalry. Pakistan in 1965 (Rann of Kutch) attacked India believing 
US or China will restrain any India´s reaction. In 1999 Kargil War, the leaders of Pakistan 
send to India paramilitary units to escalate hostilities regardless Pakistan´s military inferiority 
to India. The main purpose of this operation was to alert international community of possible 
nuclear conflict in South Asia which was then believed to reopen the Kashmir issue and 
possibly renegotiate it in Pakistan´s favor. 
Sometimes, leaders hope their adversaries will give up on their objectives just to avoid war. In 
1962, Soviet Union lied about its nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles superiority against 
the US. Khrushchev, being himself aware of his bluff, did not mind to risk asymmetric US 
response by deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba.  
In other cases, country´s military resort to preventive or preemptive strikes. Military - can 
under certain circumstances - conclude that should the war be inevitable, it is rational to 
attack rather now than later. Pakistan in 1965 knew India was stronger, but after receiving US 
military aid, assaulting India currently worn down by its war with China seemed rational. 
Israel, triggering the Six Day War favored a surprise and decisive preemptive strike over 
waiting for Arabs to strike first. 
Countries relatively stronger vis-à-vis their adversaries sometimes intentionally want 
deterrence to fail. India, being aware of its relative military strength compared to Pakistan, in 
1971 hoped its adversary would strike first providing it with a casus belli to liberate East 
Pakistan. In 1983 during Operation Brasstacks, one influential India´s generals hoped 
Pakistan will initiate a war in self-defense which would allow India to strike its nuclear 
facilities. 
Power Discrepancy certainly matters when it comes to deterrence & credibility. Through the 
lens of a common sense, it is rational that stronger countries tend to engage more often in 
conflicts with their adversaries rather than relatively weaker ones. It has to be noted though, 
that there are many significant exceptions to this trend. 
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6.2 Head of State Term Length 
The entirely new units of analysis - Challenger´s and Defender´s Head of State Term Length 
are examined in this part. Surprisingly enough, none of the three datasets (International Crisis 
Behavior Dataset, Correlates of War, and Uppsala Conflict Data Program) considered for this 
research paper did operate with the variables related to head of state´s. 
Chart 4.2 Enduring Rivalries Challenger´s Head of State Term Length & Conflict Frequency 
 
Previous chart shows a relationship between Challenger´s Head of state Term Length (X axis) 
and Conflict Frequency (Y axis). The trendline shows the frequency of a conflict decreases 
with the number of years challenger´s head of state was in power. Taking it the other way 
around, the shorter the time the challenger´s head of state was in office, the more likely it is 
that status quo will be challenged. Based on the chart above, it is clear that most conflict takes 
place within first couple of years new challenger country´s head of state was in power.  
The way trendline is skewed implies that conflict frequency decreases with the number of 
years challenger´s head of state was in power. It should be noted though that such a trend is 
given namely by extreme values represented by Soviet leaders Stalin a Brezhnev, who ruled 
their countries for unusually long periods of time. To a certain extent, these exceptional cases 
might distort reality. 
Increased conflict frequency in the initial years of new administration makes sense. On 
challenger´s side, newly appointed head of states usually tend to either test commitments of 
their adversaries or to neglect status-quo pursued by their predecessors (by conducting quite 
the opposite policy, in some cases more aggressive, in some cases aimed at conflict de-
escalation). 
Qualitative analysis of three protracted conflicts in main part of the body supports this notion 
with multiple empirical examples. 
Pakistani leadership tends to escalate conflict with India to gain public support and to divert 
attention away from internal problems. Civilian governments tend to defuse the conflict with 
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During the Cold War, Khrushchev´s attitude was much more less risk averse than Stalin´s. 
Stalin was very careful about giving Mao and Kim his permission to attack South Korea, 
while Khrushchev did not mind to risk nuclear war by his support of Cuba. Brezhnev, unlike 
Khrushchev, paved the way for policy of détente. Giving the US example, Kennedy was 
willing to negotiate with the Soviets rather than his predecessor Eisenhower. Ronald Reagan 
labeled Carter´s foreign policy as weak and adopted much stronger stance vis-à-vis Soviets. 
President Nasser in Egypt overthrow king Farooq claiming his policy towards Israel failed 
and has to be revised. Sadat revised Nasser policy and devoted first years of his term to 
preparations on what was later called the Yom Kippur war as did his Syrian counterpart 
Assad. 
Through the lens of empirical evidence, the chart below is even more interesting. 
Chart 4.3 Enduring Rivalries Defenders´s Head of State Term Length & Conflict Frequency 
 
 The chart on the previous page demonstrates that value of Number of Years Since Last 
Conflict (axis Y) increases with Defender´s Head of State Term Length (axis X) and vice-
versa. The shorter the duration of defender´s head of state being in power, the more likely that 
its adversary will attack.  
New administrations lack of experience usually give their opponents a chance to catch their 
adversaries by surprise. Decision-making channels are usually not well-operational which 
increases reaction time and thus opens a window of opportunity for potential aggressor. 
Probably the most famous case is that of President Kennedy. Soviets realized that young and 
relatively inexperienced President might be easier to be intimidated than his skilled 
predecessor Eisenhower. Therefore, the Soviets pressured the US first over West Berlin, 
second over Cuba. 
When Soviets invaded Afghanistan, they took into consideration president Carters reputation 
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Reagan introduced very assertive policy towards the Soviet Union when Andropov came to 
power. 
Israeli leadership conspired with United Kingdom and France with hopes to overthrown 
Nasser´s regime whose ascension to power changed the dynamics in Egypt-Israel relations. 
Nasser promised to push the Jews back to the sea. His deal with Czechoslovakia to receive 
offensive weapons including combat aviation made Israel act decisively. Golda Meier who 
replaced Prime Minister Eshkol in 1969 escalated Israeli attacks on Egyptian forces during the 
War of Attrition. Saddam Hussein, for instance, was in power less than year and a half when 
Israeli Air Force carried precision airstrikes on nuclear reactor Osirak. His pursuit for nuclear 
weapons did not give Israel any other option. 
Pakistan in 1965 before attacking India found as an advantage the fact India´s Prime Minister 
passed away in 1964. New Prime Minister, food shortages and war lost to China a few months 
ago created a perfect storm for India creating a perfect opportunity for Pakistan. When 
Pakistan attacked India in 1999 triggering the Kargil War, India´s Prime Minister Vajpayee 
was in office only a bit over a year. 
Based on the charts presented in this chapter it is evident that a link can be found between 
head of state´s term length and conflict frequency.  
Both options are usually materialized in a form of a conflict engagement with an aim to test 
adversary´s credibility. In case of head of state´s change on defender´s side, challenger´s lean 
to test new administration’s willingness to keep commitments of their predecessors. In the 
opposite case, new head of state´s tend to change policy of their predecessors either more 
aggressive or more aimed at seeking a compromise.  
6.3 Inherent Credibility or Commitment Theory? 
In order to judge which theory offers a better explanation of crises which emerged as a part of 
three different enduring rivalries analyzed in this paper, one should take a look on results of 
logistic regression. Thanks to logistic regression, one can model a relationship between 













































































































































































































































































































































































Logistic regression was run between an independent variable (Credibility Failure) and 
multiple dependent variables (Challenger´s/Defender´s Head of State Term Length & No. 
Years Since Last Deterrence Failure).   
 
If credibility failure in one crisis has any impact on likelihood of deterrence failure in the 
crisis which follows, there should be a clear relationship between these two variables. Based 
on the given input, table below with Deterrence/Credibility failure predictions was created: 
 
With 50 % cutoff, deterrence was predicted to succeed in 11 crises out of 13. Current model 
correctly predicted almost 85% of the cases. Analyzing deterrence failure, the model 
predicted correctly only 1 case out of 9 resulting in accuracy of 11%. On average, this model 
can predict less than 55 % of total 22 cases. These results are not satisfying enough to claim 
there is a clear relationship between the two variables measured.  
This conclusion can be seen in a better way when visualized on the chart below. 
 
coeff b s.e. Wald p-value exp(b) lower upper
Intercept 0,718153682 0,941800991 0,581455519 0,445742 2,050644
Power Discrepancy (Challenger´s 
Perspective)
-0,001990547 0,026386502 0,005690905 0,939866 0,998011 0,94771 1,050983
Challenger´s Head of State Term 
Lenght
-0,003436053 0,068364209 0,002526168 0,959914 0,99657 0,871598 1,139461
Defender´s Head of State Term 
Lenght
-0,020469204 0,149706052 0,018694902 0,891245 0,979739 0,730601 1,313834
No. Of Years Since Last Opponent´s 
Credibility Failure
-0,026762986 0,045082123 0,352419882 0,552746 0,973592 0,891257 1,063533
Suc-Obs Fail-Obs Total
Suc-Pred 11 8 19
Fail-Pred 2 1 3
Total 13 9 22





















No. of Years Since Last Credibility/Deterrence Failure





Should credibility failure in previous crisis lead to a deterrence failure in crisis which follows, 
with every credibility failure the frequency of deterrence failure (war) should increase. 
The chart on the previous page shows relationship between Number of Years Since Last 
Credibility/Deterrence Failure (X axis) and Deterrence/Credibility failure (Y axis). 
Apparently, there is no clear connection between two variables measured. 
The question is, how is it possible that so many authors using statistical methods confirmed 
the validity of Commitment Theory? 
 Crisis classification - the first problem stems from relevancy of conflicts added to 
measured dataset. 
 Crisis definition – should crisis be measured as a single unit or rather as a set of 
events? (US campaign in Vietnam and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan consisted of 
different phases. Perhaps they should be considered as separate cases rather than a 
single conflict. The same way of reasoning is valid for majority of conflicts. 
 Reason-Consequence relationship – to give an example: Did the US pressured 
Vietnam because of their possible alliance with the USSR or did US interference make 
Cuba and Vietnam to join Soviet camp? 
 Conflict distribution by region – successful US response to 1948 Berlin Crisis did not 
deter Soviets supporting North Korea in its attempt to conquer South Korea. 
Credibility and deterrence might eventually need to be assessed only in terms of the 
same region. 
Despite criticism, Commitment Theory should not be neglected. The truth is, in general, both 
theories are valid. Countries certainly do take care about the events which preceded crises, but 
the depth of their analysis is limited rather to mandate of a single head of state.  
Why would it matter what previous administration thought? Now, country has to deal with a 
new decision-maker with unique set of traits, values and experience. 
It implies that deterrence should not be related to countries defined as homogenous entities, 
but rather to concrete decision-makers who are responsible for foreign policy design and 
execution. 
Accuracy of used statistical methods is not satisfying enough to make a valid conclusion, but 
it could be increased by increasing the number of observations. 
It is evident that countries asses’ behavior of their adversaries when predicting their behavior 
and reactions to certain political or military actions. There might be many events which could 
be used to expand given dataset. 
Take the Soviet Union for instance. When speculating about the true nature of 1983 NATO´s 
Able Archer exercise, Reagan´s administration´s behavior was carefully analyzed. US 
invasion of Grenada, SDI, Pershing II missiles deployment and rhetoric over Soviets downing 
of South Korean airliner in the Far East made Soviets think Americans are willing to initiate 
nuclear first strike. There might be plenty of more or less influential events such these which 
could be added to the dataset in order to increase the number of observations. 
In addition, every enduring rivalry had different dynamics. All the powers concerned also 
have very different strategic culture implying it would be better to analyze them separately. 
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Both statistics and qualitative research prove that leadership changes have a crucial role when 
it comes to deterrence-credibility relationship calculus. The unit of analysis used in most 
available datasets – deterrence vis-à-vis particular country - should be reconsidered. There is 
no evidence that countries assess behavior of their adversaries during past crises when 
designing foreign policies. Doing so would be largely impractical; country´s politics usually 
change as do their head of states. Why to care about policy of a politician who is no longer in 
office? According to empirical data researcher in this paper, deterrence relationship seems to 
be find a new balance after every head of state change. 
7 Conclusion 
Every of the enduring rivalries chosen for through examination shows different reasons for 
animosity, levels of intensity and depth. 
To answer the given research question- “Does deterrence failure caused by a lack of 
credibility increase the likelihood of deterrence failure in next crisis?”, the following 
hypothesis must be validated:  
Should deterrence failure caused by the credibility failure in previous crisis lead to a 
deterrence failure in crisis which follows, with every credibility failure the frequency of 
deterrence failure (war) should increase. 
Logistic regression has been made for the given dataset. Statistical analysis could correctly 
predict the result of only 55 % results of the crises. Taking this number into consideration, 
there might be just a weak relationship between deterrence failure which followed and event 
with credibility failure in a crisis which preceded.  However, considering the limited number 
of observations available, such a model can hardly be labeled as accurate. 
In order to achieve desired results, number of observations should be enlarged either by 
enhancing the examined period or by expanding analyzed dataset by adding other enduring 
rivalries. Another minor events which influenced every conflict should also help to expand 
existing dataset. 
Take the Soviet Union for instance. When speculating about the true nature of 1983 NATO´s 
Able Archer exercise, Reagan´s administration´s behavior was carefully analyzed. US 
invasion of Grenada, SDI, Pershing II missiles deployment and rhetoric over Soviets downing 
of South Korean airliner in the Far East made Soviets think Americans are willing to initiate 
nuclear first strike. There might be plenty of influential events such these could help to 
expand the dataset in order to increase the number of observations leading to better statistical 
accuracy. 
The finding of just a weak relationship between deterrence failure caused by a lack of 
credibility and the likelihood of deterrence failure in the next crisis correlates with the 
qualitative dimension of the research. Countries learn from the previous interactions on the 
tactical military and political level, but just rarely take them into account when making 
decisions about their next strategic moves. Personal experience influence leaders decision-
making process, but its influence over country´s leaders is not infinite. Political leadership 
prefers to make decisions rather on actual variables (domestic position, military balance, 
current economic performance, military alliances) rather than on previous experience. 
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Nevertheless, this conclusion does not mean deterrence is completely independent variable. 
In addition, three key units of observation were examined with the respect to crises frequency: 
 Power Discrepancy 
 Challenger´s Head of State Term Length 
 Defender´s Head of State Term Length 
Power Discrepancy 
Cold War and Arab-Israeli Conflict show similar results. The number of crises increases with 
the relative power of the challenger.  
Indo-Pakistani Rivalry is different in this regard. Conflict frequency decreases with the 
challenger´s relative power vis-à-vis its adversary. 
Challenger´s Head of State Term Length 
Cold War and Arab-Israeli Conflict rivalry follow the same trend; conflict frequency 
increases with duration of challenger´s head of state in power. Thus, the shorter the 
challenger´s head of state is in power, the more likely it is challenge the status quo. In 
addition, the longer he is in power, the more likely it is that a new conflict will emerge 
The case of Indo-Pakistani rivalry follows the opposite pattern. Unlike in case of the Cold 
War and Arab-Israeli conflict, the trendline shows that the conflict frequency decreases with 
the relative strength of a challenger. 
Defender´s Head of State Term Length 
In case of Cold War and Arab-Israeli conflict, the crisis frequency decreases with duration of 
defender´s head of state in power. That implies the following: the shorter the defender´s head 
of state is in power, the more likely it is that the challenger will try to redefine the status quo. 
Indo-Pakistani rivalry shows a different picture. Based on regression analysis, there is almost 
no relationship between a head of state term length and crisis frequency. 
It is evident that countries – before every action- asses´ behavior of their adversaries when 
predicting their possible response and reactions to certain political or military actions. Based 
on the finding above, it might be concluded that deterrence failure caused by the lack of 
credibility matters for the future interactions, but it is limited by the number of years a 
particular head of state on both defender´s and challenger´s side has been in office.  
Both quantitative and qualitative dimension of the research prove that leadership changes 
have a crucial role when it comes to deterrence-credibility relationship calculus. The unit of 
analysis used in most available datasets – deterrence vis-à-vis particular country - should be 
reconsidered. There is no evidence that countries assess behavior of their adversaries during 
past crises when designing foreign policies. Doing so would be largely impractical; country´s 
politics usually change as do their head of states. Why to care about policy of a politician who 
is no longer in office? According to empirical data researched in this paper, deterrence 




It is reasonable. Why should one care about his adversary´s decisions decades ago? Old 
leaders are gone, the new ones have a different mindset which opens the window of 
opportunity for new political or military moves. 
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